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Baltic UN Envoys Present Statement on Kozyrev Remarks

WS2501165894 Tallinn BNS in English 1414 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 25, BNS—The permanent representatives of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the United Nations today handed over to the U.N. Secretary-General Butrus-Ghali a joint Baltic statement on the remarks made on Jan. 18 by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

The Russian minister, speaking to his country's ambassadors in Moscow, declared Russia's "vital interest" in the territory of the former Soviet Union and said Russia must not withdraw its troops from the former republics.

A letter sent with today's statement by the three Baltic countries requests that the statement be circulated as a U.N. official document under the "Complete Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from the Territories of the Baltic States" topic of the General Assembly's agenda, as well as in the U.N. Security Council, a representative at the Estonian Foreign Ministry said.

Arms Negotiator Cited on Geneva Disarmament Conference

LD2501130294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1251 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Konstantin Pribytkov]

[Text] Geneva January 25 TASS—Will nuclear weapons testing grounds be finally closed? The solution of this problem, on which politicians, military leaders and diplomats have been racking their brains for several past decades, may be brought closer by the annual session of the U.N. disarmament conference, which opened here today.

Having completed in 1992 the elaboration of a convention to ban chemical weapons, it is now getting down to the discussion of the problem of an all-embracing ban on nuclear tests. The session is being attended by delegations from 37 states-members of the conference, including Russia.

"The banning of tests is a very important measure, primarily from the viewpoint of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", Grigoriy Berdennikov, Russia's permanent representative, told ITAR-TASS. "It is not a matter of concluding a treaty among the nuclear powers alone, but a matter of complete and universal prohibition of tests in all the countries of the world. This will guarantee us against the emergence of a new possessor of nuclear weapons."

The Geneva session is particularly important in light of current preparations for a conference of signatories of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty, scheduled for 1995. This conference may adopt a decision to prolong the treaty forever.

"The idea of fully banning nuclear tests was advanced by Jawaharlal Nehru in 1954. We have traditionally backed this initiative," Berdennikov added. "The treaty to ban tests in three media was concluded in 1963. We have also signed a treaty with the Americans to restrict the yield of nuclear tests. We are observing a moratorium on tests for several years now. Everybody admits that it has created a good background for talks in Geneva."

"The main problem after the end of the 'Cold War' is to save the world from the 'spreading' of mass destruction weapons and means for their delivery," the Russian representative said. "It is very important to reach agreement on security guarantees to non-nuclear state and on stopping the output of fissionable materials. The current session of the conference will also focus its attention on these problems."

Ambassador Speaks at CE Ministers' Committee

WS2501104594 Tallinn Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Release in English 24 Jan 94

[Remarks by Ambassador Vaeino Reinart, head of the Division for International Organizations and Security Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Estonia, and head of Delegation for Negotiations with Russia, at the Council of Europe 506th meeting of the ministers' deputies called for an exchange of views on the United Nations; in Strasbourg on 20 January; received via Internet]

[Text] Madame Chair, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a great honour to address this distinguished audience today. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of the Council of Europe [CE] in safeguarding human rights and promoting co-operation among relevant organizations such as the United Nations and the CSCE. Because the purpose of our meeting today is to exchange views on the conclusions reached by the United Nations 48th General Assembly Third Committee, and because I represent the only Council of Europe member state to have gone before that committee recently, specifically with regard to human rights, I feel compelled to draw your attention to a few relevant points.

We consider the results of the 48th General Assembly to be of utmost importance both with regard to the human rights issue and for the further development of mechanisms intended to ensure compliance in this area. First, let me stress the importance of the newly-established office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, who will enjoy the status of a UN Undersecretary General, a post whose creation was adopted by consensus of the 184 UN member states. However useful this post will be, recent developments regarding the use of human rights mechanisms have demonstrated to us that there can never be enough mechanisms to provide each country with the findings it may need to explain its policies to the satisfaction of others.

I would add one caveat here, and that is that we do, indeed, face challenges in integrating our alien population into Estonian society. For instance, we have a scarcity of language teachers and instructional materials. However, I would stress that these difficulties of integration are organizational matters that bear no relation to human rights.

To confuse these practical matters with the very serious matter of human rights would be irresponsible.

My second point, regarding organizational politics, is no less significant. I have in mind a serious case of abuse of the existing UN human rights mechanisms which, unfortunately for all of us here, appears to have set a precedent. As we are all aware, despite a lack of findings by the Special Mission of the UN to Estonia and regardless of the positive report of the Secretary General in this matter, the UNGA [United Nations General Assembly] recently adopted a resolution on the situation of human rights in my country. I was pleased to read the Secretariat Memorandum, prepared by the Directorate of Human Rights and submitted to the distinguished participants of this meeting, which deals with the UNGA resolution. To refresh your memory, the Secretariat Memorandum stated that, and I quote, "the brevity and wording of the text may indicate that this question will no longer appear on the Assembly's agenda," end of quote.

I would be delighted to share the Secretariat's optimism in this matter. However, because the Memorandum only suggests that the resolution's wording "may indicate" a certain result, I am reluctant to do so.

Our delegation to the 48th UNGA did its best to negotiate an acceptable wording, and we found it curious that we received no support in our efforts. This leads me to the conclusion that the Council of Europe member states represented here today harbor doubts as to whether the reports of the UN and the Council of Europe missions to investigate the human rights situation in Estonia are, in fact, credible and objective documents.

As you know, in the end we accepted the UNGA resolution proposed by the delegation from the Russian Federation and we conceded to the language because we understand that, for domestic political reasons, Russia requires any such UN document to establish the basis for possible future accusations. At the same time, we know better than most that Russia's internal political situation will not, in the foreseeable future, become so stable that these unfounded accusations will stop. This is especially clear after President Boris Yeltsin's New Year's greeting to the Russian people, in which Mr. Yeltsin described the defense of the rights of Russians living outside the Russian Federation as being among his state's highest foreign policy priorities.

In addition, Yeltsin's remarks last week at the US-Russian summit, and Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's comments last Monday, strongly suggest that the tone of these accusations in the area of human rights is likely to become more, not less, strident, and that their frequency will increase. I am confident that you share our view that these accusations are purely political in nature. In light of these developments, I would ask you to consider whether we can allow for the usurpation of this vital tool, that is, human rights mechanisms, to indulge an individual state's political interests?

I would now turn to another problem, namely, the scarcity of financial and human resources in the human rights field. Estonia believes that the international community is in danger of squandering those possibilities open to us. For instance, a fact-finding mission of the UN that visited Estonia a year ago reported no evidence of discrimination on ethnic or religious grounds in Estonia. Unfortunately, however, the Resolution of the 48th Session of the UN General Assembly on the human rights situation in Latvia and Estonia did not address that report. Are we so wealthy that we can justify dispatching costly missions whose labours are not used? I think not.

My final point touches upon the reputation of the Council of Europe as a whole, about which my country is concerned. It seems to Estonia that the quiet acceptance by Council of Europe member states of these well-orchestrated and unfounded accusations against a fellow Council member-state by a non-Council member calls into question the credibility of the Council of Europe as a whole. I ask you, does this quiet acceptance not undermine the very authority of the Council of Europe to speak with one voice in matters of human rights?

I would remind you that in ten days' time, the UN Commission on Human Rights will meet in Geneva to discuss human rights issues. Because Estonia is not a member of that Commission, we are put in the difficult position of not being able to defend ourselves against the next round of accusations which are sure to be raised at the forum.

Dear colleagues, if you share Estonia's concern about the reputation of the Council of Europe, I appeal to those of you represented on the UN Commission on Human Rights to stand up against any resolutions based on unfounded accusations that may be tabled against Estonia at the Geneva meeting.

I would conclude by saying that Estonia fondly cherishes the hope that the human rights area will not suffer from an illness that all too frequently afflicted the social sciences during the Soviet period, namely, that if the facts do not verify the theory, then it is too bad for the facts.

I thank you for your attention.

Council of Europe Assembly Elects Estonian Vice President

LD2501155094 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 2000 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Excerpt] The first session of the 1994 sitting of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly opened today in Strasbourg. Miguel Martinez was reelected the assembly's president for the next year, and 14 vice presidents were also elected including, for the first time, a representative from the Baltic states, from Estonia—Tunne Kelam [deputy parliamentary speaker]. [passage omitted]

Program for Kozyrev PRC Visit Previewed

PM2601101794 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 94 p 3

[ITAR-TASS report: "Russian-Chinese Talks in Beijing"]

[Text] Beijing, 26 Jan—Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev arrives in Beijing Wednesday on a four-day official visit. This trip, which is regarded here as an important event in rapidly progressing Chinese-Russian relations, is being made in line with the accords reached during Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin's visit to the PRC in December 1992.

The head of Russia's foreign policy department will hold talks with his Chinese counterpartue Qian Qichen and will meet with Jiang Z emin, president of the PRC and general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and with Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council. One of the main topics to be discussed by the sides is the preparation of the second top-level Russian-Chinese meeting, this time in Moscow.

The sides will examine regional and international problems of interest to Russia and China as permanent members of the UN Security Council. It is believed here that the situation in Northeast Asia, where the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula is most acute, also will not be overlooked.

Key aspects of bilateral relations—trade-economic and military-technical cooperation and border questions—will be touched on during the talks between Andrey Kozyrev and Qian Qichen, which are being held within the framework of regular consultations between the two countries' Foreign Ministries.

The talks are expected to result in the signing of an intergovernmental agreement on crossing points on the Russian-Chinese border and also a protocol on consultations between the Russian Federation and PRC Foreign Ministries.

The Russian minister will address Chinese political experts at the Institute of People's Diplomacy in Beijing and will visit the Shenzhen special economic zone in the south of the country, which is an experimental base in implementing reform and a policy of openness. He will also visit the ancient capital of the Middle State—the city of Xian, the cradle of Chinese civilization.

Commentary Previews Foreign Minister's Visit to China

OW2501185094 Moscow Radio Moscow in Mandarin 1000 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Commentary by station observer Krichevskiy from the "Current Events and Commentary" program—read by announcer]

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev will pay an official visit to China from 26 to 29 January. Station observer Krichevskiy has the following commentary on this issue:

In addition to the length of his visit to this neighboring country, we also know the scope of the issues that the Russian foreign minister will discuss while visiting Beijing.

First of all, these issues are relevant to the preparations for the second Russian-Chinese summit. Because Yeltsin visited China before the winter of last year, it is now Jiang Zemin's turn to visit Russia. The Russian-Chinese summit will settle several issues relevant to strengthening the two countries' bilateral ties and their partnership in the international arena. Kozyrev's visit (?will be) conducive to this matter. He plans to discuss with Chinese leaders the possibilities of and prospects for developing economic cooperation and trade and scientific-technological cooperation, as well the border issue.

For example, the two sides will sign an accord on establishing border checkpoints [words indistinct] improve the situation along Russian-Chinese border. The establishment of checkpoints will also help prevent trouble from arising from the border trade carried out in areas between adjacent Russian oblasts and Chinese provinces. As far as economic ties and trade are concerned, (?both sides) have expressed their dissatisfaction with their current state. Nobody doubts that these ties will expand and will become more successful in the future, even though China's trade volume with Russia already puts it in second place in this category.

In the area of economic cooperation, there is an increasingly pressing need for Russia to study the experiences that China has gained in carrying out economic reform. We should know why China's economic development has been gathering speed—speed which reached approximately 13 percent last year—as a result of its reform, whereas in Russia the rapidity has been decreasing each year. The discussion of this question cannot be avoided during Kozyrev's visit. China's experiences in building special economic zones undoubtedly have been successful.

Incidentally, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev and his experts and advisers also have plan to visit the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, while their talks in the Chinese capital will deal with international issues.

Russia and China are the two biggest countries in the Asia- Pacific region. To a great extent, the relaxation of regional conflicts and [word indistinct] development in economic relations and trade in this region depend on Russia and China. Moreover, the deepening of the Russian-Chinese partnership in all fields, including the deepening of cooperation in military technology, is not directed at any third country in any way. In fact, the more solid that Russian-Chinese relations become, the more stable the situation in the Asia-Pacific region will be. On the contrary, if Russian-Chinese relations do deteriorate in any way, this deterioration will have unfavorable effects on the overall situation in the Asia-Pacific region.

More on Kozyrev Reply to Zhirinovskiy 'Ultimatum'

PM2501183394 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

[Maksim Yusin report: "Kozyrev Rejects Zhirinovskiy's Ultimatum. Conflict Building Up Between Foreign Ministry and Duma"]

[Text] Andrey Kozyrev has rejected Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's ultimatum and does not intend to take a pro-Serb stance in the Bosnian conflict. The minister made this statement in an interview with the INTERFAX agency a few minutes before his flight from Moscow to Bishkek. Last Friday [21 January] the leader of the liberal democrats threatened Kozyrev with dismissal unless he changed his policy on the Balkans within a week and put himself unconditionally on the Serbs' side.

According to Kozyrev, by making such demands, Zhirinovskiy is pushing Moscow toward a world war. "Certain political forces," the minister said, "are trying to drag Russia into a global catastrophe, and use this to their own advantage, to seize power.... If Zhirinovskiy or anyone else demands my resignation, I will perceive this as the best admission that my policy is correct."

A conflict between the Duma and the Foreign Ministry looks inevitable. More than likely, as early as next week—having completed his trips to Yugoslavia and Poland—Zhirinovskiy will put his threat into practice and demand a vote of no confidence in Kozyrev. The majority of factions in the Duma will scarcely be able to resist the temptation to settle scores with the minister, who has always been an object of hatred for the nationalists and Communists and, following Gaydar's departure, will probably become the main target of their criticism. The "anti-Kozyrev lobby" in the lower chamber of parliament is very influential, uniting representatives of the most diverse political forces—from the liberal democrats to Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the International Affairs Committee and until recently Russian ambassador in Washington, whose strained relations with his former boss are no secret to anyone.

Two-thirds of Duma members may vote no confidence in Kozyrev, which, admittedly, does not commit either the minister himself, or President Yeltsin, to anything. In the recent past, the Russian leader ignored the majority of foreign policy resolutions adopted by the Congress and the Supreme Soviet. Is Yeltsin likely to start heeding the opinion of the Duma which, under the new Constitution, has considerably less power than Khasbulatov's parliament?

Especially since, once they discard any liberal-democrat demagoguery, the deputies will hardly be able to clearly define the turnabout they expect from Russia's diplomacy. Since the middle of last year, the Foreign Ministry can hardly be blamed for any lack of pro-Serb sympathies: Russia was among the first to call for an easing of sanctions against Belgrade and, just like before, is against any strikes by NATO aviation against Bosnian Serb positions.

Even if we were to agree with the highly dubious thesis that our foreign policy's priority must be to uphold Serb interests, it must be admitted that Kozyrev has not given all that many causes for criticism in the recent past. Provided, of course, that one does not take the positions of Zhirinovskiy who is calling for Russian divisions to be sent to the Balkans and is prepared to confront the entire world for the sake of the "Serbian brothers."

Russia, Japan Agree on Dates for Peace Treaty Talks

LD2501143094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1359 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Kutakhov]

[Text] Tokyo January 25 TASS—Russia and Japan have reached agreement on the concrete dates for holding meetings of the working team, charged with the preparation of a peace treaty between the two states, and consultations at the level of deputy foreign ministers.

ITAR-TASS has learned from sources within the Japanese Foreign Ministry here today that the meetings will take place in Moscow from February 21-23. The Russian delegation will be led by Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Panov, and the Japanese—by his counterpart Hiroshi Fukuda.

The bilateral working team, charged with the elaboration of a peace treaty, which is also discussing the South Kurils territorial issue, is to meet for the first time after President Yeltsin's visit to Tokyo last October.

Foreign Ministry 'Concerned' Over Japanese Violations

LD2501151194 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1350 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondents Boris Krivoshey and Aleksandr Krylovich]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—The Russian side is concerned about the mass violations by Japanese fishing vessels of Russian territorial waters near the island of Kunashir which could complicate relations between Russia and Japan, Mikhail Demurin, the deputy director of the Press and Information Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, said at a briefing today.

He said that on 21 January over 50 Japanese boats demonstratively entered Russian territorial waters and remained there for over five hours against the demands of border guards that they leave. The next day 30 Japanese boats again violated Russian waters.

The Russian foreign policy department spokesman said that the Russian Foreign Ministry made a representation regarding this to the Japanese embassy in Moscow. It voiced deep concern over the violations and demanded that the Japanese side take effective measures to prevent them.

"Our concern is all the more serious because the violations are taking place on the eve of bilateral consultations at deputy foreign minister level and also on the eve of the sitting of the peace treaty working group," Mikhail Demurin stressed.

Grachev, Belgian Defense Minister Discuss Cooperation

LD2501140894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1313 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—Russian Defense Minister General Pavel Grachev today met with Belgian Defense Minister Leo Delcroix, who has arrived in Moscow on a two-day working visit.

The Press and Information Directorate of Russia's military department told the ITAR-TASS correspondent that the prospects of bilateral cooperation were discussed during the meeting. The participation by battalions of both countries in the peacekeeping mission in the former Yugoslavia is given here as an example of the fruitful development of Russian-Belgian relations.

Russian-Mongolian Trade Protocol Signed

LD2601112394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0416 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Kim Boldokhonov]

[Text] Ulaanbaatar, 26 Jan—A protocol on trade and economic cooperation between Mongolia and Russia for 1994 was initialed here today. As last year, Russia remains Mongolia's principal trading partner. Areas of cooperation include Mongolia's leading industries—mining, power engineering, geology, agriculture, and transport. Both sides expressed their intention to increase two-way trade, which was worth about $400 million last year.

Mongolia will significantly increase deliveries of copper concentrate, currently its main export commodity. The Russian side will also receive fluorspar and articles made from leather and fur. Exports of meat will resume after having been interrupted for a while.

Mongolia will import a greater range of goods from Russia. Russia will supply Mongolia with all its requirements for petroleum products. Imports of agricultural machinery and vehicle spares will actually resume. Cooperation in health care and medicine is also resuming.

Agreements on the establishment of joint ventures in mining, oil exploration and extraction, and construction work on projects built in Mongolia with technical and economic help from the former Soviet Union also testify to stabilization and progress in the development of bilateral cooperation. Amongst other things, the Russian side will help to modernize the capital's heat and power plant No. 3 and a junction on the Trans-Mongolian railway.

Another new feature of the current stage of Mongolian-Russian cooperation is the fact that neighboring regions of Russia—Buryatia, Irkutsk, and Chita oblasts, Tuva, Krasnoyarsk Kray and others—are being actively brought into it.

Another noteworthy aspect of the equitable and mutually advantageous cooperation between the two neighbouring states is noticeably greater involvement of commercial organizations in foreign trade. Their share accounts for roughly 40 percent of total trade.

The sides agreed that this year Mongolia would continue repaying its current debt to Russia.

Political Issues

Fedorov Turns Down Finance Minister Post

LD2601091294 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0852 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Gennadiy Talalayev]

[Text] Moscow, 26 January—Boris Fedorov is leaving the post of finance minister.

His press secretary Olga Leonova told ITAR-TASS that at a meeting with Russian President Boris Yeltsin this morning, Boris Fedorov rejected the proposal to take the post of finance minister in the reformed government on the conditions offered to him.

At the same time, according to the press secretary, conditions put forward by Boris Fedorov were not accepted.

ITAR-TASS has learned that Boris Fedorov is preparing a statement for the press.

Yeltsin Accepts Resignation

LD2601092294 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 0900 GMT 26 Jan 94

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] This morning's meeting between President Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and Boris Fedorov in the Kremlin, which took less than a half hour, did not have a positive outcome. As you know, Fedorov refused to join the reorganized government on 20 January, saying he would only stay on as Finance Minister if Vice Premier Zaveryukha and the head of the Central Bank, Viktor Gerashchenko, left the Cabinet of Ministers. Boris Fedorov declined the invitation to stay on as Minister of Finance in the reorganized government, justifying his refusal on the grounds that Boris Yeltsin's offer to him was made without regard for the conditions which Fedorov put forward.

Boris Yeltsin has accepted Boris Fedorov's resignation.

Fedorov Warns Yeltsin of 'Economic Coup'

LD2601115894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1145 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—Russian Finance Minister Boris Fedorov who resigned on Wednesday [26 January] warned President Boris Yeltsin that the new government is staging an "economic coup" and is implementing what the disbanded Supreme Soviet cherished to fulfil.

"An economic coup is taking place in the country", Fedorov said in a statement on Wednesday.

"Boris Nikolayevich, we pin all our hopes on you. The question is not in Fedorov, the question concerns the fate of the country which is being determined in these days, in these hours. I hope that nobody has illusions that economy can be separated from politics", Fedorov said addressing the president.

The new government is now dominated by "red industrialists" who doom the country to an inevitable collapse and the people to decreasing living standards, Fedorov warned.

"All this contradicts many official government documents for which I voted and for which a fought with former Supreme Soviet the dreams of which are now being implemented. All this contradicts the course of the president confirmed only several days ago", Fedorov said.

Fedorov denied claims that his resignation was prompted by personal ambitions and dislike of Central bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko and deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Zaveryukha.

"My position has nothing in common with personal reasons", he said and explained that he resigned because "it is inadmissible that people who had inflicted colossal economic and political damage to the state, who are resolute and open opponents of the course of reforms, keep their positions in the government".

"I cannot agree with the turn in the policy which has been publicly formulated by the prime minister of late and which is being implemented", he added.

This policy consists, according to Fedorov, in backtracking from anti-inflation work, in increasing money printing and in the fact that the government is dominated by "a lifeless and incompetent ideology".

Fedorov said that the government is now raising the inflation rate planned for the end of 1994 to 8-9 per cent compared to the earlier target of 3-5 per cent. "This means that instead of the annual inflation rate of 80 per cent we are being offered at least 300 per cent. The gap is too big. Moreover, it will be several times bigger in reality", Fedorov warned.

"The Ukranization has crossed the Russian border", Fedorov said, referring to the deep economic crisis and skyrocketing inflation in Ukraine.

There is no alternative to the policy of reform and "we shall soon see that in reality", he added. Sidetracking from the course of financial stabilisation will boost inflation, decrease real incomes of the population, collapse the exchange rate of the rouble to 10,000 at the end of the year, devaluate savings, restore shortages of goods, trigger exodus of capital to the West, isolate Russia from world markets, according to Fedorov.

"At the same time there will be no rise in production, no investments, no solution of unemployment problem.

This is a way to a deadend at the expense of the people", Fedorov said predicting that the threat of a social upheaval becomes a reality.

However, it is not yet late to stop backtracking from reforms, Fedorov said and urged the president to do that.

Fedorov Scorns 'Nonmonetarist' Policy

MK2501120094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Finance Minister Boris Fedorov by Yana Yurova: "Boris Fedorov: 'It Is More Logical To Return the Union Government'"; place and date not given]

[Text] Today, when all the i's seem to have been dotted and the government crisis has spun off into a new spiral, Boris Fedorov has again been invited to take the post of finance minister. Literally on the eve of this, MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS' correspondent has interviewed Boris Fedorov.

[Yurova] Boris Grigoryevich, you have sent a letter with proposals to the president. Has there been a response?

[Fedorov] There has been neither written nor oral response. Apparently he has left this fully to Chernomyrdin.

[Yurova] You presented the same proposals at a meeting with Chernomyrdin. What, in your opinion, did not suit him about your option?

[Fedorov] Zaveryukha and Gerashchenko have proved to be so close to him that he could not agree to their resignation.

[Yurova] Who, in your opinion, will now take the post of finance minister and who would you prefer to see in this chair?

[Fedorov] They say that the post of minister will be taken by Shcherbakov, Pavlov's former deputy. I do not understand why Pavlov himself could not be appointed in this situation. Generally, it would be more logical to bring back the union government. And also replace Gaydar with Abalkin. As for who I would like to see in this chair, I will never say, because otherwise nothing will ever be offered to this person.

[Yurova] Some news media report that you have already visited the U.S. ambassador, allegedly asking him to find you a place in some international organization?

[Fedorov] Absolute nonsense! Our country has apparently brought forth the largest number of provocateurs in the world and is still using their services. Meanwhile this fabrication continues to be aired.

I am a deputy of the Duma. I will now work there, think, and watch the economic situation and study it.

[Yurova] For a long time our parliament has been playing a reactionary role while the government has acted as a counterbalance to it, as it were. Now that a substantial number of reformers are in the Duma, will it be able to play a more progressive role?

[Fedorov] The correlation of forces in the Duma is such that reformers are far from being in the lead. I think that one should not expect any great results from the Duma in terms of its influence on economic policy. I hope that it will not try, like the former Supreme Soviet, to supersede the government. The Duma's duty is to stop violations of the law. But in current politics the government should have enough independence or otherwise it will be impossible to call it to account, as was the case in 1993 when the government was constantly blaming the Supreme Soviet: It has been standing in our way and therefore we have failed to do this and that. A very convenient cover. Let the government have all the power, and with it responsibility.

[Yurova] Do you think the leaders of various factions in the Duma will be able to collaborate fruitfully on economic matters?

[Fedorov] Some concrete decisions will apparently be made without any particular problem. I doubt, however, that all the leaders are well disposed toward collaboration. Clearly, the communists will always have a position different from the others. It will hardly be possible to work out a single ideology on economic policy.

[Yurova] What is your prediction for the rate of inflation and the rate of the dollar in the new conditions?

[Fedorov] In the next few months nothing is threatening us because all the foundations were laid back in November. According to my estimates, recession will begin in April to May. Inflation will grow to 30 percent a month. Recently Chernomyrdin promised that in the first half of the year inflation will be at 15 to 18 percent. I use this opportunity to bet that these figures will be at least twice as high. Everyone must be responsible for his words. I bet $100.

Naturally, the dollar rate will be growing. When the Central Bank exhausts its resources, it will stop dumping hard currency on the market. According to our forecasts, if the proposed policy continues, by January 1995 the dollar will be worth between 10,000 and 12,000 rubles. It will be very easy to make calculations: one dollar—one 10,000-ruble bill.

[Yurova] But perhaps there is some slight chance of prosperity lying in store for our industry: After all, the new government is going to hand out credits to industrialists.

[Fedorov] Even my opponents from the Economy Ministry, when they were questioned by the premier whether production would grow if finances are relaxed, responded in the negative.

[Yurova] In your conversation with Chernomyrdin, did the premier make any arguments in favor of the new course?

[Fedorov] Chernomyrdin is not an economist and it is difficult for him to make any arguments. Apparently he will be fighting with the "sluggish-fluctuating character of inflation." I do not know that this means; nor do I understand the meaning of "nonmonetarist methods of action." For a normal industrial policy it is necessary to have willpower. After all, enterprises will have to be closed, the production structure changed, and people moved across the country. Why has this not been done up till now? I was not responsible for industrial policy. The same people will be in charge of it. Why should anything change then?

[Yurova] Policy in this country changes just like the weather, and therefore it is quite likely that in a couple of months it will again confront you. What would you say if you were again—for the third time—invited into the government?

[Fedorov] I am always ready. This country is ours and it must be helped. The main result of 1993 for me is that whereas in the past we knew the economy better in theory, now we have seen it in practice.

The market economy has been built in the country. And it must be regulated by market relations. But it is not clear how the old Soviet levers can be applied to it again. Now let the "red" economic managers try to regulate it with their "nonmonetarist methods." Then we shall see how it will work out. I am not sneering. Quite the contrary, I am upset that our country again has to face the consequences of other people's mistakes.

P.S. Boris Fedorov's press secretary has clarified for MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS that the offer to occupy the post of finance minister has been made on the same terms. Fedorov still sticks to his guns. The question has been left open and most likely it will be decided in the president's office.

Gerashchenko's Triumph Over Fedorov Viewed

PM2501152594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Bekker article: "Viktor Gerashchenko's Creative Plans"]

[Text] Boris Fedorov, who for a bet showed just how stable the ruble was against the dollar this summer, proposed a new wager the other day—the rate would fall to 2,000 a week after his resignation. Viktor Gerashchenko picked up the gauntlet and stated that the panic on the foreign exchanges had died down—"it was even necessary to buy the currency so as to prevent a sharp fall in the dollar."

Throughout the year the chief financier and the chief banker publicly exchanged caustic remarks or political invective until the former put the question quite bluntly: It's either me or Gerashchenko. The chairman did not leave the Central Bank, noting that he might be prepared to quit if Mr. Fedorov were to propose to the government something more valuable than he himself [Gerashchenko] was proposing. These poignant details of the clash between these two high officials would, in different circumstances, be a suitable subject for a gossip column, but behind their war of words is a fundamental question—which course of reform will Russia choose?

Until virtually the middle of last year the conflict between the Central Bank and the Finance Ministry was open and, so to speak, across the board—in monetary, credit, budgetary, and currency policy, and on the problems of the ruble zone. January's slide by the ruble on the foreign exchanges was an indicator of the market's attitude to the merest hint of a deviation from the principles of strengthening the ruble. It was amazing to hear Viktor Gerashchenko's interpretation to the effect that the rate slumped because it had formerly been supported artificially. First, this was ruled out by the May agreement between the Central Bank and the government "not to intervene on the foreign exchange market." Second, the Central Bank had repeatedly stated on previous occasions that it merely smooths out fluctuations in the rate. And if throughout the entire past year 4 billion dollars passed through the market, was enough to ensure a smooth fall in the ruble, and has suddenly been termed artificial support, why was it necessary to throw $1 billion into the Moscow International Foreign Currency Exchange in the space of three weeks in January?

Yet it is hard to get away from the impression that the Central Bank chairman is beginning the decisive round in the big-time political game called "change of course." Last May he formally abandoned his protracted confrontation first with Gaydar and then Fedorov and, as stated above, accepted the government's conditions. It was as if he were saying "if you want to pursue a tough monetarist policy I wash my hands of it, let's see what comes of it." Today not a thing can be said against Gerashchenko. Even the IMF, where he has long been out of favor, has no complaints about him—the refinancing rate has been raised to a market level, loans are issued only through the budget, mutual offsetting of debts is not being allowed, circulating capital has not been indexed, and lending ceilings have not been breached.

Outwardly it is hard to find fault with the Central Bank. But the Central Bank can point the finger at the monetarists in the government—the production slump has deepened, investment is falling, inflation is high, and the budget is in a bad way. "The Finance Ministry is bankrupt," Gerashchenko stated on television. He is also talking of a link between 12 December and "market romanticism," and proposing that policy be amended. It is a more than successful situation for him. Fedorov has been removed from the government, and this means that it will be easy to bury the Finance Ministry's ideas. Ideas such as securitizing enterprises' debts. It will finally be possible to restore soft loans and import subsidies. It will not be difficult to force exporters to sell 100 percent of their hard currency—and not to just anyone, but to the

Central Bank, which has an automated control system. Fedorov has gone, and so, probably, has the Finance Ministry's intention to independently sell hard currency in the marketplace through a pool of banks, reducing the dollar rate.

Gerashchenko can now play safely. Our reserves may keep the ruble afloat for a bit. "But what then?" a television reporter asked. "We will try to find other means," the Central Bank chairman replied. He is a civilized banker and refrained from using the word "administrative" in this context. But Mr. Gerashchenko is implying a fixed ruble rate, the idea of which was ratified last May by the abolished Supreme Soviet. I think it will be no great problem to get Viktor Chernomyrdin to do the same thing now.

Gerashchenko's exceptional skill is his ability, acting on the "quiet," to move things to a point where the only decision can be a strong-arm one—in other words, a political decision. This was the case after the bank note exchange in July, when there was a high-level flurry over the fact that Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were joining the ruble zone. Then everything collapsed at the last minute—the Finance Ministry managed to show that a ruble union would be premature. But in December-January the Central Bank, sensing the support of Viktor Chernomyrdin, acted even more vigorously, expediting the unification of the Russian and Belarusian monetary systems. Boris Fedorov calls the agreement on the procedure for this unification signed by Viktor Gerashchenko and Stanislav Bogdankevich, chairman of the National Bank of Belarus, "provocation on a large scale."

The Central Bank chairman's influence over the head of the government is now obvious to all. Gerashchenko is a special kind of polyglot. He talks to the [illegible] in his own language, he is subtle and witty with journalists, and speaks English and is very official with IMF experts. But Gerashchenko's main political talent, his strength, and the source of his unsinkability is his unerring ability to second-guess the secret wishes of the country's top leaders. Sensing Boris Yeltsin's "Belovezhskaya complex," he worked on the ruble zone agreements, cutting through Rutskoy's pathological hatred for Gaydar, and presented a balance of payments for Russia with a corresponding assessment of the level of capital flight abroad. Gerashchenko, latching onto the premier's unquenchable love for centralized administration, responded with proposals to organize interstate transactions among the CIS countries under the auspices of the Central Bank of Russia.

Gerashchenko is indeed convinced that infusions of money and the restoration of old economic ties will revive production and ease the transition to the market by using methods of state regulation. An "easy transition" and "state regulation" are exceptionally important to him on a personal level too. Gerashchenko already has his eye on the post of chairman of the CIS countries' interstate bank. If Russia's monetary system is united with Belarus and Tajikistan to begin with, and if the "offense" felt by Messrs. Nazarbayev and Karimov is assuaged, then he—Viktor Vladimirovich Gerashchenko—would once again be head of virtually the USSR State Bank. And if that post is ratified by the parliaments of five or seven countries, then no Russian reformers would be able to budge this chief. It would be like the lifetime appointment of a U.S. Supreme Court justice.

Correction to Yeltsin To Decide on Fedorov Resignation

LD2401191994

Moscow INTERFAX in English at 1723 GMT on 24 January transmits a service message correcting the item subheaded "Yeltsin To Decide on Resignation" published in the Russia National Affairs section of the 24 January Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT on page 19:

page 19, column two, first paragraph, last sentence make read: He said he had not accepted Fedorov's resignation-...(adding dropped word "not")

Soskovets Rules Out 'Radical Government Reform'

LD2501195094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1633 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] No radical government reform is planned, First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets said in a statement in Moscow on Tuesday following "huge media interest" in the subject. He said any government reshuffle was a routine process which should not been seen as a change in the reform policy.

Soskovets said the functions of his commission for routine economic management were widened. It will now monitor the rational use of raw materials, transport safety and prices and tariffs for electricity, fuel, oil products and railway freight.

The commission is also responsible for issuing export quotas for vital raw materials and products.

Yakovlev Describes Role as Yeltsin Representative

PM2501165994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 94 First Edition p 3

[Report by Valeriy Vyzhutovich: "Aleksandr Yakovlev—President's Representative in the Federal Assembly"]

[Text] On 24 January the well-known lawyer Aleksandr Yakovlev was appointed the Russian president's official representative in the Federal Assembly. The appointment came some days after Yakovlev had been telephoned by Sergey Filatov, head of the president's administration, who had offered him the post, saying that the offer had come from Boris Yeltsin personally.

Asked by IZVESTIYA what his official duties would be and what was behind the establishment of the post, Aleksandr Yakovlev made the following comment:

"It is not a new post. It was filled in the Russian Supreme Soviet by Anatoliy Sliva, deputy chief of the State Law Administration. The functions of the president's representative in the Federal Assembly stem from the constitutional rights and duties of the head of state in relation to the legislative body. As is known, the president is entitled to initiate legislation. Moreover, according to article 83, he will submit for approval by the Federal Assembly candidates for the following posts—government chairman, chairman of the Central Bank, judges of the Constitutional, Supreme, and Supreme Arbitration Courts, and also general prosecutor. The president needs a skilled lawyer to successfully perform the aforementioned functions.

[IZVESTIYA] Does this mean that this is the president's way of avoiding constant contacts with legislators?

[Yakovlev] Of course not. Depending on the importance of the question under consideration, the president will address the deputies of both parliaments. For example, he will soon be delivering a message to parliament. My role is to help with legal advice and consultations, ensure feedback betweenm the head of state and the Federal Assembly, and break down information barriers. And, if need be, put the lid on any conflicts that might be brewing.

[IZVESTIYA] How often do you intend to visit the Duma and the Federation Council?

[Yakovlev] I will have to go there regularly. At any rate, whenever presidential draft laws are being examined.

Aleksandr Yakovlev is a doctor of juridical sciences. Since 1975 he has headed the criminal law and criminology sector at the Institute of State and Law, where he will continue to work on half pay. Yakovlev links the inivtation to join the president's team to his recent conspicuous participation in the work of the Constitutional Conference as one of the coordinators of the group of representatives of the federal organs of authority.

The post of representative of the head of state in the Federal Assembly is an addition to the structure of the president's administration. Aleksandr Yakovlev and his apparatus, comprising several lawyers, will be located in Staraya Ploshchad.

Volkogonov To Continue To Advise Yeltsin on Security

LD2501152994 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1410 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Veronika Romanenkova]

[Excerpt] Moscow, 25 Jan (ITAR-TASS)—Dmitriy Volkogonov, who yesterday was relieved by presidential decree of the duties of defense and security advisor to the Russian president, proposes to continue to carry out his previous functions but on a "freelance" and unsalaried basis. As a deputy of the State Duma, he may not simultaneously be in state service, Colonel-General Volkogonov told the ITAR-TASS correspondent today.

"In consultation with Boris Yeltsin and Yegor Gaydar, we decided that I should stay in the Duma, because the "Russia's Choice" group I belong to is relatively small," Dmitriy Volkogonov said. In addition, he will continue work in the three presidential commissions researching into cases of missing foreign citizens and of Russian Federation citizens who disappeared in unexplained circumstances outside the former USSR, and into the use of and declassification of the presidential archive. [passage omitted]

Shakhray on Perceived Diminished Status in Cabinet

MK2501125094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Yuliya Khaytina report: "Gaydar, Pamfilova, Fedorov... Shakhray? Sergey Shakhray: 'I Could Not Care Less About My Own Status'"]

[Text] Sergey Shakhray, former vice premier, is now deep in thought on the issue of retaining the post of nationalities and regional policy minister in the new Cabinet. Shakhray's doubts have been brought about by a rather dubious status assigned to him in the Cabinet. Instead of "the man in charge" of regional policy, which has been Sergey Mikhaylovich's duty in the past several years, now he thinks of himself as a "front," just like Gaydar and Fedorov who have already left the government. Questions of regional and nationalities policy are now simultaneously in the "supreme jurisdiction" of two vice premiers—Yarov and Zaveryukha.

Shakhray's efforts spent over the two past years in seeking to settle relations with Tatarstan now appear to be simply undone. At present, problems related to the future treaty between Russia and Tatarstan are being discussed in other offices while the minister himself learns about them from press reports. "Only after I stated this to INTERFAX did they phone and invite me to study the draft treaty," Sergey Shakhray said in an interview with MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS.

The situation that has developed over Chechnya is even more unpleasant. No one is paying attention to Shakhray's directive not to treat representatives of the Chechen government as leaders of an independent republic. Chechnya Vice Premier M. Mugadayev visits Viktor Chernomyrdin in a perfectly official capacity. "Now the regional leaders, especially from Chechnya, do not wish to talk to me. They know there is no way of fooling me," Sergey Mikhaylovich comments.

Phone conferences with the regional leaders are now held behind the minister's back.

"I could not care less about my personal status," Shakhray says. "But this year the fall of the ruble is threatening the collapse of Russia's state integrity. This is evident to all. It is sad to see which conflicts are brewing and know what needs to be done to 'remove' them but have no real power to do so."

According to Shakhray himself, he has 10 more days to think. During this time decisions on the makeup of the Council of Ministers Presidium and on the distribution of duties in the government are to be promulgated. "Then it will become clear what the composition of the executive branch will be like, and I will make the final decision," Shakhray says.

Chernomyrdin Making 'Clear Challenge' to Yeltsin

PM2501170794 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Vasiliy Kononenko report: "Fedorov May Return, Gerashchenko May Go"]

[Text] The meeting between former Finance Minister B. Fedorov and Russian President B. Yeltsin, originally planned for Monday and then postponed until Tuesday 25 January, failed to take place again. According to information from the president's administration, B. Yeltsin will nevertheless receive B. Fedorov, most probably after returning from St. Petersburg, and we will at last find out how the government crisis connected with the protracted formation of the new Cabinet of Ministers is going to be resolved.

As already reported, on 24 January V. Chernomyrdin went to the Kremlin and, as competent sources assert, the discussion focused not only on budget matters but also on cadre affairs. First and foremost they discussed the vacancy in the post of finance minister, a key office in the current situation. As a result of this conversation the prime minister's list of two nominees remained on the president's desk—they are B. Fedorov and V. Shcherbakov, who is a former vice premier in V. Pavlov's cabinet.

Before flying out to Orel, V. Chernomyrdin hinted to journalists that the choice must be made by the president himself. But he has already made his own choice: Either B. Fedorov, who is perceived as an indicator of the reformist mood of Russia's top leadership, is to be rejected or he is to be restored to his post. The premier has chosen the latter option, and there were significant reasons for that. Paradoxical though it may seem, they are connected with the role of the fourth estate in our society, which rose up solidly against the government apparatus' games designed to get rid of the reformers. According to some reports, during the conversation with the president he agreed to B. Fedorov's appointment as finance minister directly subordinate to the premier. Why was this?

Recently economists have been predicting increasingly vociferously that Russia is approaching the point of economic collapse. In the words of V. Krivov, leader of the group of experts under the Russian Federation president, the main factor which could lead to a further, sharp decline in production, a fall in standards, and an end to food imports is the rapid rise in the cost of oil extraction, with the result that the export of oil and likewise of coal and timber will become unprofitable. V. Chernomyrdin was bound to know about this prospect, and thus he hesitated and did not want to shoulder the full responsibility himself.

At the same time he has not abandoned the idea of an "independent" premier. The ostentatious "friendship" with V. Gerashchenko, chairman of the Central Bank of Russia, whose days in that post are numbered according to what is being said in the Kremlin, may be considered indicative in this respect. V. Chernomyrdin's gesture of inviting V. Gerashchenko to go to Orel is being perceived there as a clear challenge to the president.

Gaydar on Economy, Russia's Choice, Yeltsin

MK2601110094 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 26 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Yegor Gaydar, leader of Russia's Choice, by Mikhail Gurevich: "Yegor Gaydar: 'The Period of Reform From Above Has Ended'"—place and date not given]

[Text] [Gurevich] At present we have a new political landscape. A president who is ever more trying to play the role of supreme arbiter, "the father of the nation." A government in which the "practicalists" [praktiki] have effectively overpowered the "marketeers." A parliament that is still divided into several parts: the even firmer democrats and the even more rabid "reds and browns." What next?

[Gaydar] It is easier for me to talk about the main, pivotal line in economic policy, which will be taking shape in the next few months, not about the movement of figures. I do not believe very much in the apocalyptic forecasts predicting an immediate economic catastrophe resulting from the new government's actions. I still believe it will have enough common sense not to do what sectoral lobbyists demand. It seems to me more likely that the government, under pressure from conflicting interests, will pursue a policy of half-measures, half-steps, first stepping up the inflationary process, then putting the brakes on somewhat. Inflation will be fairly high—20 to 25 percent a month—and people, realizing the essence of inflationary taxation, will start adapting themselves to the conditions of inflation, while the process of declining actual money supply will naturally continue.

[Gurevich] That is to say, instead of an ineluctable, speedy catastrophe you forecast a prolonged agony that may just as well result in a catastrophe, which this time may break out by the next presidential elections.

[Gaydar] This development of events may, of course, assuredly paralyze Russia's chances of economic growth. If someone in fact sincerely believes in the existence of nonmonetary methods of combating inflation...

If there is readiness to exchange the well-being of one's own citizens for an expansion of the sphere of Russia's imperial influence, one may get mixed up in ill-conceived currency unions—why not? But I am certain that only an economically stable Russia with a strong currency could be a point of attraction for its neighbors.

[Gurevich] I have also heard another version of your resignation: It was a combination thought out together with the president and designed to bring down Chernomyrdin in the end.

[Gaydar] It's like Tolstoy wrote [in "War and Peace"]: the first column is marching, the second column is marching...

[Gurevich] Do you plan to focus on working at the State Duma now?

[Gaydar] I am a leader of the "Russia's Choice" parliamentary faction, and I will use this position to defend policies of which I am confident. Presently the actual leverage of authority is, of course, held by the government. A compromise situation where both lines of economic development coexisted within one government is a thing of the past. Society will be fully able to assess the results of its work.

[Gurevich] The trial-and-error method in this situation is a cruel experiment.

[Gaydar] The reason I resigned was precisely because certainty in terms of responsibility is also an insurance. The period of reform from above in Russia has ended; further movement will be determined by the initiative and pressure from the bottom up.

[Gurevich] Back to the State Duma: Some people are leaving your faction.

[Gaydar] I think this is natural. The situation has changed; a faction that was seen by many people as a government faction is no longer such, the political landscape has changed. I do not see any tragedy in the fact that some people have decided that working in other groups would be more advisable. An overwhelming majority of the faction members, however, are unanimous in their commitment to the program principles of "Russia's Choice."

[Gurevich] Rumors have been circulating about Gennadiy Burbulis' leaving your faction; he is still a prominent figure...

[Gaydar] Gennadiy Eduardovich has not said anything about his intention to go over to another faction.

[Gurevich] Is the president still accessible to you and people who share your views? For it turned out that he did not even know that he was scheduled to meet with Fedorov on Monday.

[Gaydar] I know that the president wants reform to continue, that he takes it close to heart. In many instances he supported us in resolving very difficult and contentious questions. The president works within the limits of reality, though—he is not a tsar, not our Lord, not even a general secretary. He should heed the balance of forces in society, think about stability.

Yeltsin Drops Plans for New Parliament Center

PM2501155494 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 26 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Yeltsin Suspends Planning of New Parliamentary Center in Moscow"]

[Text] INTERFAX has learned from informed sources in the Kremlin that Russian President Boris Yeltsin has issued a directive suspending the elaboration of plans for the construction of a new parliamentary center in Moscow. Some $500 million had been allocated for its construction.

Former First Vice Premier Yegor Gaydar, leader of the "Russia's Choice" bloc, had objected strongly to the plan to construct the new parliamentary center and the allocation of $500 million, describing the decision as one reason why he refused to join the reorganized government.

Deputy Health Ministers Resign

LD2601091994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0844 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—"Two Russian deputy ministers of public health and medical industry, who tendered their resignation, said they had taken this step out of their own free will. Nothing is said in their applications that they are resigning because they do not agree with the policy pursued by heads of the ministry," Public Health Minister Eduard Nechayev told ITAR-TASS, commenting on the resignation of First Deputy Minister Aleksey Moskvichev and Deputy Minister Vladimir Starodubov.

New candidates to the posts have already been found, a ministry spokesman told ITAR-TASS. They are doctors of medicine and, in the opinion of senior officials, they are skilled professionals. According to the same source, the two resigning deputy ministers will quickly find employment for themselves. Starodubov will probably continue to work at the medical institute. He combined that job with working as deputy minister.

Shaposhnikov Appointed Representative to Company

LD2601113094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1031 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today signed a decree appointing Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov as presidential representative in the "Rosvooruzhenie" state company for exporting and importing weapons and military hardware, the presidential press service reported today.

Rumors of Chief Prosecutor's Transfer Denied

LD2501160094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1431 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] The leader of the public relations center of the office of Russia's prosecutor general, Aleksandr Zvyagintsev, said that the rumors circulated lately by some news media to the effect that the Prosecutor General, Aleksey Kazannik, is to be transferred to the Constitutional Court, are "absolutely unfounded." According to him, Kazannik is engaged in routine work; he holds conferences on pressing problems every day; under his initiative his office is working on ways to improve its performance. The plans of Russia's prosecutor general "extend far into the future," Zvyagintsev stressed in an interview with INTERFAX.

According to news media allegations, the man who is likely to replace Kazannik is Aleksey Ilyushenko, chief of the control department in the office of Russia's president. Members of his department have said that "these reports are nothing but unconfirmed rumors." Ilyushenko himself is currently on vacation.

Yazov Says Coup Attempt 'Unconstitutional'

LD2501185894 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1640 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Igor Belskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—Former Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov, one of the 1991 August failed coup leaders, now tried for high treason admitted on Tuesday that the coup attempt was unconstitutional.

Yazov also admitted the unconstitutionality of the measures taken against Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev who was removed from power and isolated at his Black Sea dacha. However, he stressed once again that these measures were necessary and aimed at preventing the Soviet Union from disintegration which, as he believes, would have been inevitable if a federal treaty had been signed by six instead of 15 republics.

He said the reasons for declaring a state of emergency in the former Soviet Union were extraordinary and much stronger than was envisaged by the Law on the State of Emergency.

The former defence minister regretted that the number of troops brought into the city on August 19, 1991 to help police ensure the state of emergency was too small. At the same time he added that no combat orders had been issued to the troops.

Yazov stressed that he personally ordered the troops on high alert, but denied he had ordered Soviet air forces on full combat readiness. He noted that all orders to the troops had been sent by the command of the airborne troops, who, apparently, have overstepped their powers.

The court ruled that all materials of investigation obtained from Yazov in absence of his lawyer shall be excluded from court hearings.

Yeltsin Aide Opposes Election of Local Heads

MK2501150594 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 2

[Unattributed report: "'Elections of Local Administration Heads Undesirable at This Stage'"]

[Text] Nikolay Medvedev, chief of the Russian Federation president's administration for work with the territories, said that during a transition period of two years it is essential to ensure the stability, unity, and governability of the executive authority system both in the center and in the field. Given this, he expressed his opinion that holding elections of local administration chiefs would be "undesirable," because it is on the local chiefs that "Russia's stability and the stability of the very system of state authority" will depend.

Gaydar Grants Interview 24 Jan

LD2501231294

[Editorial Report] Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian at 1337 GMT on 25 January, in its "At First Hand" program, carries an interview with Russia's Choice Chairman Yegor Gaydar by Radio Rossii correspondent Konstantin Revenko in Gaydar's office on 24 January.

The first question is on Gaydar's present title and position, to which Yegor Gaydar says: "First, I am a deputy and the head, the chairman, of the Russia's Choice faction. I resigned from all kinds of state duties and I am heading on a voluntary basis the scientific work at the institute of economic policy, [word indistinct], it is called the Institute of Economic Problems of the Transitional Period." He recalls that the institute was set up in 1991.

Asked why the government in general and Gaydar in particular were so unwilling to explain to the people where Russia was going and what was happening, Gaydar acknowledges that it had been "a serious fault." He goes on to say: "Our work was very hectic in 1992 . The state had practically collapsed and one had a permanent feeling that if one were to stop working for just five minutes, things would simply slip through one's hands." He continues: "The main problem of 1992 and 1993 was that we failed to convince, failed to explain some simple things, thus giving opportunities and freedom of action to demagogues and liars."

Asked to assess the state of the Russian economy at the time when Gaydar "fled," as the correspondent put it, Gaydar says "I did not flee anywhere, I left to do my own things." He continues: "The funny thing is that those who spent two years seeking my resignation are now speaking of the harm my resignation did." He further says: "There were many questions on the reasons for my resignation. I understand that some people have no shame at all. They are prepared to implement any policy and they are not ashamed of any decisions. I simply cannot understand how one can retain one's human dignity and at the same time justify a policy which allows no money for resolving the problem of nuclear waste—which we are dumping in the world ocean—but which allows 20 times as much money for the construction of a major administrative building given that two parliaments, two governments, the union and the republican government and party bodies have ceased to exist in Moscow." "Well, I cannot be held responsible for a policy such as this," says Gaydar, adding that what Russia needs is "a cost-conscious, inexpensive state with few officials whose rights should be restricted." He says that instead of arbitrarily handing out grants, licenses, and subsidies, they should elaborate rules to be adhered to in all cases and control their observance. He says that there are those who think Russia needs a large state which actively interferes in the economy, with a large army of officials and in times of trouble Russia has often reacted in this manner. He says that it sometimes yielded results, but it often led Russian into a historical blind alley from which it was extremely difficult to extricate itself.

"It is my deep conviction that the time has now come for us to extricate ourselves from this blind alley we are in and to proceed along a path which has actually ensured success for a majority of civilized states, where society is dominant over the state, rather than the other way around." Acknowledging that this was a problem for Russia, Gaydar said it must be tackled. "An army of corrupt officials, in cahoots with a part of the new bourgeoisie that is interested in receiving handouts from them represents the factor that is capable of paralyzing through and through any potential for development, simultaneously exacerbating constantly the most acute social problems, inequality, and dissatisfaction", he said.

Asked about the current situation, Gaydar said he is "deeply convinced that despite all the tremendous difficulties we are now coming up against, despite the whole seriousness of the current situation, the situation is, of course, much better than at the end of 1991." He says that at the end of 1991, Russia had enough grain to last until February and Russia was completely dependent on imports. This year Russia has major grain reserves, although there are various marketing difficulties.

Continuing his comparison, Gaydar says that "hard currency reserves as at the end of 1991 were nil; there were no hard currency reserves at all, while as at the end of 1993 they amounted to $4.5 billion" and these "modest" reserves ensured that we could pay for up to two months of imports. "We have a major trade surplus and for the first time Russia ceased to depend on many imports," Gaydar says, adding that this created preconditions for further stabilization.

He further says: "We left the country in a situation in which wages are $100 per month. This is not an indicator of greater prosperity and it would not be correct to regard it as such, because wages measured in dollars, of course, fail to reflect greater prosperity, but it is indicative of the stabilization of our domestic currency and of the extent to which the country's economy has become a part of the world market."

Hyperinflation causes wages to fall to around $10 per month as is currently the case in the former Yugoslavia and in Ukraine and as was the case in Russia at the end of 1991 "when wages amounted to seven dollars per month." "In December inflation amounted to 12 percent, a record low," Gaydar adds.

Defense orders used to play a tremendous role in the country's economy which has now adapted itself to a much lower level of these orders and is geared much more towards consumer needs which will improve in quality as they have to compete with high quality foreign consumer goods. This process of economic restructuring is only in its inception, but it is a promising trend, Gaydar claims.

Gaydar then states that demilitarization of the economy altered supply and demand and what is now needed is to finance investments in the economy. He feels this can be done through increased taxation and that the state "is currently taking a lot of taxpayers' money for itself, because we have a huge defense expenditure, reduced a bit, but you can not reduce it all in one go; one must realize this quite clearly. We continue to have serious expenditure to finance an ineffective agriculture and we have a whole lot of serious structural problems in the economy and it is not possible to cope with all this in one go and in conditions such as these to finance an ambitious and large-scale program of economic restructuring into the bargain is simply tantamount to making taxes prohibitive and such taxation does not exist." But economic investments can also be financed through voluntary contributions from the population, as is the case in Japan, where the state's investments in the economy are minimal, but where people save a lot and their money, through the banking system, is invested in the economy, Gaydar explains.

Gaydar continues: "If I was asked when will the Russian economy begin to grow, my answer would be, quite simply, that this process will start when voluntary savings of the population begin to increase substantially in our country." This would not be possible if inflation devalued savings by 20 percent a month. "So, when we say that we need to stop price increases, it is not because we are some kind of blinkered idealists, but because we simply do know how development of production is financed, as distinct, perhaps, from our opponents," Gaydar says. Inflation endangers production growth, but Gaydar says he is not overly inclined to believe that an economic disaster was looming, because the market mechanisms are in place and, he states, "I do not believe that the current Government will start making one silly and fatal error after another." Gaydar says he does not believe that the government would cause hyperinflation in the country, nor does he believe that the dollar would reach 20,000 rubles.

Asked about his forecasts, Gaydar says: "I think that the new government's policy will, to a large extent, be a policy of vacillation. The government will endeavor to hold inflation in check and, at the same time, overcome by a passionate desire to increase production, before pre-conditions have been created for this to happen, the government will throw all its resources towards supporting individual industries, especially when it finds itself under powerful lobby pressure. It will hand out promises of financial support and will subsequently come up against tremendous difficulties, unable to fulfill its promises. It will vacillate between a sharp increase in protectionism and the necessity of ensuring that consumers' elementary interests are met. In short, it seems to me that this policy will be very difficult to form, subject to powerful pressures and that it will, to a large extent, be a contradictory policy". This policy can preserve the present status quo in which inflation is not high enough to destroy the fiscal system and bring market mechanisms to a standstill and nor is it sufficiently low to stimulate growth through savings being invested in the national economy. He says that against this backdrop some officials can be in cahoots with a part of the new bourgeoisie, interested in the emergence of a protectionist, paternalistic state.

He concludes by saying that Russia is facing a choice between the all-powerful state endeavoring to solve the problem of economic development and breaking out of the "vicious circle of our history," making the state serve society and creating an open and competitive economy.

War Propaganda Charges Made Against Zhirinovskiy

LD2601094594 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0938 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—The office of the Russian prosecutor general instituted criminal proceedings on Wednesday against nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy for propaganda of war which is punishable under Article 71 of the Russian Criminal Code, TASS learned from the press office of the Russian prosecutor general.

The article envisages a prison term from three to eight years.

The criminal proceedings were instituted in connection with a letter of noted human rights activist and deputy editor-in-chief of the "New Times" weekly Kronid Lyubarskiy to Prosecutor General Aleksey Kazannik in which he said that Zhirinovskiy's book "The Last Leap to the South" contains open appeals to war.

"The author of the book advocates the unleashing of an aggressive war against countries neighbouring on Russia—Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan", Lyubarskiy said.

"In connection with received statements and appeals and with the examination of facts cited there the office of the prosecutor general instituted criminal proceedings on Wednesday against Vladimir Zhirinovskiy on charges envisaged by Article 712 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation—the propaganda of war", the press service of the prosecutor's office said.

Zhirinovskiy is a member of the State Duma and possesses immunity, however Lyubarskiy said this cannot free him from criminal proceedings as the crime was committed before he was elected. Lyubarskiy recalled that two organisers of the abortive Soviet 1991 coup who were elected to the new parliament still face trial and the court refused to drop the criminal proceedings against them while the prosecutor's office did not appeal against the court ruling.

Military & Space Issues

Deputy Defense Minister Interviewed on Budget

LD2501222194

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1725 GMT on 25 January broadcasts its regular program "Details" presented by Nikolay Svanidze who comments on the Russian Federation defense budget, which is currently in the pipeline. This is followed by an exclusive interview with Russian Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin.

Kokoshin begins by saying that in its present situation Russia needs a new armaments program but drawing it up is extremely difficult. Asked by the announcer if the Finance Ministry had been putting obstacles in the way of the program, Kokoshin said: "I would not like to criticize this particular ministry because I have a full understanding of their position: They had a clear task of reducing inflation by monetarist methods, and this resulted in chronic underpayments in practically all the main spheres covered by the budget, including the Defense Ministry. We had some disagreements in 1993, sometimes quite bitter, but at the same time, I realize that their life is not easy either. It is another matter that we need to look for new forms of more stable financing."

Svanidze then recalls that President Yeltsin had promised to pay state-owned enterprises all the money owed to them by the state by 1 February, and asked Kokoshin if that promise would be fulfilled. Kokoshin says: "I believe that it will be fulfilled, but the question is to what extent. Just now complicated work—or I might as well call it violent struggle—is in progress about who should get their money first and how much of it. We order for defense."

Asked by the announcer about his personal standpoint when discussing the budget in the government, and if he was capable of reconciling the requirements of the defense industry with the awareness that it is a burden on the national economy, Kokoshin replies: "We have no wish to form our budget through robbing our own country, and I can tell you that in the past too much money was invested in the defense industry, and often those were rather imprudent investments. Now the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction. I think one of my tasks, and those of my colleagues, is to prove that the pendulum should be brought to a more balanced position, and that our Armed Forces should be equipped as they deserve."

Finally, Svanidze asks Kokoshin how he thought the current government reshuffle would affect the defense budget. Kokoshin replies: "In my opinion, the approach we had before was really too monetarily oriented, and I have also argued—both at the open and closed sessions with Boris Fedorov and with other adherents of this approach. I think it insufficient, to put it mildly, and I hope that we will at last begin to stimulate industry.

Military Issues Roundup; Grachev Illness Denied

PM2501132194 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 2

[Igor Chernyak article under the "Military Review" rubric: "...And Then There Was This Big Bang"]

[Text] **We Expect GI's**

As reported by a high-ranking officer of the Russian General Staff, the details of maneuvers involving Russian and U.S. units are under active discussion in the military department. According to preliminary information, these maneuvers could take place in the Volga Military District in the summer. The idea put forward by U.S. Defense Secretary Les Aspin and Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev of holding maneuvers in Germany, which was discussed during their recent meeting in the FRG, did not, to put it mildly, find support among the Germans who, according to the officer's account, are not at all keen on having Russian and American tanks rumbling under the windows of their homes as in 1945. It is expected that the U.S. Army's 3d Mechanized Infantry Division and the Russian Army's 27th Motorized Infantry will take part in the maneuvers. However, according to the latest information, each side will send only 500-700 servicemen to the maneuvers. The very small number of participants in the proposed exercises is due to the Russian military department's difficult financial situation. "However, high-ranking military officials are today discussing a compromise solution whereby the Americans would assume the bulk of the cost," the officer stated.

At the same time, according to the officer's information, General Staff analysts are seriously concerned that the top Russian military leadership could face serious protests from the population of the Volga region and find itself the focus of unprecedenteed conflict in connection with the preparation of the exercises. According to information being received by the Russian General Staff, the idea of joint maneuvers in the United States has had a mixed response.

Off to the States in High Spirits

According to unofficial information, more than 200 Russian generals and other officers visited the United States in 1993. Short courses, seminars, symposiums, and conferences make up a far from complete list of the aims of their visits. Even according to the roughest estimates, it cost the U.S. Department of Defense a considerable amount of money to look after the Russians. Many Russian generals frequently visit the American continent in circumvention of the law forbidding representatives of leading state organs to travel abroad at the host side's expense.

Staff in the appropriate agencies who had initially informed the Main Intelligence Directorate [GRU] about secret Pentagon plans to work with top Russian Armed Forces military staff eventually gave up. It is impossible for ordinary operational staff to fight against generals, even those violating the Russian president's edict.

The Sick Serve in the Army

As reported by a high-ranking officer from the defense minister's immediate entourage, members of the Russian Federation Security Council who attended the 19 January Security Council session were misled when informed that Pavel Grachev was absent because he was "carrying out a task for the president." In actual fact, according to this officer's account, Grachev was in a military hospital on the outskirts of Moscow. It is noted that this is not the first time that the 46-year-old army general, who always gives the appearance of being hale and hearty, has had health problems. Subordinates recall in this regard one of the minister's favorite phrases: "The sick don't serve in the army." It is noteworthy that often Grachev's indisposition is carefully covered up in the Defense Ministry and coincides with his reporting to the top organs of state power.

Russian Defense Ministry Press Secretary Yelena Agapova denied the report of Pavel Grachev's illness.

At the same time the likelihood of Grachev's removal from the post of minister in the near future is remote, according to information stemming from circles close to the Russian president.

Remember Afghanistan, Comrade?

As reported at the press service of the CIS Joint Armed Forces High Command, Colonel Viktor Timofeyev, commander of the 201st Russian Motorized Infantry Division, which is stationed in Tajikistan, was recently removed from his post. The reason for this was not reported; however, sources in the military department suggest that Colonel General Boris Pyankov, commander of the CIS Coalition Peacemaking Forces in Tajikistan, played a considerable role here.

In the opinion of those sources, it was not difficult to find a formal reason for Timofeyev's removal from his post: Discipline in the division has not been not brilliant, to put it mildly, the vaunted contract personnel's actions are unpredictable, and several serious incidents connected, among other things, with drunkenness among the personnel have occurred of late. However, it is thought that one of the main reasons for the conflict lies in the differing approaches to the peacemaking forces' actions in Tajikistan. Timofeyev, who comes from Leninabad Oblast and has a pretty good knowledge of the language and customs of the local population, advocated maximum neutrality on the part of the division and noninterference in the internal affairs of an independent state and was also opposed to expansion of the Russian military presence there. Pyankov, however, is regarded as a supporter of a tougher approach, and his stance could be summed up by the phrase: "If we have signed a treaty with the present government we should stop any incursions by gummen." Such a standpoint was typical of Soviet generals in Afghanistan.

Announcement!

It is no secret that Russia has drastically cut back on its arms sales in recent years, and as a result earns a lot less hard currency—$1.9 billion in 1992 as opposed to $21.2 billion in 1982. Perhaps there is not enough advertising? That is why the first issue of VOYENNYY PARAD/MILITARY PARADE—a Russian military-industrial complex magazine—appeared in January. Printed in Italy, the magazine is as good as any of its Western counterparts. Information about the latest Russian weapons and their specifications and performance characteristics is given in English and Russian. The first issue presents the pride of the Russian military-industrial complex, ranging from the Ka-50 "Black Shark" helicopter to the "Tor" air defense missile system and the "MSTA-S" self-propelled howitzer. The magazine has some pretty good writers—the greetings message to readers is penned by Viktor Chernomyrdin. We were pleased to see that the publishers took a photograph of one of the latest pieces of equipment from KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

Anecdote?

The military carries out a nuclear explosion. The next day a general holds a press conference. A Western journalist asks: "General, why did you announce yesterday that the yield of the explosion was 5 kilotonnes when it was actually ten times greater?" The general scratches his head: "We ourselves thought it was 5 kilotonnes, and then there was this big bang..."

Extension of 1993 Draft 'Forced Measure'

PM2601101394 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Oleg Falichev report: "The Fall '93 Draft Was Very Difficult. What Will Its Extension Be Like?"]

[Text] There is hardly any sense in discussing again in detail the difficult situation among the troops due to the shortage of personnel. Much has already been written about officers doing sentry duty, about the inordinate physical and psychological burdens leading to incidents, accidents, and human fatalities... The prime cause of this lies in many ways in the hitches in the induction of citizens into service and the rapid increase in legal nihilism among the population. Finally, there is the fact that some provisions of the new Law "On Military Duty and Military Service" are not fully operating.

All the same, until recently there was no sufficiently full and generalized factual picture of the 1993 draft for Russia as a whole. The draft's final results were recently compiled in the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. What do these results suggest?

Around 70 percent of the planned number of draftees were sent into the Armed Forces and the military formations of other ministries and departments. That is to say, the draft quota was fulfilled by roughly two-thirds. A considerable number of citizens received deferments or exemptions on lawful grounds, so to speak. For example, 50 percent of the draftees [as published] were granted deferments to continue their education, 3 percent for family reasons, and 4 percent to work in the spheres of art, education, or health. But there are also those who found themselves at odds with the law and simply dodged the draft. There were 70,000 such people in 1993. Criminal proceedings have been instituted in 1,531 cases, more than 90 persons have been sentenced, and 20,053 have been fined...

Figures are dispassionate. But imagine 70,000 unoccupied combat posts, weapon operators' positions, and chartrooms... How hard it is for the troops to fulfill their appointed tasks and maintain combat readiness in such conditions. But, of course, this is not the first year that such a picture has been observed. Perhaps this is why the government was forced to take an extreme measure: to extend the fall-93 draft into the new year. It was decided to conduct it in two phases. The first, main phase, was completed by 1 January 1994. The second is linked with the Russian Federation president's decision on drafting into military service all citizens of induction age studying in elementary and secondary vocational education establishments, including those doing final courses. They must be issued with secondary education certificates early, so as to be inducted and sent to join the troops by 10 March this year. This in turn will help somewhat to compensate for the release of enlisted men and NCO's from two service periods at once in the fall of 1993.

This is a forced measure, let us stress. After all, in 1993 we managed to induct fewer than 22 percent (!) of the total number of citizens on the military register. Is that a lot or a little? By way of comparison let us state that, for example, in Germany 50 percent of total induction resources are drafted into the Armed Forces and a further 25 percent perform alternative service. In France the figure is 58 percent, in Italy—85 percent, in Spain—75 percent, in Turkey—84 percent. It is not surprising that the manpower levels of our troops today are barely more than one-half of requirements.

Alas, the quality characteristics—including the state of health—of the young replacement forces being sent into the troops and fleets have not improved. The number of persons unsuitable for military service for medical reasons has grown from 5 percent in 1988 to 22 percent in 1993. Why? "Unfortunately, the state has neglected this question in recent years," Major General of the Medical Service V. Zolotov, chief of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense Central Commission of Military Doctors, stated bluntly. "It is not surprising that during the induction process more and more drug addicts and glue sniffers are found among young people...." Not to mention the decline in educational standards and the increased number of convicts....

A situation has come about where the military themselves first and foremost are obliged to tackle the draft. Many citizens have formed the stereotypical idea that is a military prerogative. But it is not the Ministry of Defense or the General Staff which carry out the draft but local government bodies. The military commissariat officials of are only members of the induction commissions. I mention this because maintaining the strength of the Armed Forces is a statewide, not a departmental concern. In this respect there are examples of good work by local military directorate organs and administration heads. Colonel General M. Kolesnikov, chief of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff, for example, singled out for special commendation the military commissariats of Udmurtia, Bashkortostan, Yakutia, Stavropol and Maritime Krays, and Vologda, Kamchatka, Kurgan and Kaliningrad Oblasts. The draft is less well conducted in the republics of the North Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Kemerovo, Chelyabinsk, and a number of other oblasts.

Of course, today contract-based service is resolving to a considerable extent the problem of maintaining the manpower levels of the Army and Navy. Some 120,000 contract-based servicemen are already serving among the troops. But so far this has enabled the manning levels of units to be increased by only 10 percent. The Russian Federation president's edict "On Recruiting Citizens for Military Service in the Russian Federation Armed Forces on a Contract Basis in 1994" was signed 18 January 1994. Under this edict the Russian Army is granted the possibility of accepting a further 150,000 people for military service on contract. The corresponding funds for this in 1994 are also allocated. In the past, for example, 6 billion rubles has been allocated for contract-based servicemen.

Incidentally, about money. It is becoming increasingly difficult to come by, although there are quite a lot of people, it turns out, who wish to serve on a contract basis: There are thousands of application forms lying on military commissariat desks. Hence, in view of the difficult economic situation in the country, the Ministry of Defense has submitted a proposal to the Russian Federation Council of Ministers not only to reduce the Armed Forces but also to cut their table of organization. The T/O had already been reduced by 500,000 in 1991-1992. The reduction process is proceeding now, so to speak, ahead of schedule by 350,000. Right now the Armed Forces' T/O is over 2 million. All these measures, and also the replacement of a number of military positions by civilians, are expected to resolve the problem of manning levels in the Armed Forces by the end of 1994 or the beginning of 1995. Col. Gen. Kolesnikov stressed that by that time manning levels could stand at 90-95 percent. By that time it looks as though optimum numerical levels will finally be established. That does depend, however, on what tasks the state sets for the Armed Forces.

One last point. The figures for the 1993 draft provide food for thought on many questions raised by our stormy times. These include: What will be the Russian Army's social makeup in the future? Does the state have sufficient funds to maintain its strength on a contract basis? Will it be possible to maintain the prestige of military service among young people and in the country as a whole? Difficult questions which, obviously, only time will answer. But we must all reflect on them together.

'Meteor-3' Satellite Launched

LD2501142194 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1412 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—A Meteor-3 meteorological satellite was launched by the Tsyklon rocket-booster on January 25, 1994, from the Plesetsk space launching grounds.

The satellite carries Russian-made equipment to obtain meteorological and gelio-geophysical information, as well as a French-made Scarab device to measure radiation balance of the earth and a German-made Prare navigation system to measure parameters of the spacecraft motion.

The satellite was put into the orbit with the following parameters:

—the initial period of rotation—109.4 minutes;

—the maximum distance from the earth surface (in the apogee)—1,221 kilometers;

—the minimum distance from the earth surface (in the perigee)—1,198 kilometers;

—the inclination of the orbit—82.6 degrees.

The on-board equipment is functioning normally. The control-measurement complex controls the satellite's flight.

Information from the Meteor-3 satellite is received by the Russian Federal Service for Hydro-Meteorology and Environmental Monitoring for processing and use.

Alongside with the satellite, they launched a German tubsat small detached satellite to test the system of precise orientation with the help of star and solar sensors. Parameters of its orbit are close to the parameters of the Meteor-3.

The Meteor-3 launch commemorated chief designer V. Adasko.

Federal Assembly

Text of Draft on Amnesty for Criminals

PM2501141594 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 4

["Draft Decree of the Federal Assembly State Duma on an Amnesty in Connection With the Adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution"; published under "Official Section" rubric]

[Text] In connection with the adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution, and guided by the principle of humanity, the Federal Assembly State Duma decrees:

1. That the following be released from penalties taking the form of imprisonment, as well as from penalities other than imprisonment:

a) convicted persons who have served in field armies or combined units or participated in combat actions in defense of the motherland or in the course of performing service duties connected with this;

b) women;

c) men over 60 years of age;

d) first and second category invalids.

2. That persons sentenced for crimes of negligence to terms of imprisonment up to and inclusive of five years who have served at least one-third of the specified term of punishment be released from penalty.

3. That male minors condemned to terms of imprisonment up to and inclusive of three years and who have not previously served time in corrective-labor colonies be released from penalty.

4. That persons on probation, persons on suspended sentences, and persons sentenced to punishments other than imprisonment be released from penalty.

5. That persons sentenced for premeditated crimes to terms of imprisonment up to and inclusive of three years who have served at least one-third of the specified term of punishment be released from penalty.

6. That all criminal proceedings pending examination by the courts should be terminated where they relate to crimes committed prior to the entry into force of the decree by:

a) persons listed in Paragraph 1, and persons who do not fall within the remit of Paragraph 8 of the decree;

b) persons who have committed a crime for which punishments other than imprisonment are envisaged;

c) male minors who have committed crimes for which a punishment of no more than three years' imprisonment is stipulated and who have not previously served time in corrective-labor colonies.

In cases concerning crimes for which punishment in the form of imprisonment is envisaged but which were committed before the entry into force of the decree, it is decreed that the court, if it deems it necessary to specify a penalty other than imprisonment, release the convicted person from penalty.

7. That time yet to be served be reduced:

a) by one-half for male minors who do not fall within the remit of Paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of the decree, and for persons convicted to a term of imprisonment for crimes of negligence who do not fall within the remit of Paragraph 2 of the decree;

b) by one-third for persons sentenced for premeditated crimes to terms of imprisonment up to and inclusive of five years and who do not fall within the remit of Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5 of this decree;

c) by one-quarter for persons convicted of premeditated crimes to terms of imprisonment of over five years, and who do not fall within the remit of Paragraph 1 of the decree.

8. That the validity of Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the decree does not extend to the following convicted persons:

a) those who have committed crimes under Articles 64, 66, 67, 68, 74, 77, 77.1, 79, 86, 87; Section 2 of Article 88; Sections 3 and 4 of Article 89; Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 90; Article 91; Section 3 of Article 92; Sections 2 and 3 of Article 93; Articles 93.1, 95, 102, 103, 108; Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 117; Section 1 of Article 125; Articles 125.1, 126.1; Sections 3 and 4 of Article 144; Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Article 145; Article 146; Sections 2 and 3 of Article 147; Article 148; Section 2 of Article 149; Section 2 of Article 171; Articles 173, 174, 174.1, 176, 176.1, 176.2, 177, 178, 179, 191.2, 193; Section 3 of Article 206; Articles 212.1, 213.2, 218, 218.1; Section 2 of Article 224; Articles 224.1, 224.2, 226.1; and Paragraph (c) [v] of Article 240 of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code;

b) those previously convicted for premeditated crimes and again condemned to a term of imprisonment for premeditated crimes;

c) those deemed particularly dangerous recidivists;

d) those who are malicious violators of the prison regime [rezhim otbyvaniya nakazaniya];

e) those previously released from their places of detention prior to completion of the sentence specified by the court within the confines of an amnesty or a pardon who have again committed premeditated crimes.

9. That for persons subject to release from penalty under this decree but in respect of whom measures of compulsory treatment for alcoholism, drug addiction, or venereal diseases have been specified alongside the penalty for the crime committed, the act of amnesty be applied on completion of the full course of treatment.

10. That persons convicted by courts of the Russian Federation and also by USSR courts fall under the remit of this decree.

11. That this decree shall enter into force from the moment of publication and shall be subject to implementation over the course of six months.

[Signed] The Chairman of the Federal Assembly State Duma

Yeltsin Urges Duma To Approve Draft

PM2501153994 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Edict No. 173 of the Russian Federation president "On the Federal Assembly State Duma Draft Decree Declaring an Amnesty," dated Moscow, the Kremlin, 21 January 1994 and signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin]

[Text] Taking into consideration the many appeals from private individuals and public organizations and requests from ther families of convicted and indicted individuals, guided by the principle of humanity, and in connection with the adoption of the Russian Federation Constitution, I decree that:

1. An act of amnesty should be proclaimed for certain categories of people convicted of crimes which do not represent an increased risk to the public.

2. The Federal Assembly State Duma draft decree declaring an amnesty should be approved so that the Russian Federation president can submit it for immediate scrutiny to the Federal Assembly State Duma in accordance with the procedure laid down in Paragraph "e" of Article 103 of the Russian Federation Constitution.

3. This Edict comes into force from the moment of its signing.

[Signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 21 January 1994
No. 173

Duma Deputies Discuss Committees, Privileges

PM2501133194 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Yevgeniy Skukin report: "One State Duma Deputy Costs 15 Million Rubles a Month. Is That Not a Lot?"]

[Text] On 21 January before leaving for the electoral districts, State Duma deputies demonstrated what seemed to me to be two important qualities which they have acquired in two weeks in parliament: the ability to wage a factional struggle and an unexpected capacity for compromise.

...There were two apparently separate questions to be resolved: the approval of the composition of the Geopolicy Committee and the vote on the inclusion of deputy Andrey Makarov in another committee—the Committee on Legislation. Both questions were put to the ballot the day before. Then there was a proposal to vote on both questions as a package: We scratch your back, you scratch ours.

I would venture to suggest that this spectacle was not without a certain drama. Suffice it to say that the words "motion carried" were heard only after...the fourth vote. The breakthrough was achieved in the following manner. Initially Ivan Rybkin, chairman of the chamber who was conducting the session, admonished the deputies, and not for the first time: This attempt to bamboozle one another will get nowhere. He was followed by Vladimir Volfovich who said: If you do not approve the Geopolicy Committee, what compromise will its nonexistent members be able to make?

Subsequent events disproved the well known saying that might makes right. Thanks to some maneuvering the factions were able to elaborate a package of proposals on cadre questions and furthermore, according to Deputy Viktor Zorkaltsev, deputy chairman of the Communist

Party of the Russian Federation Central Executive Committee, they will be able to agree on specific draft laws.

This idea was graphically illustrated by a second episode at the session. This was a discussion of a State Duma statement on events in Yugoslavia. When the session rejected the proposal by Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, member of the International Relations Committee, to postpone it until consultations are held with representatives of the Foreign Ministry, the question raised then was what version of the statement should be adopted: The one proposed by the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, and the Agrarian Party of Russia or the version offered by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the International Relations Committee? Here again the democrats demonstrated an exceptional tactical flexibility. Initially they adopted Lukin's proposal with a paragraph from from the alternative draft on lifting the economic blockade against Yugoslavia. But then they prevented the inclusion in the statement of a paragraph proposed by a representative of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia demanding the withdrawal of the UN forces from Yugoslav territory.

I asked Gennadiy Burbulis, a "Russia's Choice" deputy, whether the interfactional squabbling will not be a hindrance to legislative activity and he stated with the utmost clarity: There is every reason for separating the political struggle, which is inevitable in the State Duma, from the pragmatic activity of a parliament consisting of professionals.

There is one final event in the State Duma's life which has done very little to establish an image for it that is different from that of the former Supreme Soviet. The majority lacked the strength to resist some tempting privileges.

They should not complain from the rostrum about the lack of objectivity of the press which latched onto Deputy A. Volkov's rejected amendments. Yes, they rejected a remuneration of $3,000 and a personal car equipped with a radio. However, at the suggestion of S. Baburin, who remembers past privileges, they returned to the automobile question and awarded themselves a car each but without a radio.

Meanwhile, at the same session objections were raised to the expansion of State Duma structures. Nevertheless, in addition to the State Duma secretariat, which includes the apparatuses of the committees, the offices of the chairman and deputy chairmen, the State Duma conference, and so forth, the apparatuses of the factions and groups of deputies not belonging to the Secretariat will also provide backup for the deputies' work. Furthermore, each deputy can provide himself with a whole staff of assistants—up to five people. And all this is at the taxpayer's expense....

Lukin Views Duma's Influence on Foreign Policy

LD2601101894 Moscow Radio Moscow World Service in English 0910 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Vladimir Lukin has been elected the head of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs. He was a former Russian ambassador to the United States. How can the State Duma influence the formulation of Russian foreign policy? More from our parliamentary correspondent, who interviewed Vladimir Lukin.

[Unidentified correspondent] Primarily, under the Constitution, the State Duma shall or shall not ratify international treaties concluded on behalf of the country. The State Duma also approves of the foreign policy articles in the budget. Besides, under the Constitution, the State Duma will agree upon Russia's ambassadors to foreign countries' appointments and withdrawals.

We shall see to it that these responsible posts are filled with the persons who can respectfully present Russia's interests, said Vladimir Lukin. When asked to respond if he had shared the viewpoint that the Russian Foreign Ministry paid insufficient attention to the Asia and Pacific region, he said that this is exactly so. A foreign policy is first and foremost the accomplishment of specific results, significant to the country concerned. From this point of view, our Asiatic policies do leave much to be desired.

He goes on to say that Russia's foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, is to visit China shortly. I wish his visit could produce good results. And in his final remarks, Vladimir Lukin stressed that we would need specific accomplishments in the foreign policy we pursued, and this would relate not only to China, but to other Asian countries as well.

Concept of Bill 'On Political Parties' Criticized

LD2501190294 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1627 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Alexandrova]

[Text] Moscow January 25 TASS—A concept of the draft law "On Political Parties" was criticized today by the majority of speakers at hearings of the Russian president's commission for legislative proposals.

The five-page concept gives the notion of "an all-Russian political party", specifies conditions of party formation and registration, enumerates party rights and control over party activities.

The majority of party representatives opposed an idea to describe a party as all-Russian only in case of "its support by over five per cent of voters in the state Duma elections" and a strength of no less than 5,000 members. The commission suggested to consider all- Russian only the parties represented in the parliament although many of them won the elections within larger electoral coalitions.

The idea was most severely criticized by parties that did not gain the five per cent of votes at the recent elections—the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the Conservative Party, the Party of Consolidation, the Socialist Party of Working People, the National-Republican Party and others.

Deputy Russian Labor Minister Vladimir Varov said the document is "a worst concept of draft laws discussed by the former Supreme Soviet". In his opinion, the body registering a party should proceed from party deeds and not its rules or other documents which may be written in a way to meet all the criteria. "Otherwise, we will soon have dozens of paramilitary organizations named 'parties'," he stressed.

Leader of the Association of Russian Independent Professionals Pyotr Filippov called for "application of tougher norms to political parties". In his opinion, all parties—including those which exceeded the five per cent limit and those which did not—should constantly confirm their right to existence. He said regular re-registration of party members is necessary.

Zyuganov Defends Duma Against Hostile Media

PM2501141194 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 2

[Article by Gennadiy Zyuganov, chairman of Communist Party of Russian Federation faction in State Duma, under "Parliamentary Process—View from Factions" rubric: "Start of Duma"]

[Text] The first, organizational stage of the State Duma sessions is over. The deputies have gone their separate ways for a week to work in their electoral districts. The official mass media have made the maximum effort to portray the Duma's first days as an all-Russia slanging match and a struggle of egoistic ambitions, to discredit it in the public consciousness, and, to be frank, to prepare the ground for its speediest dissolution.

The reason for such zeal is understandable. The regime, which convened the Duma as a cover designed to legalize the results of the coup d'etat, obtained as a result of the elections something qualitatively different, which does not fit in with its plans. It has no need of such a parliament, and the first act in the struggle against the Duma was a psychological war against it on the air and in the pages of the press. Everything is being done to conceal from the electorate the true meaning of the work that has been done. Therefore, it is important to understand its actual meaning.

For 10 days a very hard struggle was being waged to ensure the Duma's capacity for work—to make it as difficult as possible for particular groupings inside and outside the Duma to block and thwart its activity by means of a boycott, procedural ruses, the fueling of organizational muddle, etc. It was in order to prevent such phenomena that a low quorum needed to open the sessions was set; it was made difficult to delay matters by arranging secret votes on any pretext; an obstacle was put in the way of the fragmentation of the corps of deputies into a mass of small and very small factions; and a small Duma Council was formed, consisting of just 10 members and, consequently, arriving more quickly at agreed decisions. All this has already yielded the first fruits and made it possible quite promptly to elect the chairman and his deputies and to form the Duma committees. On the whole, it can be said that the Duma promises to be an organ that is perfectly capable of working.

Thus, an important point, but still not the decisive one, has been passed in the Duma's development as an organ of real state power. It is capable of adopting principled decisions, but will the decisions of the Duma (and the Federal Assembly as a whole) have a substantial impact on the state of affairs in the country? According to the text of the Constitution, which the Central Electoral Commission hastened to proclaim adopted, the rights and powers of parliament have been curtailed to such an extent that they are, in point of fact, not even legislative but advisory. On behalf of the so-called "legislative proposals commission under the president" the Duma was presented with a 107-point plan of legislative activity whose adoption would mean parliament vegetating for many years in complete isolation from reality and from the real needs and requirements of society and the state. The fact that the Duma brushed that plan aside attests to its state responsibility.

It is undoubtedly necessary to develop the legislative base. But it is perfectly clear to any unbiased observer that the country's present problems lie in a somewhat different plane. We are suffering not from a deficit of laws but from a deficit of legality, when none of the existing laws is seriously being fulfilled and, most dangerously, an example is being set here by the top executive structures headed by the president, which descended to a coup d'etat and crude armed violence against law-abiding citizens. The question now stands as follows: Either legality will be restored or the country will sink deeper and deeper into the quagmire of economic catastrophe and smouldering civil war, which threatens at any moment to escalate into a full-scale war.

It was in order to try to restore legality by peaceful, nonviolent means that the opposition entered the Duma in full awareness of the fact that the entire post-October political structure was lacking a strong legal foundation. Consequently, it is a question not of a submissive existence under conditions imposed by force but of a need to radically change these conditions. This objective need can be formulated as follows: the restoration of effective parliamentary control over the executive structures—presidential, government, and any others. At the same time it is necessary to sustain the principle that the greater the powers of the executive, the more rigid and scrupulous must be the legislature's control over them. This not only does not contradict the principle of the separation of powers but, on the contrary, stems directly from it.

The legislative determination of the composition, structure, and size of funding of executive organs, the approval of candidacies for ministers and other top officials, the regular hearing of reports on the activities of ministries and departments, the holding, where necessary, of investigations—all this is the inalienable prerogative of parliament and of its committees and commissions with a normal democratic procedure of state management and must become part of Russian political practice. This virtually means an objective need to adopt a new constitution.

Is the Duma (Federal Assembly) ready to take serious steps in the said direction? Taking into account the substantial political heterogeneity of the corps of deputies, obviously a return to legality will not be a one-off act but will require persistent efforts to form a responsible state majority in the Duma and for it to win public trust and support. In our view, the platform for its consolidation must be an understanding of the disastrous nature of the present socioeconomic policy, protection for Russia's fundamental national-state interests, and the desire to establish genuine people's power in the country and the fatherland's spiritual revival.

For its part the deputies' faction of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation will strive to ensure that the Duma adopts decisions on a number of fundamental questions.

It is necessary to investigate and make a political assessment of the events of 21 September through 4 October last year and their consequences and to adopt legislative acts aimed at preventing anything similar ever again. The circumstances and consequences of the illegal Belovezhskaya Forest compact must similarly be analyzed.

A very important task of parliament by way of restoring legality is also to examine the question of the lawfulness of the interpretation of the voting results of 12 December 1993 as the electorate's adoption of the draft constitution proposed in B. Yeltsin's name. It is our conviction that such an interpretation is unlawful. So many very gross violations of the Constitution and the Referendum Law were committed in the course of preparing and "adopting" that draft that they constitute perfectly adequate grounds for repealing the Central Electoral Commission's decision and resuming the constitutional process by means, for example, of scheduling a general election to the Constitutional Assembly.

The period which the country is going through is a typical example of what is called a suspension of law, when legitimacy finds itself in question, i.e. the legal succession of all the branches of power without exception, including, of course, the Federal Assembly itself. In our view, the legality of parliament can be interpreted only from the viewpoint of the need for the country to return to the channel of rule-of-law development and the maintenance of civilian peace. Those actions—and only those actions of it—which are aimed at achieving the said goal can be considered lawful. This goal also determines the extent of the Duma's powers needed to realize it. The source of these powers is the direct expression of the electorate's will, certainly not Edict No. 1400, as frequent attempts are made to portray the matter.

All these juridical niceties might at first sight seem to have no direct bearing on the country's real needs in its present catastrophic state. It must be understood, however, that without an increase in the rights and powers of parliament it will be unable to make a real contribution to the cause of surmounting the crisis, and any initiatives by it will remain just good intentions.

This does not mean, however, that urgent socioeconomic problems have remained outside our attention. The Communists' faction has its own plan of legislative initiatives on a wide range of issues. These are, above all, draft laws aimed at replacing the policy of reforms and protecting the Russian economy: on labor collectives, taxation, price formation, the destatization of ownership (as an alternative to privatization), investment policy, and support for the agro-industrial complex. State support for science, culture, education, and health care and material and moral protection for the family, motherhood, and childhood require special attention. Extraordinary measures are needed to combat corruption and crime, particularly street crime.

Any government which seriously intends to work in this area will receive our vote of confidence. But first a government program with a clear indication of the specific goals and the approximate deadlines for realizing them and with calculations of the funds necessary for this must be published, receive an expert appraisal in parliamentary committees, be discussed in detail, and, finally, be approved by the Duma. Only in this case does parliament have the right to give its consent to the appointment of the head of government and other officials, and only on this condition can it bear responsibility for the country's situation.

Maybe a different way of conducting state affairs, which was practised hitherto, the method of backstage infighting and intriguing, creates an illusion of autocratic power, but in practice it has led and does lead to increased chaos and arbitrariness, when crude violence remains the only argument in a dispute, and this, as is known, is a highly unreliable and short-lived instrument for resolving complex tasks.

This is not the first time Russia has experienced such a situation. Every time the executive's stubborn reluctance to cooperate with the representative power and to submit to parliamentary control has led, in the final analysis, to very grave social upheavals. The last time, this happened literally before our eyes. The collapse of the great power, bloody conflicts, economic disaster, the unprecedented degrading of national and state dignity—do these cruel realities really not serve as an adequate argument in favor of choosing a different path of cooperation among public forces and among the branches of state power?

The first days of the Duma's work have created the impression that there are forces in it which are capable of responding to reasonable arguments. Despite all their heterogeneity, they will be able to cooperate if they regard the interests of the whole state and the whole people as of paramount importance. It would be better for those who are not capable of this to leave the political stage voluntarily, without waiting for tough circumstances and the people's indignation to force them to do so.

Talks on Duma's Possible Move to Southeast Moscow

MK2501143094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 1

["NG" report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Where Shall Duma Sit?"]

[Text] It has become known to NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA from a confidential source in the State Duma apparatus that most probably, the question of moving the lower chamber from the building of the former Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to a new location will be decided today. The same source has made it known that the most probable destination for the Duma is in southeast Moscow, in the building of Moscow's Academy of Management. Incidentally, this option was discussed during the meeting between President Yeltsin and Speaker Rybkin last week after Mr. Rybkin came in for criticism from the leaders of Duma factions for his excessive pliancy.

Black Sea Fleet Officers Send Letter to Duma

LD2501161394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1440 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Sergey Ostanin]

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—Officers of the Black Sea Fleet and their families are in a calamitous state, says a letter from the Coordinating Council of Officers' Assemblies to Russia's State Duma. The ITAR-TASS correspondent learned about the contents of the message in the Black Sea fleet press center today.

The officers voice their concern over allowance payments being two months in arrears, in view of increases in inflation. The document also draws attention to the fact that children of servicemen in the fleet cannot go to Ukraine's civilian higher education colleges, because they do not speak Ukrainian.

The Coordinating Council is also concerned, the letter says, that the proposal by the officers' assemblies for the Black Sea fleet to be granted the status of the Russian Federation fleet has not yet been considered at the state level.

Regional Affairs

Kozyrev Stops in Far East En Route to China

LD2601075794 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0728 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Georgiy Shmelev]

[Text] Blagoveshchensk January 26 TASS—A regional conference of senior officials of the administration of the Far Eastern region was held here today. Its agenda included prospects of Russian-Chinese cooperation and border relations. The conference, the first of this kind, was attended by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, who arrived here on Tuesday night en route from Bishkek to China.

The relations of partnership and cooperation with China, our great neighbour, should be worthy of the two great powers and should measure up to the current situation in Asia and the world in general, Kozyrev said at the conference.

Speaking about the present state of Russian-Chinese relations, the minister touched upon the problem of the settlement of border disputes between the two countries. Some people mention the "seizure of Russian territories in favour of China," but this does not correspond to reality. Talks are under way between the two countries on this problem, which has become of late one of the main irritants in bilateral relations, Kozyrev continued.

So far as border trade is concerned, its volume exceeded 2.5 billion dollars in 1993, Kozyrev said. However, we should now move to an entirely new stage of the development of border cooperation and ties and pass over to production cooperation, for which we have all the needed conditions.

According to Kozyrev, the problem of opening check points on the Russian-Chinese border is also being discussed at the talks. During the visit to Beijing an agreement on it is planned to be signed, he said. Now there are 21 check points, of which 19 are functioning. It is necessary to make their work more orderly and to open new ones. The existing check points cannot cope with with the enormous flow of people wishing to cross the Russian-Chinese border. Last year their total number was 2.5 million.

The Russian foreign minister devoted special attention to the creation of free economic zones. The study of the experience of creating such zones in China will be one of the objectives of his visit.

Immediately after the end of the conference Kozyrev left for the city of Heihe, where he met senior officials of the province of Heilongjiang and Heihe. They discussed the development of border trade. The Russian foreign minister saw the Heihe free economic zone and a passenger check point on the Russian-Chinese border. After returning to Blagoveshchensk Kozyrev visited a frontier guard post in the western suburb of Blagoveshchensk and had a meeting with frontier guards.

Kozyrev flies to Beijing today for an official visit.

Discusses Trade, Travel Restrictions

LD2601095094 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0900 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev, speaking in Blagoveshchensk at a conference of representatives of regions of the Russian Far East bordering on China, said that the volume of bilateral trade in 1993 was $2.5 billion, with which it is possible to ease the shortage of consumer goods in Russia. Kozyrev also said that an agreement would come into force in 1994 restricting visa-free entry into Russia for citizens of the PRC. Visa-free entry will only remain for holders of diplomatic or business passports. According to the minister, this is not a case of the recreation of an iron curtain. It is, nonetheless, necessary to know how many Chinese citizens are on Russian territory, Interfax reports.

Chernomyrdin Views Future of Reform Program in Orel

LD2501140394 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1312 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Serafin Bykhun]

[Text] Orel, 25 Jan— Nobody "can suspect the government of rejecting reforms," Viktor Chernomyrdin, said in Orel today at a regional conference dedicated to questions of drawing up a state program for reviving Central Russia. The head of cabinet stressed that "we shall not deviate from the course we have chosen."

Viktor Chernomyrdin assessed positively the "serious and substantial talks" which took place in Orel today both on the region's problems and the economic and political state of affairs in Russia as a whole.

Summing up the results of 1993, the head of government annnounced that Gross Domestic Product last year fell by 12 percent as against 19 percent in 1992 and industrial output by 16 percent in comparision with 22 percent in 1992. Viktor Chernomyrdin stated that "the overall volume of trade grew considerably." The population's money income in real terms, according to him, grew by 10 percent in comparison with 1992. The average monthly rate of inflation fell from 26 percent in January 1993 to 12 percent in December. However, there was a considerable growth in the rate of inflation at the beginning of this year.

Chernomyrdin said also that "everything the government does is toward implementation of its program, which is tightly linked to maximum restraint of inflation."

The head of the Cabinet announced that budget expenditure for the first quarter of 1994 has been held at the level of the fourth quarter of last year. Spending items will be financed as and when revenues are received by the federal budget. He also announced that four trillion rubles have been earmarked in the first quarter of 1994 to pay off the state's most outstanding debts to the agro-industrial, defense and some other sectors. "We must not allow this money to go solely on wages or on financing dubious measures or organizations", he stressed.

Chernomyrdin set out the government's primary economic goal in 1994: "Not to accept any impossible commitments." The premier hinted that if the required finance is not available then the state will have to refuse to carry out some decisions reached earlier at federal level.

Chernomyrdin then spoke of the need for a thorough reform of the social sphere by way of rational use of state resources. He stressed in particular the need to strengthen financial stability in the country with a sensible and effective investment policy. "In this, I see one of the principal ways of achieving a sounder budget," Chernomyrdin remarked.

Speaking at the gathering, one of the main aims of which was to resolve problems of food supplies and development of agriculture in Russia's central oblasts, the premier said that he had adopted a decision yesterday to issue 2.3 trillion rubles to the agro-industrial complex in the first quarter of 1994. "The government has supported and will continue to support agriculture in the country".

Gerashchenko Addresses Orel Conference

LD2501155294 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1431 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] President of the Central Bank of Russia Viktor Gerashchenko says the country's budget deficit in 1993 ran at 17 trillion rubles, or 10.5 percent of GDP. In a speech to the governors of 18 regions in the city of Orel on Tuesday, he said the main points of a statement on economic, crediting and financial policies the government and the Bank made last May had been implemented, but this did not lead to curbing inflation as planned. On falling inflation at the end of 1993, Gerashchenko attributes this to an artificial underfunding of the national economy.

In his words, money supply was reduced from 60 percent at the end of 1992 to 30 percent last year.

The CBR president called for economic policy corrections and for an integrated concept of investment policy raising the possibility of subsidizing interest rates for farm credits in some cases. He suggested an issuing of government securities on a large scale in an attempt to try to narrow this year's deficit.

Gerashchenko says that uncertainties about the economic and investment climate prevent commercial banks, which accumulated 4 trillion rubles of "free money" as of January 1, from investing it into the economy, an indication of a new spiral of inflation being imminent.

Under the existing legislation, he said, "we cannot force them into investment." The CBR president says that incentives such as tax benefits or interest rate subsidies must be created to reverse the situation.

Gerashchenko has called for seeking ways of attracting those free funds into the Russian economy.

Regional Policy Reviewed

LD2501175193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1657 GMT 25 Jan 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov, Yuriy Likhopek, and Serafim Bykhun]

[Text] Orel January 25 TASS—A four-hour conference of leaders of federal bodies and heads of 17 Russian regions ended in Orel on Tuesday. The conference decided that "the Federal Programme of Development of Central Regions of Russia until the Year 2000" be submitted for endorsement by the president and government of the Russian Federation early in March this year. This programme needs 40.3 trillion roubles to implement.

After the conference Russian Prime-Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, told ITAR-TASS the government would make maximum efforts to revive regions in Central Russia so that they "could feed the whole country".

"Before we only pumped resources from Central Russia giving nothing in return. This practice should be changed radically", the prime-minister said.

Chernomyrdin Talks With Moscow Mayor

MK2501135094 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 3

[Irina Matveyeva report: "Moscow Mayor Wants Debt Paid. Moscow Intends To Get 250 Billion Rubles Returned"]

[Text] Leaving yesterday for Orel for a conference of the heads of administrations of central Russia, [Prime Minister] Viktor Chernomyrdin was busy even on the plane solving regional problems, one of the most painful of which is federal government debts. According to KOMMERSANT-DAILY's lights, Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, who had interrupted his vacation, did his utmost to use the flight together with Russia's head of government to get from the premier a firm guarantee: The federal government will pay up its debts to Moscow. Despite the declared intention to discuss at the conference the prospects of interaction between central Russian regions in resolving the problems of the agro-industrial complex, and provision of food for big urban centers, the main topic of the meeting will of course be the federal government's debt, assessed at 8 trillion rubles [R]. The total federal government debt to Moscow today is about R250 billion. The mutual settlements debt accounts for R117 billion, the Finance Ministry has failed to transmit R102 billion for the purchase of food, and R33 billion is owed for the maintenance of Moscow's subway system. The Moscow mayor's push seems to have yielded results, which is likely to lend confidence to the heads of other administrations. Although the regions, perhaps, are trying to force an open door: Addressing the first session of the new Russian Government, its head named as an immediate task the payment of all government debts to the agro-industrial complex, the military-industrial complex, and the budget sphere.

Moscow Food Supplies, Services Face Disruption

PM2501152394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA/ITAR-TASS report under the "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" rubric: "Supplies to Moscow Threatened With Disruption"]

[Text] The tense situation in the capital's economy has forced Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov to cut short his vacation. He had flown to Orel together with Viktor Chernomyrdin. The reason for the economic problems is that the Russian Government has built up a debt of approximately 250 billion rubles with various Moscow organizations and enterprises over the past year.

The supply of vital foodstuffs, goods, and services to Muscovites is threatened with disruption.

Yeltsin Appoints Heads in Maritime Kray, Ryazan

LD2501140694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1334 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Moscow, 25 Jan—President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin has signed an edict appointing Vladimir Ignatenko presidential representative in Maritime Kray. This was reported by the Russian presidential press service today.

On the nomination of the chairman of the Russian Government, Boris Yeltsin has appointed by edict Gennadiy Merkulov to the post of head of administration for Ryazan Oblast.

At the same time the Russian president signed an edict removing Lev Bashmakov from the post of head of administration for Ryazan Oblast. Lev Bashmakov was removed from his post on representations from the chairman of the Russian government for systematically exceeding his powers, failing to ensure implementation of the edicts of the Russian president aimed at building a market economy, and also for taking decisions which contribute to the destabilization of the political situation in the country.

North Ossetians Oppose Additional Russian Troops

MK2601103094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 26 Jan 94 p 2

[Natalya Gorodetskaya report under the "Conflict" rubric: "North Ossetia Against Bringing Additional Russian Troops. State of Emergency Regime Will Apparently Be Extended"]

[Text] Vyacheslav Titorenko, representative of the Russian Federation Government interdepartmental commission for the elimination of the aftermath of the Ossetia-Ingushetia conflict, has arrived in North Ossetia, in the zone under the emergency situation regime. According to INTERFAX, the purpose of his arrival is to coordinate the actions of all interested ministries and agencies, including "power" ministries and agencies, to implement the Russian Federation president's edict on returning to their homes refugees and those who have been forced to resettle.

In the meantime, there is growing dissatisfaction in the republic at an alleged introduction of additional Russian military formations onto its territory. The All-Ossetia "Greater Council" ("Styr Nykhas") and the pan-national movement "Our Ossetia" have passed a request to Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin to confirm or deny this information. A statement circulated by these movements says that on the territory of North Ossetia now "there are more than enough military formations to ensure security in the zone affected by the emergency situation regime." In the view of the statement's authors, troops are being brought in the republic in order "to create a powerful military fist in the center of the Caucasus," capable of "pacifying" the Caucasian peoples." North Ossetia's public movements have demanded that the Russian Government withdraw the additional troops from the republic's territory, and discontinue support to extremist circles in Georgia's leadership.

It appears that the possible introduction of additional Russian troops is causing such dissatisfaction because the emergency situation regime is to end on 31 January. On 28 January, North Ossetia's parliament intends to discuss this question, and, according to information from Vladikavkaz, many deputies will speak categorically against extending the validity of the emergency situation. However, INTERFAX reports, it is known from competent sources that the president of North Ossetia is now ready to sign an edict extending the state of emergency, but that would affect a considerably smaller area. The edict will apparently be signed after Akhsarbek Galazov, former chairman of North Ossetia's Supreme Soviet, is sworn in as president. The inauguration ceremony has been scheduled for 26 January. Invitations for the ceremony have been forwarded to Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, government chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin, and to the leaders of both chambers of Russia's Federal Assembly. The leaders of the North Caucasus republics, krays, and oblasts are also expected to arrive in Vladikavkaz for the ceremony.

Former Altay Governor Criticizes Reform Course

MK2501144094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report in the "Russian Federation—Altay Kray" column]

[Text] On 24 January a briefing took place at the Kray administration where Vladimir Rayfikesht, former head of the Kray administration, spoke about the motives for his resignation. V. Rayfikesht cited personal reasons as the main motive but refused to comment on it. Furthermore, he considers it impossible for him to continue work at the post of kray governor owing to the inconsistent reform course pursed by the government. Rayfikesht blamed the latter for the economic crisis and the colossal outflow of hard currency funds and raw materials from Russia. At the same time, Rayfikesht stressed that "although the government composition is bad, another would have been 100 times worse." In Rayfikesht's opinion, Yeltsin can no longer enjoy the entirety of his powers. The former governor stressed that the Russian president displayed weakness when after the elections to the Federal Assembly he failed to consolidate the reformist wing in the government. Hence the resignation of Gaydar and Fedorov, which only aggravated the situation. Summing up his performance in the kray, Rayfikesht stated that he is leaving with a clear conscience. First, the kray has not become "a preserve of socialism." Second, market structures have been put in place. Rayfikesht stressed that the incumbent administration is not responsible for the production decline in the kray, since that was largely conditioned by the financial and credit policy pursued by the government.

Krasnodar Kray Lifts Export Restrictions

PM2601092594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Andrey Aderekhin report: "Licenses No Longer Needed For Exports From Kuban To CIS Countries"]

[Text] Krasnodar—The Krasnodar Kray Government directive on the licensing of exports of output and goods to the CIS countries has been repealed.

North Caucasus Railroad department leaders have been instructed to lift the restrictions on allocating freight rail transport to carry agricultural, industrial, and other products from the Kuban to the CIS countries.

International Affairs

Kravchuk Asks Supreme Council To Reconsider START I

LD2501190694 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1713 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By UKRINFORM correspondent Mikhail Melnik for TASS]

[Text] Kiev, 25 Jan—Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk has asked the republic's Supreme Council to reexamine its decision on the ratification of the START I Treaty and the Lisbon (March 1992) Protocol to it. As is known, the decision adopted by the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 18 November 1993 states that the republic does not regard it as obligatory for it to accede to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The document containing Leonid Kravchuk's proposal was distributed to Supreme Council members to look at today.

In the note accompanying the draft parliamentary decision, Leonid Kravchuk notes that the accords reached in Moscow on 14 January between the presidents of Russia, the United States, and Ukraine provide guarantees for the national security of Ukraine, pledges by the United States to grant Ukraine a minimum of 175 million dollars for the dismantling of the nuclear weapons, with the possibility that this amount may be increased, and also the removal of all nuclear charges from Ukraine to Russia for dismantling with the simultaneous provision of compensation to the republic in the form of removed and processed nuclear fuel for nuclear power engineering. Further, the Ukrainian president's note states that the United States has declared its readiness to help Ukraine to develop a market economy.

The Ukrainian Supreme Council plans to examine the question of the trilateral Moscow Statement of the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia this week.

Sends Letter on NPT

LD2501204294 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1600 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev, 25 Jan—A letter, dated 24 January 1994, from the president of Ukraine to Ukrainian deputies and Ivan Plyushch, chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine, numbered 1-14/23 and concerning the Moscow statement, was distributed to people's deputies of the Supreme Council of Ukraine. In particular the letter says:

"In connection with the recommendation by the Supreme Council of Ukraine contained in point 11 of the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine of 18 November 1993, I am informing the Supreme Council about the steps taken by myself and the government of Ukraine. Talks in a bilateral and trilateral format with the Russian Federation and the United States of America were initiated by us to implement the Supreme Council resolution. As a result of intense talks in Kiev, Washington, and Moscow, a trilateral statement by the presidents of Ukraine, the United States, and Russia was elaborated, which was signed in Moscow on 14 January of this year. The text of the statement and the appendix to it contain clauses going in the direction of implementing the issues noted in the resolution. In particular the accords reached in Moscow envisage granting Ukraine guarantees of its national security after the START I Treaty comes into force and Ukraine accedes to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They contain pledges regarding confirming independence, sovereignty, and existing borders and refraining from threats of force or using force or measures of economic pressure; a pledge by the United States to grant Ukraine a minimum of $170 million for the dismantlement of nuclear weapons with the possibility of the size of this assistance being increased; moving all nuclear warheads in Ukraine to Russia for their dismantlement with simultaneous compensation being granted in the form of deliveries of fuel assemblies to Ukraine for the needs of its nuclear power engineering.

"In addition, and this is of especial political significance, it was confirmed that Ukraine, the United States, and Russia will cooperate with each other as fully fledged and equal partners and that relations between them should be developed on the principles of respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of every state.

"The United States also stated its readiness to render assistance to Ukraine in creating a market economy in Ukraine. In this way, the trilateral statement and the appendix to it, and also their implementation, meet the demands set forth in the resolution of the Supreme Council of 18 November 1993. In connection with this, in accordance with an article of the constitution of Ukraine, by way of a legislative initiative I am submitting proposals to remove the reservations contained in the resolution of the Supreme Council of 18 November 1993 concerning article 5 of the Lisbon Protocol and Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A draft of a corresponding resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine is appended."

Appended to the document is the Supreme Council's draft resolution on this issue of the following contents:

"The Supreme Council's resolution on the implementation by the Ukrainian president and the Ukrainian Government of recommendations contained in Paragraph 11 of the Ukrainian Supreme Council's resolution on the ratification of the Treaty between the USSR and the U.S. on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Nuclear Offensive Weapons, signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991, and the protocol to it, signed in Lisbon on behalf of Ukraine on 23 May 1992;

"Taking account of the specific steps that were taken by the Ukrainian president and government in the period from November 1993 to January 1994, in respect of the implementation of the provisions of the Supreme Council's resolution of 18 November 1993;

"Proceeding from the results of the meeting between the Ukrainian, U.S. and Russian Federation presidents in Moscow on 14 January 1994 and the trilateral statement and appendix to it, signed by them;

"Taking account of the fact that it was confirmed to Ukraine by the U.S. and Russian presidents that they were ready to extend to Ukraine national security guarantees after the START I treaty is brought into effect and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is acceded to by Ukraine as a nuclear-free state;

"As well as taking account of the obligations by the United States, Russia, and Great Britain relating to Ukraine, to respect its independence, sovereignty and existing borders, refrain from the threat or use of force against its territorial integrity or political independence, as well as refraining from economic pressure, and taking account of their obligation not to use any weapons against Ukraine;

"In view of the confirmation from the Ukrainian, American, and Russian presidents that they will build their relations on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of each of the states, as well as the confirmation of their readiness to assist Ukraine in setting up an effective market economy; and

"Acknowledging the fact that the United States assured Ukraine of providing technical and financial assistance to dismantle nuclear weapons securely and safely and preserve fissionable material, as well as of promoting the speedy implementation of the agreements on this assistance, that are already in existence, the Supreme Council of Ukraine resolves:

"1. Taking into account the specific measures taken by the president and Government of Ukraine regarding implementation of the resolution of the Supreme Council of Ukraine on 18 November 1993 and the steps on the part of the United States and Russia to meet Ukraine half way, to remove the reservations regarding Article 5 of the Protocol to the START I Treaty signed in Lisbon on 23 May 1992.

"2. To charge the Government of Ukraine to exchange instruments of ratification of the START I Treaty.

"3. To accede to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1 July 1968, which will henceforth be called the Treaty, as a state not owning nuclear weapons, with the following statement:

"1) Ukraine owns the components of the nuclear weapons that it inherited from the former USSR. After the weapons are dismantled and destroyed under its control and in accordance with a procedure that will rule out the possibility of reusing these weapons' components for the original purpose, Ukraine intends to use the material extracted from them exclusively for civilian purposes, as fuel for Ukrainian AES [nuclear electric power station]'s in particular, or receive compensation for them;

"2) The Treaty does not fully cover the unique situation that arose as a result of the disintegration of nuclear power of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of Ukraine until they are eliminated entirely, as well as appropriate activity to maintain, service, and eliminate them, does not contravene Articles 1 and 2 of the Treaty.

"3) Ukraine will hold talks with the International Atomic Energy Agency with the aim of concluding agreements regarding the guarantees envisaged by the Treaty;

"4) The violation of the territorial integrity or inviolability of Ukraine's borders on the part of any nuclear state will be viewed by Ukraine as a violation of the Treaty."

Foreign Minister Views Tripartite Pact

WS2501162794 Kiev KIEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 2

[Report by Larisa Zhalovaga: "I Am Sure the Tripartite Agreement Serves Ukrainian Interests"]

[Text] Speaking at a meeting devoted to the recent scientific conference held in Jamaica and titled "Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, and the U.S. Policy," Ukrainian Foreign Deputy Minister Borys Tarasyuk said that sentiments in the U.S. scientific circles, which have a substantial influence on American lawmakers, have recently changed in favor of Ukraine. In the opinion of Mr. Tarasyuk, Ukraine is regarded as a serious factor in the geopolitical situation. The journalists wanted to learn certain aspects of the tripartite agreement regarding the liquidation of Ukrainian nuclear weapons recently signed in Moscow by the three presidents.

Asked whether the agreement will be implemented if the Supreme Council blocks joining the Lisbon Protocol, Borys Tarasyuk said: Of course, as a legislative body, the Supreme Council wields powers ensured by the Constitution, and its position on the Lisbon Protocol is known. However, one cannot deny the fact that the executive branch has a somewhat different viewpoint. As you know, the Ukrainian president has repeatedly stressed his disagreement with the Supreme Council decision made on 18 November, and again will try to persuade the deputies that Ukraine must join the nonproliferation treaty. Will the agreement be implemented?

We know how the world reacted to the ratification of START I by our legislature. Some participants of the tripartite agreement soundly rejected the position and all conditions put forward in the Supreme Council resolution. As a result, the fact of signing the tripartite agreement proves that our partners recognized the correctness of the conditions declared by our parliament on 18 November, 1993.

Let us examine the most important ones. National security guarantees are reflected in the agreement. So is compensation for nuclear weapons and financial aid. A question may arise here: Are these sufficient guarantees? But this is a different issue, and it will be worked on. I am confident, however, that implementation of this agreement serves the interests of Ukraine.

Asked how the Crimean elections will influence Russian-Ukrainian relations, the foreign deputy minister cited a statement by a high-ranking Russian diplomat reported by INTERFAX, who thinks that the issue of the presidency in the Crimea is not completely settled with the Ukrainian parliament. Legally, the Ukrainian president can declare the elections void. The unidentified diplomat believes that no serious political crisis should be expected in case Yuriy Meshkov is elected Crimean president. Russian should only develop mutually advantageous relations with the Crimea, but on no account, as he put it, get it to eat out of Russia's hand. Politically, this would not be a good move regarding Ukraine. Besides, Russia does not need any spongers. This is the viewpoint of a ranking Russian diplomat, stressed Borys Tarasyuk. He also said that since this is our internal affair, the Crimean elections should cause concern to Ukraine rather than to Russia.

If the presidential elections in the peninsula do not change the present norms of international law and the Helsinki principles, improving instead its social and economic life, they should only be welcomed.

But if those elections result in attempts to change Crimea's status as part of Ukrainian territory, this will certainly produce very serious consequences in the domestic situation and, depending on Russia's reaction, on Ukrainian-Russian relations.

At the same time, Borys Tarasyuk emphasized, signatures of the three presidents on the tripartite agreement that speak about territorial integrity—especially as it applies to Ukraine—and the nonviolability of the present border point to the explicit position of the Russian leadership on possible attempts to split the Crimea from Ukraine.

Environment Minister Criticizes Disarmament Plan

MK2601104094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 26 Jan 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Yuriy Kostenko, environment minister and head of a parliamentary working group on START I and nuclear disarmament, by Vladimir Skachko; place and date not given: "'This Is Not Disarmament but Disrobing [razdevaniye] of the State.' The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Can Give a Legal Assessment of the Moscow Statement by the Three Presidents"]

[Text] Ivan Plyushch, speaker of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, has stated that the Supreme Soviet must decide on the question of compatibility of Ukraine's national interests with the statement signed by presidents of the United States, Ukraine, and Russia on the future of the Ukrainian strategic missiles and also consider a draft resolution on Ukraine's accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. According to Ivan Plyushch, because the resolution on joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty was prepared by the presidential services, the report on this matter should be made by President Leonid Kravchuk. Yuriy Kostenko, head of a special working deputies group on preparing the START I Treaty and on Ukraine's acquiring a nonnuclear status, and minister for environmental protection, commented for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on the deputies' decision to return to these matters.

[Kostenko] The Moscow tripartite statement has actually offered quite a different scheme of nuclear disarmament for Ukraine than what was decided on this score by our Supreme Soviet. This scheme does not take many aspects into account either from the viewpoint of national security or from the viewpoint of our economic interests. Therefore the Moscow statement must be considered in full as a separate agreement and be given an appropriate legal assessment.

[Skachko] But this is a statement, not an agreement. The parliament may neither ratify it, nor fail to ratify it.

[Kostenko] I understand this. The statement has been made in such a way that it could not be submitted to the consideration of the Supreme Soviet. This is so-called legal chicanery. Now, Ukraine's supreme legislative body adopts one scheme of nuclear disarmament while the executive branch, contrary to this, proposes a totally different one. Therefore the Supreme Soviet, in line with the current constitution and entitled to consider all international agreements, is also to consider this document as well as give it a proper legal appraisal and establish whether it is good for Ukraine. Possibly, it will have to be vetoed as a document which contradicts Ukraine's national interests.

[Skachko] And presumably the parliament resolution on this question must be enforced?

[Kostenko] This is undoubtedly the power of the Supreme Soviet. Moreover, I would like to point out that the work conducted by the Supreme Soviet will allow, in my opinion, more or less to balance Ukraine's interests with the interests of those who insist that Ukraine become nuclear-free. In the Moscow document I do not see either the economic interests or guarantees of Ukraine's security that many are talking about so much.

[Skachko] How would you comment on the view that neither the statement nor the appendix to it contains a word on compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons evacuated to Russia?

[Kostenko] This only shows once again that there is a certain contradiction between what our Supreme Soviet has adopted and what our president has signed. The parliament resolution clearly says that compensation must be made also for the tactical nuclear weapons, while the Moscow statement does not say anything about this separately. As far as I know, Russia apparently promises to consider this issue and provide some compensation after all.

[Skachko] In other words, compensation for tactical nuclear weapons is a subject of separate talks between Ukraine and Russia?

[Kostenko] Yes, talks on this issue have been going on, but it has not been settled conclusively yet because experts have been tasked to consider it and establish how exactly compensation will be made.

[Skachko] Has any time frame been defined for making compensation to Ukraine for the tactical nuclear weapons?

[Kostenko] No, no term has been established. This is very difficult to do because no one knows with what funds compensation will be made. If from the proceeds of the 500 tonnes of enriched uranium that Russia is to sell to the United States, then this can happen only after this uranium has been sold on the world market. Only then will Russia start partially to receive real money and, naturally, will be able to make some compensation to Ukraine. At present, however, no such funds are available. True, there is also another option (which, incidentally, would be the most adequate for Ukraine): to evaluate the cost of each warhead. This is possible because it is known how much uranium and plutonium there is in each warhead. Therefore, using an equivalent, one could estimate the value of the tactical nuclear weapons that we have transferred to Russia. According to our preliminary estimates, the value is $10 billion. Assuming this sum, Russia is already in debt to Ukraine—not the other way around, as some are trying to have us believe today. And if we talk about energy, then, given that uranium and plutonium are very valuable energy carriers, an equivalent exchange scheme could be used: We deliver highly enriched uranium and plutonium to them, and they supply us with oil and gas. But unfortunately this option has not been used; moreover, during the talks the subject of "plutonium" was somehow lost altogether. And it is a very costly element: one kilogram of enriched plutonium, according to various estimates, can cost up to $1 million, and one kilogram of enriched uranium up to $100,000. Now you can imagine the value of the material assets that we have already transferred to Russia.

[Skachko] How much uranium and plutonium have you transferred to Russia?

[Kostenko] Approximately 10 tonnes of enriched plutonium and more than 90 tonnes of enriched uranium.

[Skachko] What is the correlation in parliament of people who advocate a solution of the problem of Ukraine's nuclear weapons on terms favorable for it and those who are ready to give the missiles away?

[Kostenko] Judging by the results of voting during the ratification of START I, it can said that the majority of parliament members are inclined toward organizing a normal nuclear disarmament of Ukraine. But what has happened in Moscow is not nuclear disarmament but the disrobing of the state. In the military, economic, and political sense.

Military Trying To 'Delay' Missile Removal

PM2501100594 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition pp 1-2

[Viktor Litovkin report: "Not Everyone in Ukrainian Missile Forces Agrees With President Kravchuk"]

[Text] There is growing opposition within the Ukrainian Army—as there is within parliament—to the tripartite statement signed in Moscow by President Leonid Kravchuk, U.S. President Bill Clinton, and Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

This IZVESTIYA correspondent has learned that, at a Ukrainian Defense Ministry Collegium session 21 January devoted to the training of military personnel in the country's higher educational establishments and the strengthening of discipline among the troops, Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhtyuk, commander of the Strategic Missile Forces 43d Missile Army stationed in Vinnitsa, and Major General Nikolay Filatov, commander of the 46th Missile Division from Pervomaysk in Nikolayev Oblast, unexpectedly and without prior arrangement took the Ukrainian military oath.

Major General Rustam Karimov, commander of the 19th Missile Division stationed in Khmelnitskiy, refused to take the Ukrainian oath at this collegium session and stated that he would not even do so before his own combined unit—where 40 percent of the officers do not want to swear an oath of allegiance to a fatherland yet again. That accounts for 413 of the 1,017 officers in the division. Of these, 354 want to move to Russia for the rest of their service, while the others want to be discharged to the reserve and go to live back home.

Given that, before last Friday, the leading personnel of the missile army and missile divisions stationed in Ukraine as well as the overwhelming majority of other missile officers had not sworn loyalty to Ukraine, this step by the Defense Ministry Collegium is being seen by some observers as a direct challenge to the policy announced by President Leonid Kravchuk in the sphere of his state's nuclear missile disarmament, and as an attempt to complicate and delay this process as long as possible, to make it as unpredictable as possible, and to nullify cooperation with Russia in carrying out the START I and II treaties.

As is well known, there are 176 strategic RS-18 liquid-propellant missiles (90 in Khmelnitskiy and 40 in Pervomaysk) and RS-22 solid-propellant (all 46 in Pervomaysk) launch systems with 1,250 nuclear warheads plus 650 air-launched cruise missile assemblies [bloki] in Ukraine. The Strategic Nuclear Forces Administrative Command and Control Center is located there, and the creation of nuclear space forces has been announced.

The elimination of the strategic nuclear complex along with the country's fulfillment of its commitments under the Lisbon Protocol to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nuclear-free state represents for many Ukrainian generals—particularly those who had recently moved to top jobs in the Kiev Defense Ministry—the complete end of their careers. They will naturally do all they can to prevent it.

Meanwhile the situation in the Ukrainian Missile Forces—this is no secret to specialists—remains very complex despite all the reassuring statements from Ukrainian generals. Many missile systems have come to the end of their warranty and inspection and maintenance [reglamentnyy] servicing period. The state does not have enough money to carry out the servicing.

In 1993 Ukrainian specialists stood down two RS-18 strategic missile regiments in Pervomaysk and Khmelnitskiy (10 RS-18's each). The nuclear warheads were dismantled and sent to technical storage bases, the missiles were removed from their silos, their oxidants and fuel were transferred to special tanks, and the missiles were loaded onto railcars and prepared for dispatch to "Yuzhmashzavod" in Dnepropetrovsk.

But each dismantled missile still contains up to 100 kg of a highly toxic substance—one of the components of the missile fuel. The equipment to degasify them does not exist, nor does the technology for processing the heptyl. The plant turned out not to be ready to receive these missiles.

It was necessary to remove them from the railcars and transfer the toxic liquids from the rail tanks into other containers. The dismantling of obsolete [vysluzhivshikh svoi sroki] missiles has been halted indefinitely. There are neither the warehouses, nor the specialized transportation, nor the funds to handle them. Officers are angry that they are being forced to do such a dangerous and senseless job.

Their service conditions and their pay are far lower than in Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces. For instance, a missile division commander in Ukraine earns 2.2 million coupons-karbovantsi a month. If this sum is expressed in Russian rubles [R] at the actual exchange rate (24 to 1), it turns out that a Ukrainian general is "valued" less than a Russian lieutenant—who earned around R100,000 in December 1993 and will have been earning 90 percent more as of January. Moreover, last month Ukraine's missile troops received their pay literally on the eve of the New Year, after major scandals at the Finance Ministry, and have not yet seen any money this January.

Parliament Speaker Cited on Nuclear Arms Issue

LD2501133794 Kiev UNIAR in Ukrainian 1245 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Excerpts] Kiev, 25 Jan—The Supreme Council of Ukraine began its session today under the chairmanship of Speaker Ivan Plyushch. [passage omitted]

With regard to the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty, Ivan Plyushch said that the last time parliament discussed the issue was on 18 November 1993, when it adopted reservations concerning ratification of the START treaty. Since then, the president of Ukraine has carried out a great deal of work which resulted in the signing of the Moscow statement.

Plyushch said the president of Ukraine requested the Supreme Council to examine the issue of Ukraine's accession to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. However, the Supreme Council's three standing commissions, which met 24 January with the participation of the working group dealing with ratification of the treaty, failed to find a common solution.

The parliament speaker said that this afternoon's session of the Supreme Council will look at the resolution on the state privatization program for 1994.

Political, Economic Results of Accord Viewed

WS2501145694 Kiev UKRAYINA MOLODA in Ukrainian 21 Jan 94 p 3

[Article by Olena Lisnycha: "What Will Ukraine Get From the Nuclear Deal?"]

[Text] At first, it should be emphasized that terms and figures included in the agreement by the three presidents and in an appendix to it are suspended in a volatile imbalance, because that document does not have the force of a concrete international legal document, reflecting simply formal political obligations assumed by all sides. If that document had the form of an agreement or treaty, it would certainly affect our internal law, which would enable the parliament to resort to its favorite weapon, impeachment.

"I have no doubts whatsoever about the legitimacy of what was done by the executive branch. However, it is up to the Supreme Council to examine how this was done," said Mr. Chalyy, chief of the legal department at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry. Thus, the Ukrainian parliament will have to ratify START I with no reservations and join the nonproliferation treaty to implement the agreement. Ideally, the legislature should endorse START II, that is, to give the go-ahead regarding the destruction of nuclear arsenals so that the Moscow agreement is legally binding. Silenced by top officials of our state, this question somehow remains nothing more than rhetoric.

It is strange that the agreement's appendix provides for the decommissioning of most of the modern SS-24 missiles within 10 months and not the SS-19's whose short expiration terms cause much concern.

The agreement signed in Moscow will surely be extended by a long chain of negotiations, and its contours—now pretty vague—will have to become more specific.

Nuclear Fuel

"Enriched uranium contained in nuclear arms is a matter of a purely commercial nature," said Bill Clinton at a news conference at the Boryspil Airport. It was agreed that within seven years, Russia would process—at our expense—highly enriched uranium into fuel for atomic power stations, one portion of which will be immediately shipped to Ukraine (100 tonnes of low-activated uranium in the first 10 months), while another part will be sold to the United States for $1 billion. Ideally, Washington should send this billion to Kiev. However, Russia also claims its portion of the nuclear pie as a country tasked with processing the uranium. So far, details regarding the division of this billion-dollar tidbit are inaccessible.

Debts for Energy Sources

The information that came in last Friday [14 January] about Moscow's pledges of fair play in negotiating the $2-billion indebtness with Kiev have not borne out entirely. Looming ahead is the perspective of endless blanket-pulling and difficult inter-governmental talks. According to a dark vision by government officials, instead of the entire debt, Russia will agree to forgive only its small portion. The point is that structures with looser dependence from the state, such as the "Gazprom," were also engaged in energy supplies. This kind of "debt canceling" is more profitable for them.

Support of International Financial Organizations

This support is possible only when Ukraine devises clear-cut plans for getting out of an economic crisis. In other words, only staunch optimists can count on it at the present time. For example, propped up by the United States, Russia is expecting $1.5 billion from the International Monetary Fund and $500 billion from the World Bank. This is a modest sum considering the size of Russia, and would remain so if allocated to Ukraine. Hypothetically, even with credits on hand, Ukraine should be prepared for high interest rates.

Tactical Weapons

This appears to be the biggest "white spot" in all this nuclear business. The agreement does not offer a clear statement on compensation for tactical weapons removed from the three ex-Soviet republics to Russia. Officials warily say that "experts are now working on this issue."

Support for Weapons Destruction Process

This support was offered by the Nunn-Lugar plan initiated in December 1991 and will be financed by U.S. Defense Department resources. The plan's basic provisions envisioned for 1993 fiscal year spendings for dismantling and destruction of nuclear weapons, establishing aid funds for disarming CIS countries, and humanitarian aid, which is $800 million, $100 million, and $410 million, respectively, for all nuclear successors of the Soviet Union. Of this amount, $175 million for technical assistance in weapons destruction was promised to Leonid Kravchuk by then-President Bush in December 1992. This promise was also confirmed by Bill Clinton at the meeting with the Ukrainian president in Kiev. The American side is relying on its experience of scrapping similar 300-missile complexes in 1992 that needed $300 billion for destruction. Foreign Ministry officials claim that if the process "gets rolling," Americans are ready to provide additional funds to Ukraine. On the other hand, the Nunn-Lugar program contains quite a few discriminative limitations. One of them, for instance, says that the CIS country receiving this aid should also put in its own money to finance the destruction of nuclear weapons. So disarmament will definitely put a squeeze on the more than meager Ukrainian budget. In addition, Ukraine will be able to use the $175 billion only for U.S. and Ukrainian (practically nonexistent) technologies and experts.

The United States will definitely reap most of the profits coming from the nuclear deal. Bill Clinton returned to the White House with another victory. The United States will cash in on buying cheap fuel for atomic power stations practically without spending their budget dollars for the important cause of "peace in all the world." Ex-Soviet republics safeguard the quiet sleep of Americans because the spread of nuclear technologies and weapons to unreliable Asian regimes—so much feared by America shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union—appears to be unrealistic now. Russia, America's strategic partner, achieved its goals by bashing Ukraine on the nuclear issue. The issue of energy debts—one of the leverages over Ukraine—remains unsolved; now even fuel supplies to Ukrainian atomic power plants depend on Russia.

So what has Ukraine gotten from the deal except for international acknowledgment? For now, we can definitely point to a great relief for our state budget from a huge burden imposed by servicing nuclear complexes. In addition, preliminary estimates show that the 100 tonnes of fuel for atomic stations, due within 10 months, will keep our plants going for two years.

Sufficiency of Guarantees, U.S. Aid Questioned

WS2601100294 Kiev VECHIRNIY KYYIV in Ukrainian 21 Jan 94 p 1

[Report by Oksana Boyko: "Let's Hope"]

[Text] William G. Miller, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, held a news conference in the just-renovated American House on 19 January devoted to the tripartite Declaration signed by Ukrainian, American, and Russian presidents in Moscow last week. As expected, the ambassador highly praised this document and the efforts by the leaders of the three countries—especially the courage displayed by President Kravchuk—directed at nuclear disarmament. The ambassador also recalled the history of nuclear disarmament dating back to late 1960's. William Miller himself has been working on this problem for a long time, and he also personally knew Andrey Sakharov, the father of a hydrogen bomb who ardently fought to rid the world of nuclear weapons.

The signed tripartite Declaration, stated the ambassador, is seen by the United States as an important element in intensifying and strengthening bilateral relations with the United States, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. In the words of the American diplomat, the entire list of the conditions put forward by the Supreme Council regarding the ratification of START I and the Nonproliferation Treaty was included in the agenda of Ukrainian—American-Russian negotiations. And all of them have been fulfilled. Of course, the ratification of the Moscow agreement by the Supreme Council is an affair of the Supreme Council itself and the Ukrainian people. However, Mr. Miller believes that when they understand all provisions of the document and the scale of events it affects, everything will be fine and the agreement will be ratified. An interesting discrepancy should be noted here. Both the American ambassador and Russian officials refer to the document as an "agreement" [preceding word published in English] and talk about the need to ratify it. On the other hand, Ukrainian Foreign Ministry officials explained that the Declaration signed by the presidents is not subject to ratification. What should be ratified is START I and Ukraine's adherence to the Lisbon Protocol. The Declaration simply points to a mechanism for their implementation. Russians have already started to talk about the scrapping of Ukrainian nuclear weapons as an accomplished fact. Does this mean that each side sees in the document what it likes?

The issue of money was also brought up at the news conference. Why so little (in our opinion, of course)? Mr. Miller assured that the United States would not stop at the $175 million earmarked by the U.S. Congress for the dismantling and removal of the missiles. The United States will now orient its foreign policy toward expanding comprehensible contacts with Ukraine and establishing closer cooperation with it.

Asked about nuclear security of a nonnuclear Ukraine, the ambassador gave a very diplomatic answer. As for actions by international organizations and the United States in the event of an assault on Ukraine by some nuclear state, Mr. Miller said that in this hypothetical case, the mechanisms established by the UN and CSCE Statutes would be initiated. "Let's hope that these international organizations will prove strong enough and be able to put in motion all powers that they have." A very promising perspective, considering the UN's smashing success in settling conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, etc.—not to mention indirect aggressions in the sub-Dniester Republic, Southern Ossetia, or Abkhazia, which received its own powerful Armed Forces out of nowhere—as well as the great respect for international public opinion exhibited by such politicians as Zhirinovskiy elbowing his way to the Russian leadership. Yes, let's hope that nothing will happen to us—just like in that famous Russian fairy tale.

Cooperation Accord Signed With Uzbek Minister

AU2501121294 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 22 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "A Cooperation Agreement Has Been Reached"]

[Text] Lieutenant General Rustam Akhmetov, minister of defense of the Republic of Uzbekistan, arrived in Ukraine on an official visit. He met with Ukraine's Minister of Defense Army General Vitaliy Radetskyy. In the course of the meeting, the leaders of the military departments exchanged experience in building armed forces and discussed questions of cooperation between the military structures of Ukraine and Uzbekistan. As reported by the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, particular attention was given to cooperation in the branches of rear and technical services, air defense, the training of officers' personnel, and so on.

The leaders of the military departments of the two states signed an agreement on military cooperation between the ministries of defense of Ukraine and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

National Affairs

Kravchuk Introduces Constitution to Supreme Council

LD2501202094 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Speech by President Leonid Kravchuk to the Supreme Council in Kiev—live]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies: In his introduction, chairman of the Supreme Council, Ivan Stepanovich Plyushch, gave some brief information about the order, procedure, and the passage of this document [draft constitution] and also of documents that were examined here in the Supreme Council, including the draft constitution. You will recall that after the concept of the constitution was adopted, I first made a speech when the constitution was submitted for nationwide discussion for the first time and then the second speech was made by Ivan Stepanovich Plyushch. Thus, according to the constitution, three speeches were made: one on the concept, and two on the draft of tne constitution itself. Thus, we may say that the Supreme Council and the commission on elaborating the new constitution which it created worked actively for two years. A large number of proposals were received. Some of them were taken into account and more than 2,000 proposals were received after it was published. If one were to give a short description of them, they relate to the problems of organizing power and most of them relate to the problem of the territorial organization of power and local self-government.

The main aim of preparing the adoption of documents which we are now discussing lies in the urgency of improving and stabilizing the system of organizing power that is naturally an indivisible condition for further political and economic reforms in Ukraine: the creation of a stable legal basis for the activity of the Supreme Council of the new convocation and other bodies of power, and the speeding up of the constitutional process and finalizing work on the new constitution of Ukraine. The form of the adoption of this document by means of a referendum establishes firm legal foundations for the legitimate and evolutionary process of organizing power structures, holding it with the agreement of the highest bearer of power: the people of Ukraine. Without doubt this will become an important condition of accord, social peace, and partnership in our society.

Other ways of resolving constitutional issues were examined at an extended session of the constitutional commission. In particular the talk was about the possibility of working out a mechanism for elaborating the draft new constitution of Ukraine and submitting it as a whole to a referendum. The talk was about the possibility of the Supreme Council again directly adopting a constitution and about a Ukraine-wide referendum adopting a prepared draft law on the organization of authority in Ukraine. Documents were submitted, I repeat, on all of these aspects, and were discussed. But it was agreed that the most legitimate and productive path is for the Supreme Council to approve the basis for constitutional principles and for it to be submitted to a referendum.

And now briefly about the content of the document submitted: It is based on principles determined by the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine and on the corresponding principles of the new draft constitution of Ukraine, which, as has already been said here, have been frequently examined in this hall. The fundamental constitutional clauses contain guiding principles and powers and mechanisms of restraint and counterbalance, which make it possible to create an efficient system of organizing state authority and local self-government.

It is also important that they provide answers to questions, which people's deputies and representatives of local bodies of authority are proposing and have proposed be put to the referendum in a separate bloc. That is, questions on constitutional order, on the form of state government, and on the territorial organization of power and local self-government. That is, this document, in our opinion, resolves the fundamental issue as a whole. It does not tear them away from the general political and state context and does not create an atmosphere of social tension in society.

The substance of the fundamental constitutional clauses gives grounds for determining a democratic, lawful, and social nature of the state and social order, where universal values are determined without any "-isms"; the priority of human rights and freedoms are also determined this way, as are political, economic, and ideological variety and equal protection for all forms of ownership in a socially oriented market economy. The fundamental clauses establish elements of the form of government that are the most acceptable under current conditions by determining the authority of the branches of power, and these clauses determine the territorial system and territorial organization of power, specifically unitary decentralized power.

As you see, the document is composed of seven chapters, the first of which deals with the general basis of the organization of state power and local self-government, proceeding in particular from the principles of democracy, the supremacy of law, and the division of state power into its legislative, executive, and judicial branches. These principles are further developed and enforcibly realized in the draft's further chapters.

The second, third, fourth, and fifth chapters contain the main provisions on the status, plenary powers, functional mutual relations, and organization of central branches and establishments of state legislative, executive, and judicial power, as well as the plenary powers of the Ukrainian president.

The second chapter emphasizes that the people exercise legislative power by way of an all-Ukrainian referendum and that the only body of legislative power, that functions permanently, is the Supreme Council of the Ukrainian parliament. Also determined here are the main legislative, institutional supervisory functions, and plenary powers of the Supreme Council, its capabilities in respect of the operation of budgetary and taxation policies, appointment, and election of the president, and his impeachment, formation of the government, etc.

The draft's third chapter establishes the status of the Ukrainian president as the head of state, who is removed from the system of executive power and placed with various branches of power, acting in relation to all of them as a guarantor to ensure that the Constitution of Ukraine is abided by, human and civic rights and freedoms are complied with and state unity, sovereignty, and the national security and territorial integrity of

Ukraine are preserved. It is in connection with this that the relevant functions and plenary powers are also vested in the president.

The fourth chapter defines the system of executive power in Ukraine and the status of the supreme organ of state executive power, the Cabinet of Ministers, that is accountable and responsible to the Supreme Council and is under the Ukrainian president's control. The preparation of this chapter was based on the need to raise the level of the government's independence and strengthen executive power and discipline at every level in all.

The fifth chapter, as you see, is on the subject of an authoritative system of judicial power.

A separate provision in the draft's sixth chapter is on the territorial reorganization of power and local self-government. It is about this, as has already been said, that discussions were particularly acute. This chapter's agreed version proceeds from the direction of the territorial organization of power and local self-government toward uniting state, regional, and local interests under the unitary decentralized construction of a single system of Ukraine's territorial structure.

This is particularly pressing because of the situation which today surrounds the Crimean issue. It is completely understandable that it cannot be further left undefined. That is why section six outlines the status of the Crimean Republic on the principles of autonomy, of Kiev as the capital of Ukraine, and Sevastopol as a city that has a general state significance, bodies of state power of the Crimean Republic, and bodies of local self-government. Local interests will be represented by heads of oblast, rayon, and town and village councils that will be directly elected by the population and will be headed officially by the executive bodies of the appropriate councils. In order to avoid centrifugal and separatist tendencies and also with the aim of strengthening executive discipline on issues of powers delegated by the state, they will be answerable to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. In the event of a blatant violation of Ukraine's constitution or legislative acts they may be removed from their posts.

Cases are envisaged when the powers of the Supreme Council of the Crimean Republic and also of respective local councils may be terminated ahead of time by Ukraine's Supreme Council. This relates to the adoption of decisions directed at violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine, an arbitrary change in its state territorial system, the blatant violation of Ukraine's Constitution and laws, and not bringing their own decisions in line with them.

The draft's final seventh chapter points out that this document lays the foundation of the completion of work on Ukraine's new constitution and that the organs of state power and local self-government across the whole territory of Ukraine are formed after the fundamental constitutional provisions are brought into effect, which is quite essential in order to understand and overcome the differences between the current constitution and this document which will be implemented as relevant laws are worked out and Ukraine's new constitution is adopted.

As for the possibility of the issues of state symbols, citizenship, linguistic policy, and so on being included in the fundamental constitutional provisions, this was the subject of every session. All of them are undoubtedly very important and of consequence and cannot be ignored. We all very well know, however, that there is no uniform perception of them today in various regions of Ukraine. Including them in the fundamental provisions and putting them up for a referendum—on top of all this at the time of holding the elections—can lead to exacerbating the political struggle and further increasing enmity in society. That is why raising these issues now is inexpedient. They could well be settled either in a new constitution or constitutional legislation which will be dealt with by a newly-composed Supreme Council.

Since the fundamental constitutional provisions on the reorganization of state power and local self-government in Ukraine have also been appropriately approved, endorsed, and recommended for a decision to be taken on them, with approval given by the conference of councils at all levels, and are based on the provisions of the draft new constitution of Ukraine, it is proposed that a discussion should be held about them, that changes and amendments, if any of course, should be introduced and that then the decision drafted should be taken.

In view of this, we have every ground to propose this document and include it in a referendum at the time of the elections on 27 March 1994.

Esteemed People's Deputies: Here in this hall, fateful and some of the most responsible decisions were made. I hope that, its historical mission taken into consideration, the Supreme Council today will, on the basis of its experience, open a new page in the development of nation-building in Ukraine, of new prospects, treating their electorate with great respect and enabling them to make their conclusive pronouncement on the organization of power in Ukraine. Thank you for attention.

Kravchuk Answers Questions

LD2501233794 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 94

[President Leonid Kravchuk question and answer session with deputies following his speech at a session of the Supreme Council in Kiev—live]

[Excerpts] [Deputy Chernyavskyy] Deputy Chernyavskyy, electoral district 352. Esteemed Leonid Makarovych. I think that the question is to Ivan Stepanovych Plyushch, too. Isn't there a contradiction in the fourth, fifth, and eighth points of chapter six on chairmen of councils of the relevant level—when they are elected by the people—but here the issue comes up that they are subordinate to the appropriate council.

[passage omitted] One can be elected by the people, but removed from one's post by the president. With all due respect to the president, well, that is, one can be removed not by those bodies and people by whom they were elected.

[Kravchuk] I think that there should always be some kind of mechanism. Well, for example, the question did not occur to you that the president is elected by the people, but the Supreme Council can remove him from his post by means of impeachment or by submitting the issue to a referendum. Such a question has not occurred. It did not occur. So why does the question occur here—one is elected by the people, but if the person violates the Constitution, violates laws, and in that part especially where the state delegates functions for him to carry out, then naturally the representative body cannot remain without reacting to these matters, and neither can the government remain aloof from this if we truly want to create a strong and responsible executive authority. Therefore I think that a counterbalance should always be there, and the person should know that there is some kind of lever forcing him either to work responsibly or he will be removed from his post.

[Deputy Starichenko] Esteemed Leonid Makarovych. Starichenko, Donetsk oblast. I have a question which perturbs my electors. We are submitting the basis of the constitution for examination and (?without) the main issue, which we have taken away from our electors, which was in the old constitution. That is the right of the individual to labor, to free education, the right to free health care and so on and so forth. The question is why the said issue has not been submitted in this basis.

[Kravchuk] I share this point of view and the concern of your electors. For in our time we removed an entire 23 chapters from the constitution then in force, and now these clauses are not in our constitution either. That is, the present Supreme Council has removed them from the constitution. But they were in this constitution. But we, until now...[pauses] what is the law called? On the fundamentals, the fundamental constitutional principles regarding the organization of state authority and local self-government. That is, we have taken a narrow issue, which will be set out in the relevant chapters of the constitution. But the Supreme Council, which will be convened, I am convinced that it will, these chapters, and incidentally they are in the draft constitution too, but maybe not in this wording, but the Supreme Council will be adopting the constitution as a whole, and these chapters will find a place there without fail.

[Unidentified deputy] I'm sorry, but this situation—because that which I spoke about is not here—these clauses, this situation could cause people simply not to come to the electoral districts to vote. Because they want to see in the constitution namely that which they had, and that which we want to take away from them now.

[Kravchuk] Well, this also depends on us. If we explain to people that everything is not determined by this law or by the fundamental principles, then other issues have to be taken into account too. (?We have taken) a narrow issue. But they will certainly be in the constitution. But the Supreme Council can adopt this too, because this is the most acute issue, and as a rule the most acute debates occur regarding this.

[Deputy Stepenko] Stepenko, electoral district 330. Leonid Makarovych, I have a brief question for you. Here in the second chapter, the second sub-point, the paragraph where it says that the Supreme Council works on a permanent basis, there is an omission in the second version. Is this a misprint or is it really an omission and is parliament going to work on a nonprofessional basis? And another question. Here, well we say that a strong presidential authority is needed. [passage omitted] But look, the president does not appoint or sack the Cabinet of Ministers. [passage omitted] And the last question—on the last page—the issue was discussed whereby the chairmen of oblast, rayon, and settlement councils are directly elected by the people and head the executive authority. But the directors of executive authority—I am making this additional proposal—are elected at council sessions, that is, to exclude personal appointments, which lead to servility and so on.

[Kravchuk] Well, first about the professional nature of parliament. The present Supreme Council adopted a decision by means of a law that the parliament is a professional one and it has made an appropriate change to the constitution. It is already in the constitution. It is already in the constitution. We have not submitted everything. I repeat again. These are details here. Everything that has already been decided today is decided. As regards power and structure, we did not put it in this draft. That is the first thing. The second question concerned a strong executive authority and there being a link between strong executive authority and the president. In this draft, and we all agreed on this, the constitutional commission and council representatives agreed, that executive authority is fully concentrated in the hands of the Cabinet of Ministers. And it is entirely natural that if the prime minister is responsible for executive authority, then we should give him the right to form the government with which he wants to work. But we also give the Supreme Council the right to express no confidence in him or to propose another way, and then he leaves his post and forms another government. If the president is again going to be directly involved in these issues, then he must assume executive authority.

This cannot be. Then a prime minister is not needed. One thing only is needed. That is why we agreed on this version.

As for what you propose regarding the directors of executive authority, I think that this can be resolved by a certain clause. This does not necessarily have to be put into these fundamentals.

[Deputy Marchenko] Marchenko, electoral district 347. [passage omitted] I am asking you one question, only one. Would you not agree for a third time to be true to your right of legislative initiative and submit to a referendum only one question—on the need for the institution of the presidency in Ukraine? Thank you.

[Kravchuk] Well, I understand that this is the stance of your party. For your party the president is now an eyesore, let us say, in Ukraine. You want this issue put to a referendum. But the Supreme Council adopted corresponding decisions. And I am guided by the decisions of the Supreme Council and not by the decisions of individual deputies. There is a decision adopted by this body on the referendum. Then they revoked it and adopted a decision on preterm elections of the Supreme Council and new elections of the president. What contradictions are there here? The time will come, and there will be elections. But you again want a referendum on whether a president is needed. It is not about the name of the president, but about a concrete figure, about the structure of power. If the people do not vote for these fundamental constitutional clauses, then imagine—then the Supreme Council of the new convocation will adopt the decision it considers necessary, and on the institution of the presidency in Ukraine too, and on the nature of power too. But this will then mean that the people do not want such a structure and put themselves in the hands of the Supreme Council of the new convocation. But you want to again return to the issue of a referendum.

[Deputy Petrenko] Volodymyr Petrenko for Azov Electoral District 195. [passage omitted] Following the logic of what is written—and I, for example, am not happy about—I am also going to vote—I am not happy about paragraph 2 of Chapter 4, Executive Power: The supreme organ of state executive power in Ukraine is the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

This is a collective body, whereas I would like a prime minister to head executive power. Thus, only because of one paragraph will I vote entirely against the whole of the fundamental provisions.

So my proposal—and I would like to know your view on that one—is that we should remove these fundamental provisions because we are adopting this package when there is not yet a new parliament. Seventy percent of us will not be there. There will be new people who will have their vision but who will not, however, have the freedom of maneuver because people will have voted on this. Thank you for your attention.

[Kravchuk] Well, I would like you to listen to what I think. I cannot see, for example, how the whole of executive power can be vested in the sole person of the prime minister given that he as a person is appointed by the Supreme Council. Executive power has to concentrate in the Cabinet of Ministers as a body, while the prime minister—it is there further on, do have a look under what the prime minister can do—heads this power and heads the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, forming the government and the composition of the Cabinet of Ministers and exercising control over the Cabinet of Ministers, coordinating and so on. In other words, the organ itself represents executive power and the premier is at the head of it. So what you are saying is there, and I cannot see any differences here. However, the person is not elected democratically, but appointed, so do you really want the whole of full executive power to be given to one person? In that case, what is the role of the government? That is to say, this has to be explained, as simple as that, just explained. [passage omitted]

[Deputy Charodeyev, in Russian] Charodeyev for Donetsk's Proletarskiy rayon. [passage omitted] The question is this: Leonid Makarovych, I am carefully watching what you are saying now and you said earlier that the questions on bilingualism and state symbols could not be put up to a referendum, saying that this question was unconstitutional. In many civilized countries, this is a constitutional question. Where the leadership is wise and makes the right decisions, it does so without a referendum. Here the question is ripe. [passage omitted] Maybe the people in the east will see that the majority in Ukraine is in favor of this—if it is in favor—and maybe they will calm down. Believe me, there is the total unacceptance of either the symbols or monolingualism, and not only in eastern Ukraine. There are letters from western Ukraine, in Ukrainian, that to us, yellow has always been the color of harlots, traitors, and the soft-headed.

That is why it is a referendum, rather than [Pavlo] Movchan or [Larysa] Skoryk [both pro-Ukrainian people's deputies], that can resolve this question. If you think there will be dangerous consequences, tell me what they are. I would sincerely like to make this issue clear to myself. I, however, will prove in a speech that you are mistaken being under pressure from Rukh people and unscrupulous advisers.

[Kravchuk] Well, you know, if we cannot reach a decision here, given that we have not been able to reach it since May 1990, this is because there are different points of view. However, under enforcible enactments and the procedure of work of the Supreme Council, decisions here are made by a majority of votes and nobody makes any distinction between deputies from the West or East voting. It is a majority, period.

Now, imagine such a scene—we have already seen it and here; I am not making anything up; it has already happened—as Ukraine's western regions voting for the yellow and blue flag and the east—I do not know what for and I will not make any forecasts now—and they then (?secede). Then it is not that the deputies cast their votes at the Supreme Council as a body, that will be said. There will be a territorial division as to who voted for what flag. You will say that by a majority this flag should be hoisted here and you are bound, bound, to cause confrontation. This is first.

Second, as democrats—please listen, this is an important issue, and it will anyway have to be settled...

[Plyushch interrupts and trys to restore order]

[Kravchuk] As real democrats, the issue in general and the formulation of the issue on the state language, as it is, is absurd, i.e. it fails to withstand any criticism. In this case, however, it is about supporting the state language. That is all. That is why I cannot see why this issue should be included in the constitution. This can be settled by a law on languages. This law exists, by the way, and it can be worked out, corrected and adopted in the form the Supreme Council deems necessary. This is a democratic way. But to impose on the people and divide them according to the linguistic determinant will simply be dangerous for the state, trust me, and passions will all the time be inflamed over this, whether you want it or not. The thing is that there is the situation that is in existence in Ukraine today. That is why what I am saying about this is that there is no need to include [the issues of state symbols and bilingualism] in the constitution, moreover by a referendum. Settle it by a law and everything will be all right. Perhaps the Supreme Council will consider that two or three official languages are spoken in Ukraine, Ukrainian, Russian and some other.

[Plyushch] The second microphone.

[Deputy Romanov] Romanov for Odessa's District 294. [passage omitted] We have a document called the Declaration on the Sovereignty of Ukraine, where it is written down that the declaration is the basis of a new constitution. We have now prepared another document, which is the [fundamental constitutional] provisions, that are also the basis of Ukraine's new constitution.

My understanding is that the adoption of a [new] constitution will be carried out by a new Supreme Council. That is why, so that there would not be variant readings, and since it will be the basis of a new constitution, I think it would be all right to write the following clause—I would like to know your attitude toward this—in the general provisions, which is Chapter 1—so that we then would not be accused of anything: The right—in Paragraph 4—the right to work, education, scientific development, and environmental protection shall be ensured for the future generations. If we do not write this down, anything can happen after a referendum.

And the next question: In Chapter 5 on judiciary power, nothing is said on the role of the office of the procurator. My opinion is that this particular issue should by all means be elucidated. The issue of the responsibility of the organs of power for violations of the current legislation should also be elucidated. What is your attitude towards these chapters?

[Kravchuk] Well, first of all let us assume the right to everything you say is ensured. Ensured by whom? The state? For everybody? Well, in that case, we have to say one more thing, which is that there shall not be, shall we say, any insurance medicine or any private colleges. No, no, no, no—wait, wait, wait. Once we are saying A, we have to say B. That is to say, the state in accordance with the budget takes it upon itself fully to finance and ensure social security, which is how it used to be.

Let us talk openly: Is it realistic in transition to a market, socially oriented economy?

The next question to you then is this: I am not just saying that we should write it down. Anything can be written and paper will cope with it, but if we write down unrealistic things we will simply ... [responding to a call from the audience and changing thought] What you are saying is correct, but what you have following this is another course of the development of our society. Let us then write down that we are returning to the old styles of work and to the old system of labor and everything, and this all can then be written down.

That is why I would like to say this: If the Supreme Council ... [pauses] Why is it important that this issue should be examined by the Supreme Council? It is because it will weigh up every situation and will specify it and can differentiate something—I do not know.

It cannot just be written down for the state then to say: I have no base to do so, our economy is different. Throughout the world, human beings have the right to use their talents, their capabilities and conditions, rather than having it immediately provided at any cost. You will not find it to be the case anywhere.

So let us now take a realistic look at things. If you are now in favor of this course, then finally say how you formulate it and what we are to vote for.

[Plyushch] There was the office of the procurator. We agreed that by a law on the office of the procurator...

[Kravchuk, interrupting] The office of the procurator—it is moved outside judiciary power. Our office of the procurator is separate, it is to be established by a law on the office of the procurator. You know that it is not included in the system of judiciary power. Then a separate chapter will be needed. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified deputy] I have several questions: Why are the fundamental constitutional provisions on the organization of state power prepared so as to suit a personality, a personality, rather than the state and the people? Let us so far consider them to suit you as president and some...

[Kravchuk, interrupting] Can you be more specific?

[Deputy] I can say specifically...

[Kravchuk] Please.

[Deputy] This is the first question: Why is it that you are elected for five years and the parliament for four?

[Kravchuk] You are welcome. First [words undistinct]...

[Deputy, interrupting] Why is it that you elect the judges and we approve them? [passage omitted]

[Kravchuk] My explanation is this: If it is about the election of the president for four years, I am ready today to alter the number of years, and by the way, it was not I who put it forward.

Second, about why it is me who proposes the judges [passage indistinct] why the president does the proposing is because every society has to have counterweights. If it is the Supreme Council that does the electing, then someone must do the putting forward. You may not elect someone who is proposed, and the president will have to put forward another candidacy. However, it cannot be that an organ grabs everything. Let us say the Supreme Council and president are elected democratically, right? Why should one organ have more rights, more functions, more powers, and more levers to exert pressure than the other who is also someone elected democratically? One does the putting forward and the other does the voting. There are not any discrepancies here.

[Deputy] I have a second question. A second question. Do you agree in accordance with your statement on re-election as president in June?

[Kravchuk] The Supreme Council has adopted a resolution on this.

[Deputy] Are there going to be elections or not?

[Kravchuk] Do I really decide this? The Supreme Council decides this. Why are you addressing me? The issue has already been resolved. Make a correction [as heard]. I repeat, the Supreme Council commission, Oleksandr Pavlovych is right here. I read it today. The draft has been distributed to you—vote for it. I cannot vote for the Supreme Council. Kozarenko there is saying that this is not in the constitution. The Supreme Council adopted a resolution from my proposal. And the Supreme Council should secure this.

[Deputy Tkachuk] Anatoliy Tkachuk from the town of Khmelnitskiy. Esteemed Leonid Makarovych. Please tell me, to this first question, do you believe that when two documents exist in Ukraine, namely one document voted for at a referendum and a second document called the Constitution of Ukraine, and which is referred to here, that this eliminates turmoil in the hall? In my view, this will only increase turmoil. This is the first question. And the second question: please tell me, have you made a psychological analysis of the situation on elections of presidents of oblasts, an analysis of the Ukrainian mentality, when anarchists are even praised in our songs. And in two years you did not manage to remove your representative, whom you appointed in Sevastopol. Will you remove such a representative, when he is elected by the people?

[Kravchuk] I will start with the second question. First, it is entirely untrue that I could not remove him. Simply I could have removed him on the following day whenever I wanted to. So one should not say that I did not manage to. This should be precise.

To continue. You say that there will be two constitutions. I will show you an example. I will show you with one example, let us say with the example of executive authority. The Supreme Council takes this as a basis—that in Ukraine the Cabinet of Ministers has executive authority, the Cabinet of Ministers is the higher body—takes this and on the basis of this adopts a law on the Cabinet of Ministers. Then there is no debate as to who is the head. The people will already have granted fundamental powers to the Cabinet of Ministers. The Supreme Council elaborates a law on the Cabinet of Ministers and it begins to work fully. And there is no discrepancy here. [passage omitted]

There is no fear here. There will only be fear if a new Supreme Council comes to power with nothing in the way of a constitution and begins once again going over what to give to whom. Then they will divide up into blocs, some here, some there, and in this way we will never agree on anything. The people express their will, and the Supreme Council will then act in accordance with the will of the people.

[Deputy Tkachuk] Aren't you afraid of little presidents in oblasts? For instance, I do not fear this. If the oblast entrusts one person with leading it, then let him lead.

[Kravchuk] Well finally, let us, well, I understand the complexities. I understand the ambiguity of our situation and life, but when we trust the people to elect a leader in the localities, this has more possibilities, because they know their own people best. Second, if he violates the law and constitution, he can be removed—this is envisaged—removed by the Cabinet of Ministers. And more, he can be removed by the representative body if deputies assemble and vote for this. That is, there is a counterbalance here. I am saying there is a counterbalance. And there is no need to be afraid. And then you will not be putting questions to me about why I did not sack the representative of the president in Sevastopol. Because this will be decided on the basis of the will of the people.

[Deputy Yatsenko] Yatsenko, Korosten region, electoral district 157. [passage omitted] Why not determine approximately five to seven selected issues that would more or less determine where we are really going? Then the people would understand and politicians would understand. And they would work for the people and not for something else. And I would like to reduce the second question to the second point regarding the president. The president is the guarantor of human rights and freedoms. Does the president have levers to implement, well, this protection of the people? Evidently all of this is a matter for the judicial authority, which has these levers. What do you think? Thank you.

[Kravchuk] Well, where we are going and what we are doing—this is an eternal question. It is not, for instance, a question to which one can reply unambiguously. If one is to take the division of society on a historical scale into some kind of formations, this is simple to do, to capitalism or to socialism. This we know and studied five...[changes thought] you understand, social and political formations. And one can clearly define them. If you are talking about general rules, they are here, freedoms before the law irrespective of one's parentage, social and property freedoms, so that all forms of ownership are safeguarded and all people are protected. But if you have a specific proposal to formulate, then please formulate it. Please do. It can be submitted. But I repeat, this is about authority and what it should protect.

But can the president secure rights and freedoms? I think that, for instance, in an abstract sense he is obliged to do this, and in a concrete sense, certainly. But can the Supreme Council ensure rights and freedoms today? No. This means that this is a realistic mechanism when an individual should live in a lawful, economic and social space, which protects his interests. And everybody should do this—and the president above all—if he is elected by the people. This question has to be asked without fail. If it is not asked at all, then this question is left up in the air: Who ensures these rights?

[Deputy Zakharuk] Dmytro Zakharuk, Snyatyn electoral district 205. I have a question to both co-chairmen and authors of the said draft from this aspect: first of all, one draft was distributed, which truly said that the Supreme Council works on a permanent basis. [passage omitted] So what do you think of submitting this point (?to a referendum), that the Supreme Council works on a permanent basis.

[Kravchuk] I noted in the draft that the parliament works on a permanent basis, but not to note how many deputies.

[Zakharuk] Not to note down how many, but just that it is on a permanent basis?

[Kravchuk] I agree with this. Because just imagine now. I will name one figure now: 450 deputies and 450 assistants—900 offices. The current Cabinet of Ministers has 870. And I am not even mentioning motor vehicle transport, apartments, or anything else. So maybe the new parliament will pay attention to the situation. So I would note—on a permanent basis—but not the number of deputies.

[Deputy Zakharuk] And the no less important issue is the establishment of a balance between legislative power and the president as to confidence and non-confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers. This is to prevent such a happening as the Supreme Council expressing non-confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers, followed by it being once again full of the same people as before composing it. Do you think a norm has to be brought in here for no more than one third of the people from the old Cabinet to be able to join a Cabinet of Ministers of the next composition if the Supreme Council expresses non-confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers?

[Kravchuk] What there can be is this: As it happens, I have never been a supporter of, shall we say, unequivocal decisions. But if you put it this way, then it cannot be one third. If, shall we say, the Supreme Council expresses no confidence in the Cabinet of Ministers, nobody can reenter a new Cabinet of Ministers. Otherwise, how can it be divided? What does one third mean? How will they be distinguished? Is one better than the other? You are either in or out.

The truth, however, is that, as we saw, there are people among the government that, shall we say, are not responsible for separate sins, whereas the whole of the Cabinet of Ministers is made to resign. I think what we have here is that if we take the road of confidence in the prime minister, and the prime minister is responsible for the state of executive power and is accountable and responsible to the Supreme Council, he then should have our confidence. When he resigns, he forms a new government that is again agreed upon by the Supreme Council. I cannot see it happen in any other way.

[Plyushch] Leonid Makarovych, your time is up.

[Kravchuk] Thank you.

Council Postpones Referendum

LD2501210994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1944 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet put off a decision on the referendum on basic constitutional provisions concerning state authorities and local governments at its evening session Tuesday [25 January].

Ivan Plyushch, the Supreme Soviet Chairman, told deputies that opposing views had crystallized. Numerous deputies want to keep the rights of the presidential representatives intact, not delegating part of them to the elected bodies. Others insisted on electing all local authorities.

Plyushch also said that if the Supreme Soviet did not make a decision on the referendum, the president had a right to do so.

The proposal that a referendum on basic constitutional provisions should be held had been made by the constitutional conference held on January 14. These provisions include the list of the powers to be exercised by the president, the Supreme Soviet and the government.

By that draft, the president's functions would be only representing the country on the international scene and supervision of the government activities.

The Supreme Soviet would remain the highest legislative body while the government would take over all the executive functions.

Parliament will continue the debate on January 26.

Government Issues Report on Economic Performance

LD2501142494 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 2023 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Kiev—According to information from the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers' economic department, Ukraine entered a state of hyperinflation in the final months of 1993: in September the inflation index exceeded 180 percent, in October—166 percent and in November—145 percent. The price rises in December led to a new rise in the level of inflation which, according to previous assessments, reached almost 200 percent.

Incomes of the consolidated budget for January-November 1993 were 33.718 trillion karbovantsi, 8.765 trillion karbovantsi in credits from Ukrainian banks were drawn into the budget to cover the planned deficit and a number of other expenses. The mobilization of the budget's incomes took place in difficult conditions: a considerable number of enterprises, organizations and institutions and also citizens violated the tax law, actually underestimating earned income and profits and delayed making payments to the budget. Expenditure of the consolidated budget for January-November was 38.673 trillion karbovantsi. Of this figure, 12.464 trillion (32.2 percent of total expenditure) were directed at the implementation of measures for the social protection of the population; 8.944 trillion (23.1 percent) for the financing of socio-cultural measures, and 8.725 trillion karbovantsi (22.6 percent) for the national economy. The financing of expenditures on defence was 1.639 trillion karbovantsi and 1.096 trillion karbovantsi for maintaining law enforcement bodies. The consolidated budget of Ukraine was fulfilled with an excess of expenditure over income of 4.955 trillion karbovantsi.

The emission of money in 1993 was 12.299 trillion karbovantsi which is 25 times more than in 1992. In the fourth quarter alone an additional 7.537 trillion karbovantsi entered into circulation of which 3.776 trillion karbovantsi took place in December.

Creditors' debts between Ukrainian enterprises and organizations and economic subjects of former USSR countries declined in November by almost 40 percent and was 5.7 trillion karbovantsi at the beginning of December while debts grew by 15 percent reaching 4.6 trillion karbovantsi. Creditors' debts of Ukrainian enterprises with Russian trading partners declined by 38 percent (from 8.2 trillion karbovantsi as of 1 November to 5.1 trillion karbovantsi by 1 December) and with Turkmenistan by 96 percent (from 588.1 billion karbovantsi to 24.3 billion karbovantsi respectively). In total over 11 months of 1993 creditors' debts grew by 17 times and debtors' debts by 10 times.

In 1993 measures were carried out to form a hard currency market in Ukraine. As a result of this, the volume of currency sales at the Ukrainian interbank currency exchange rose continuously throughout January-August. Thus, if $7.3 million were sold during trading in January, in March the figure was 40.4 million, in June—122.3 million, in July—142.7 million; trading in German Marks: in April—5.1 million, in June—11.5 million, in July—12.9 million, in August—16.8 million; trading in Russian rubles: in April—11.6 billion and in June—74.2 billion.

However, from August to September the volume of sales of these currencies began to decline at exchanges and in October only $29.3 million, 3.3 million German marks, and 10 billion Russian rubles were sold.

During the year there was a sharp drop in the exchange rate of the Ukrainian karbovanets in relation to foreign currencies. Thus, if during trading on 5 January 1993 the exchange rate was 798 karbovantsi to the U.S. dollar, during trading on 28 October it was 31,000 karbovantsi. During trading in April the German mark was being sold at 1,886 karbovantsi but at the end of October it was 19,300 karbovantsi and the Russian ruble was 3.5-4.3 karbovantsi and 25 karbovantsi respectively.

During 11 months of 1993 (compared with December 1992) prices for consumer goods and services increased by 54 times, by 57 times for foodstuffs, and by 70 times for non-food products.

Average monthly salaries for workers in the state sector of the economy increased by 19 times in the 11 months of 1993 and in November amounted to 307,200 karbovantsi which is almost 40 times lower than the value of the minimum consumer budget.

At the beginning of 1994, 123,400 citizens who required help to find work were registered in employment establishments. Of these 83,900 were granted the status of unemployed.

Kravchuk Promises Not To Interfere in Crimea

LD2501152394 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1111 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] "The Ukrainian president will take no resolute actions towards the Crimean Republic on the eve of the second round of presidential elections there," Ukrainian people's deputy from the Crimea, Vladimir Sevastyanov, told INTERFAX-Ukraine. He had taken part in a meeting between President Kravchuk and several members of Ukraine's parliament representing Crimea Monday evening.

According to Sevastyanov, "at the meeting Kravchuk pointed to the unwillingness of Russia and the U.S. to revise borders or recognize the Crimean Republic after their statement signed in Moscow."

Kravchuk also stressed that he himself has nothing against the candidates for the Crimean presidency, Sevastyanov noted.

According to Sevastyanov, Kravchuk said that "the Ukrainian army will remain outside politics, and, should the situation destabilize, the existing structures of law-enforcement agencies will have to be used." Kravchuk made it clear that Crimea can use additional law-enforcement forces, "if it is in a position to keep them."

At his meeting with the deputies from Crimea, President Kravchuk also said that neither the Ukrainian parliament nor he himself will interfere in the process of establishing an open economy in Crimea. According to the Ukrainian president, the efforts to achieve economic stabilization in Crimea will now depend solely on the measures the Crimean leadership will take.

Kiev will support all Simferopol's initiatives, if they do not conflict with Ukraine's legislation, Kravchuk told the deputies from Crimea.

In the first round of presidential elections in Crimea, the greatest number of votes was collected by the pro-Russian candidate, Yuriy Meshkov. In the second round, the present Speaker of the Crimean parliament, Nikolay Bahrov, will be his rival.

Military Exercises in Crimea Planned

PM2501161794 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'Battle' in Crimea, Everything Up in Smoke"]

[Text] The increased tension in Crimea's sociopolitical life caused by Kiev's dissatisfaction with the results of the first round of the presidential election in Simferopol cannot, it appears, reduce the fighting spirit of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. From 24 through 28 January large-scale command-staff exercises are being conducted by Armed Forces units and commands on the territory of Odessa, Kherson, and Nikolayev Oblasts and in Crimea.

No doubt in this connection, in an interview with KIYEVSKIYE VEDOMOSTI Ukrainian Defense Minister General Radetskyy made the statement that "I would not like to have to liberate Crimea as the Americans liberated Kuwait." In response to this, Admiral Eduard Baltin, commander of the Black Sea Fleet, expressed doubt that the young, respected, and promising Ukrainian defense minister could become a General Schwarzkopf....

Navy Chief Denies 'Large-Scale' Maneuvers

AU2601123894 Kiev MOLOD UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 25 Jan 94 p 1

[Unattributed report published under the rubric "Fact"]

[Text] The commander of Ukraine's Naval Forces, Vice Admiral Volodymyr Bezkorovaynyy, has refuted "Ostankino" assertions about alleged plans to conduct a large-scale training exercise of Ukrainian troops in the Crimea that might influence the course of presidential elections in the autonomous republic. As reported by the Press Service of Ukraine's Ministry of Defense, between 24 and 27 January, staff training will be held for all the armed forces without the involvement of troops or technology. The training will be supervised by the supreme commander, L. Kravchuk.

Crimea's Bagrov Interviewed on Election

AU2501153894 Kiev DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 22 Jan 94 p 1

[Interview with Nikolay Bagrov, chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council and Crimean presidential candidate, by unidentified DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA correspondent by telephone from the Crimea; date not given: "We Will Struggle...."]

[Text]**The Central Electoral Committee appointed the second round of Crimean presidential elections for 30 January. The leader of the Crimean Republican Party, Yuriy Meshkov, and the chairman of the Crimean Supreme Council, Nikolay Bagrov, will compete for the post. The difference in the number of votes they received in the first round of elections was quite significant. That is why the present speaker's chances of victory are assessed as illusory. Besides, those candidates who had quit the struggle called upon the voters to cast their votes for separatist Meshkov. How does Nikolay Bagrov himself see the situation? Our correspondent phoned him and asked him to answer a few questions.**

[Bagrov] I will take part in the second round—this is not so little. All of my opponents campaigned against Bagrov and accused me of all the shortcomings of Ukraine's economic policy and of all the difficulties. Of course, it is a serious struggle. However, I am an optimist, and I think that I have a real chance of winning. For this, it is necessary to struggle. People have already started thinking....

[DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA] Yet, Nikolay Vasilyevich, you probably counted upon greater support in the first round.

[Bagrov] I was honest with the people. Meshkov promised them that Russia would take them into her open arms. He said everywhere that once people vote for him, they will receive prosperity and peace. The Crimea will become Russian. I am not promising people a rose garden, because one will have to meet the bills after the elections. I am openly saying at all meetings that the secession of the Crimea from Ukraine is out of the question. Meshkov's policy leads to an impasse.

Let us look at things realistically. There exist the Helsinki Agreements on the inviolability of borders that emerged after World War II. There exists an agreement between Ukraine and Russia where the inviolability of the borders of the two countries is recognized. Finally, a tripartite agreement was signed in Moscow between the United States, Ukraine, and Russia on the elimination of nuclear weapons; these aspects are also reflected there. Ukraine received guarantees of European countries in addition to those of the United States. It is naive to assume that Russia will want to violate these agreements.

I believe that we have not yet fully implemented, in the interests of the Crimean people, the possibilities of the autonomy offered to us by Ukraine's legislation in both economic and political spheres.

[DEMOKRATYCHNA UKRAYINA] The election campaign in the Crimea has been accompanied by a series of murders. The assassination of your adviser Iskander Mamedov near his family's house is simply appalling. What can you say about this?

[Bagrov] Iskander organized my election campaign. He was a very good and decent person. I deeply mourn his death and sympathize with his relatives and friends. A criminal case has been initiated, and competent organs must answer who needed this.

I will say one thing: I want to live in the Crimea and do everything in order that harmony and peace prevail on the peninsula and that it becomes a bridge connecting Ukraine and Russia, and not a new Karabakh.

Meshkov Seen as Unqualified for Crimean Presidency

WS2601113194 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 0600 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The presidential race in the Crimea is approaching the finish line, and we will learn who is the winner in a couple of days.

The electoral debacle of Mykola Bagrov, speaker of the Crimean parliament, in the first round of elections is virtually a defeat for the Party of Crimean Economic Rebirth [PEVK], which decided to support Bagrov at its convention. As a matter of fact, the PEVK could propose for president one its members—there are suitable candidates in this party. However, entrepreneurs have always been noted for their realistic and sober thinking and their ability to predict things. They understand that experience gathered at rallies is not enough to become a good president. Czars, for example, were prepared to rule from the day they were born—and not all of them were good at it. When someone's background includes only a higher educational institution—and a Soviet one at that—and slight experience as an attorney, he would find it somewhat hard to run the state. Yuriy Meshkov never got a chance to hold even a low managerial post. Of course, he did not even plan to become the president. He was elevated this high by the All-Russian idea and ample promises generally distributed at rallies during the first round. Here is what Oleksandr Dudko, member of the PEVK Presidium and president of the Union of Crimean Entrepreneurs, told us.

[Begin Dudko recording] If you carefully read programs of the PEVK and Meshkov, you'll find them consisting of basically the same elements—salaries paid in rubles, removal of customs barriers, etc.—only our program is without any heavy political shading. To achieve all this, one doesn't necessarily have to quarrel with our current situation and replace one border with another. [end recording]

The PEVK will soon try to demonstrate to Crimean residents its implementation mechanisms and expose all of its advantages. However, it will be up to electors to decide for whom they should cast their votes. Whatever the case, they will get what they elect.

Crimean Tatars Urge Vote Against Meshkov

WS2501202994 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Ukrainian 1900 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Today, the National Assembly of the Crimean Tatars held a meeting during which its position for the second round of presidential elections in the Crimea was defined. It was decided to participate in the elections and appeal to the people to vote against Yuriy Meshkov [pro-Russian candidate].

Party Urges Finance Minister To Resign

MK2501145094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 3

[Unattributed NEGA report]

[Text] "The draft budget for 1994 presented to the Supreme Soviet in which expenditures coincide with revenues defies common sense and has no economic legitimacy." This is said in a statement by the Ukrainian Constitutional Democratic Party [UCDP] promulgated on 24 January. In the opinion of the Constitutional Democrats, the attempts to please international financial organizations will only further discredit Ukraine as a country "run by ignoramuses." The UCDP believes that no one in Ukraine has any illusions about the cabinet of ministers, but the performance by Finance Minister Hryhoriy Pyatachenko has transcended all permissible bounds. The UCDP has called for his immediate resignation. Meanwhile the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet will not return to the consideration of the budget until 27 January.

Rukh Chairman Demands Inquiry Into 'Terror' Acts

AU2501121494 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 22 Jan 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Rukh Believes That a Campaign of Political Terrorism Is Being Waged Against It"]

[Text] On 20 January, the chairman of the Ukraine People's Rukh [Movement for Perestroyka] held a news conference during which he read the statement, adopted the day before by the Rukh central leadership on the terror campaign against Rukh, its leaders, and activists. The Rukh believes that the acts of terror against it are due to its political line aimed at the building of an independent democratic state and at ridding Ukraine of the former communist nomenklatura.

Vyacheslav Chornovil quoted a number of facts: Several attacks, over the recent weeks, on the electoral headquarters of the Rukh Chernivtsi regional organization; a pogrom on Christmas night in the building of the Ternopil Rukh organization; the beating up of the children of several leaders of rayon Rukh organizations in Odessa Oblast. Unknown people broke into the apartment of the chairman of the Kirovohrad organization, and on 15 January, there was an attempt to break into the apartment of Les Tanyuk, member of the central Rukh leadership and member of Ukraine's Supreme Council Presidium. On 17 January, in broad daylight, Colonel Serhiy Budko was beaten up in Vinnytsya. Finally, there is the attack on the Rukh secretariat in Kiev and the disappearance of the head of the secretariat Mykhaylo Boychyshyn, of whom nothing is known to this day.

Rukh demands that the president and the Supreme Council chairman intervene in the situation and that Ukraine's Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Procurator General's Office investigate the criminal actions against Rukh activists.

Rukh Alleges Persecution

MK2101104094 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 21 Jan 94 p 3

[Vladimir Danko report: "Provocation or Speculation? The Kidnapped Chief of the Rukh Secretariat Has Not Been Found Yet"]

[Excerpts] The election campaign in Ukraine, with the abundance of aspirants for deputy seats, could not do without manifestations of extremism. And its first victim has been one of the most powerful political parties—the Ukrainian People's Rukh with a fixed membership of more than 50,000, which has fielded candidates in practically all constituencies.

The Rukh Secretariat's press department reported that overnight from 15 to 16 January an armed attack was launched on the secretariat building. [passage omitted]

The central event of that night was the disappearance of Mikhail Boychishin, 43, head of the Rukh Secretariat, deputy of the Lvov Oblast Council and Rukh's parliament deputy candidate, who left three hours before the attack but never got home. [passage omitted]

Rukh leader and parliament deputy Vyacheslav Chornovil told NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA's correspondent that "we are dealing here with a system of political provocations and political terror with the only aim being the disruption of the normal conduct of the election campaign and the intimidation of Rukh members and voters." [passage omitted]

The actions by the authorities were glaringly passive. It was not until Vyacheslav Chornovil's energetic intervention that the police, prosecution, and security service bodies started an investigation into Boychishin's disappearance. [passage omitted]

Ivan Makar, a Rukh critic, former human rights activist and currently an independent member of parliament, holds a different opinion on what has happened. In his view, there has been a political provocation. "In all likelihood, Rukh itself has organized this in order to gain extra points in the elections. Whoever needed to seize Boychishin in the Rukh building when he could have been easily captured near his home?" Ivan Makar said. It should be noted that his view is apparently shared by representatives of other Ukrainian political parties which are in no hurry to issue statements in support of Rukh activists. [passage omitted]

UNA Terms Rukh Kidnapping 'Storm in a Teacup'

WS2501100794 Lvov POST-POSTUP in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Speaking at a news conference held in Lvov on 24 January, Andriy Shkil, chairman of the Ukrainian National Assembly [UNA] Lvov Oblast Committee, deemed the affair of Rukh Deputy Chairman Mykhaylo Boychyshyn's disappearance as a "storm in a teacup." Shkil pointed out that "if some people lack action, words are brought to the fore, and affairs like this one arise." The UNA regional commander underlined: "When Mykhaylo Boychyshyn was still Shevchenkivskyy Rayon Council chairman in Lvov he had certain connections that could be the motives behind his disappearance" and added that "we cannot rule out that in a day or two Boychyshyn will emerge safe and sound, and will tell tales about his kidnapping." Boychyshyn's wife's televised appeal gave this idea to Shkil because "one had the impression that she had recently seen her husband." UNA Chairman Yuriy Shukhevych said: "Mykhaylo Boychyshyn is not an outstanding Rukh activist. Why has there been no similar actions against Vyacheslav Chornovil?" The UNA leadership believes that Boychyshyn's mysterious disappearance might be linked to Rukh's financial activities.

Meanwhile, according to a report by Maryana Chorna published in Lvov's RATUSHA on 22 January, the newspaper had received "unsubstantiated information from law enforcement circles" that Mykhaylo Boychyshyn's dead body had been discovered.

Belarus

'Anti-Mafia' Committee Suggests Ousting Shushkevich, Kebich

WS2601130894 Minsk RID in Russian 1200 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Aleksandr Lukashenko, leader of the "anti-Mafia" deputies' committee, has addressed the secretariat of the 13th Supreme Soviet session in Minsk with a proposal to introduce an amendment to the draft resolution on his infamous report on corruption among top Belarusian officials. The amendment envisions a vote of confidence in Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich. Aleksandr Lukashenko has told an RID correspondent that he is going to cite new examples of embezzlements among the Belarusian leadership. In particular, instead of "four facilities" that are being repaired for Stanislav Shushkevich in Minsk, the Lukashenko committee has discovered 13 facilities.

Commenting on these charges, Dmitriy Bulakhov, Supreme Soviet Legislative Committee chairman pointed out: "Attempts to remove Shushkevich will continue as long as he remains in the post of Supreme Soviet chairman." According to Bulakhov, the issue of ousting Shushkevich may be resolved due to Lukashenko's amendment. Shushkevich's opponents need 174 votes to remove him.

Supreme Soviet To Discuss Ousting

WS2601142394 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1300 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] The 13th session of the Belarusian Supreme Soviet continues its work in the House of Government in Minsk. Today, following the discussion on miscellaneous matters, people's deputies addressed the issue of corruption. During the morning proceedings, the people's deputies heard Prosecutor General Vasil Shaladonaw's account of the facts which were touched in Aleksander Lukashenka's report. The prosecutor general has been charged to provide this account by the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Next, the people's deputies discussed three draft resolutions on the issue, which were proposed by the temporary commission headed by Lukashenko, People's Deputy Antonchyk, as well as by Labyedzka and some other people's deputies. The roll-call voting approved the temporary commission's draft resolution as a basic document.

The people's deputies were given a written addendum to the Supreme Soviet draft resolution on the report of the temporary commission for fighting corruption, which proposed to put on the agenda of the session the issue of recalling from duty Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shuskevich and dismissing Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich from his post. The voting included these issues in the draft resolution of the temporary commission for combating corruption. Following a long discussion, the people's deputies adopted a resolution stating that the temporary commission for combating corruption will continue its activity.

Interior Minister, KGB Chairman Dismissed

WS2501193494 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 1850 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] As you were listening to the deputies' speeches delivered during the so-called miscellaneous portion of today's Supreme Soviet session, we learned about the results of the voting in the Supreme Soviet: 195 deputies voted in favor of dismissing Vladimir Yegorov from the office of interior minister, against—31 deputies. In addition, 187 people's deputies voted to dismiss Eduard Shirkovskiy from the post of KGB chairman, against—41 deputies.

Following are the results of the voting on Attorney General Shaladonaw's dismissal: 196 deputies voted for dismissing him from office, against—98.

With these results, the Supreme Soviet has formally discharged the interior minister and the KGB chairman from their duties.

Government Discusses Economic Programs, Chernobyl

WS2601100494 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0400 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] A regular session of the Council of Ministers' Presidium has been held under the leadership of Vyacheslav Kebich. The central topic on the agenda was the discussion of a draft program for the reconstruction of the Belarusian economy. The session was addressed on the issue by Krukaw, director of the Scientific Research Economic Institute of the State Planning Commission. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers also discussed draft laws on protective measures against radiation, on refugees and immigrants, as well as a draft state program for overcoming the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe. The session resolved to submit these documents, following the necessary revisions, for Supreme Soviet approval.

Kebich Views CIS Summit, Union With Russia

WS2401200094 Minsk RESPUBLIKA in Russian 19 Jan 94 pp 1, 2

[Speech by Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich at the Supreme Soviet in Minsk on 18 January: "'The Republic Has Sufficient Potential To Conduct Negotiations on Par'"]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!

Within the short break in the proceedings of our session, many events of great political and economic importance have come to pass.

These include the meeting of CIS leaders in Ashgabat in late December, in which, on your behalf, I participated as head of the Belarusian delegation.

These include the talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin and Russian Prime Minister V.S. Chernomyrdin, which were held by our government's delegation in Moscow on 4-5 January.

These also include the visit of U.S. President Bill Clinton to Belarus.

First—concerning the Ashgabat meeting. This meeting, as you know, was held with the most representative participants over the entire period of the CIS' existence. Taking into account Georgia and Azerbaijan, which recently joined the Commonwealth, the leaders of 12 republics of the former USSR were in attendance. This, at first glance formal, side of the matter produced, to the satisfaction of all participants in the meeting, an exceptionally important result from all viewpoints.

A large number of reviewed documents were of an economic nature. The leaders of CIS states realized for the first time how important the strengthening of economic relations was for all states.

The awareness of those dangers that ensue from delaying economic integration created an atmosphere of genuine interest in making the meeting truly fruitful.

Out of the adopted agreements, I would single out the agreement on general conditions and the mechanism for supporting the development of production cooperation. This agreement creates a firm basis for reciprocal cooperative deliveries which are linked with the work of many enterprises. The adoption of this agreement frees enterprises from import and export duties, taxes, excise duties, and quantitative restrictions on goods provided through cooperation.

This is a serious step toward restoring broken economic relations.

Participants in the CIS meeting also adopted an agreement on investment cooperation. We have a paradoxical situation when joint ventures are set up with far abroad countries and Western capital. Regarding our relations with traditional partners from the former USSR, however, this mechanism has not yet been outlined. The current agreement fills this vacuum and opens up new ways for mutually beneficial investments in all CIS countries.

Certainly, the problems associated with the implementation of the treaty on economic union signed in September of last year in Moscow came to the fore of the meeting. Participants in the Ashgabat meeting were almost unanimous on the idea that we must do everything to make this agreement effective as soon as possible. Therefore, a decision was adopted to begin applying its clauses before the final resolution of procedures for its ratification.

I would also like to report to the Supreme Soviet that the delegation of the Republic of Belarus took full advantage of the Ashgabat meeting for the signing of bilateral trade and economic agreements with other CIS states for 1994. I would note that Belarus had already completed such preparations by that time. We concluded agreements with almost all CIS member countries.

Of course, certain difficulties emerged concerning the agreement with Uzbekistan, which has not yet been signed due to the demand of the Uzbek side to develop our trade and economic relations solely on a clearing-basis, and also due to Uzbekistan's great indebtedness to Belarus for deliveries in 1993.

We plan to sign an agreement on trade and economic relations with the Republic of Moldova during the upcoming meeting of our government delegations.

This is what concerns the Ashgabat meeting. A special place in this period belongs to the issue of developing and deepening our relations with Russia.

After the ratification of the agreement on monetary union by the government and the Supreme Soviet of our Republic, much has been accomplished in executing its provisions.

A package of documents for the agreement on monetary union was drafted on the level of experts, government leaders, and the National Bank in cooperation with the Russian side. These are interbank agreements on the mechanisms for unifying the monetary systems and their functioning, as well as protocols on:

- — the unification of customs duties applied to third parties;
- — the introduction of a unified nontariff regulation of trade with coordinated nomenclature and scope for licensed goods and their quotas;
- — terms and procedures for introducing, preserving, and revoking temporary restrictions on mutual trade;
- — the introduction of a free trade regime without exceptions and restrictions between our states while uniting both monetary systems;
- — the organization of joint customs control on goods and transportation facilities at checkpoints situated on the customs border between Belarus and Russia;

We also signed a memorandum on mutual relations with international economic and financial organizations.

The coordination of the intergovernment agreement on the mechanism for managing the budget systems and conditions for their unification, and of exchange rates for the transition period is under way.

After all the preparatory work was practically completed, our government delegation left for Moscow. Apart from conversations with Russian Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin and other leaders, our delegation held long talks with President B. Yeltsin. We discussed a broad range of issues concerning not only the unification of monetary systems, but also many other economic and political problems. This resulted in a statement of which you know.

Certainly, there are many questions about what is behind the unification of our monetary systems, the more so that some forces both in our Republic and Russia abuse this unification by taking advantage of a specific political situation.

In light of this, I would like to make it absolutely clear that despite all the difficulties our economy is experiencing, our Republic has sufficient potential to conduct all negotiations on par.

Without waiving the Republic's sovereignty in any way, the government is seeking to build our economic interests with Russia on the basis of mutual benefits and sound economic views.

If someone, for example, in Russia is trying to put it into people's heads that the unification of monetary systems is almost a sort of dole to us, he or she is deeply mistaken, both from the economic and the political points of view.

Speaking of the economy, one should bear in mind that large industries present in our Republic are an integral part of the extensive technological cycles in Russia. Therefore, Russian procurers and consumers are not indifferent toward the development of our economic relations.

I would not dwell on this aspect of the given issue now. However, I would like to put emphasis on such an important fact that our Republic has never lived at the expense of others, including Russia, not even when we were part of the former Soviet Union. This is one thing.

Second, no one, not even some Russian politicians, are allowed to forget that the current Siberian oil industry, refineries, and gold and currency reserves were once created with the joint labor of all nations of the former USSR, including a large share of labor of the Belarusian people.

I am saying this not to present some claims. I would like public opinion in Russia and Belarus to be based on a correct assessment of the situation.

Moreover, no document that would make the Republic of Belarus dependent on any other state will be signed. Any such agreements will be coordinated in Supreme Soviet committees.

By the way, a close economic union with Russia will by no means shut the door to our establishing normal economic relations with other states, including Western countries.

The work has not yet been completed by adopting the statement on the unification of monetary systems. The government has charged the Belarusian Foreign Ministry and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations to adopt measures with the aim of forming an objective opinion among the international community on the domestic and foreign policies conducted by our Republic, an assessment of their essence, the consistency of our course, and the mutual benefits of monetary union.

Regular meetings with leaders of industrial, agrarian, construction, and trade enterprises, and their economic services confirm the government's point of view: The unification of monetary systems will not be automatic. It will be a process.

I must say that some of the decisions have already been adopted and become effective. The budget deficit, taxes, and the credit, monetary, and customs policies have been coordinated, while other issues—prices, customs duties, and the mechanism of unification—are still being coordinated.

One should bear in mind that macroeconomic problems are not resolved through monetary union. From what did this ailment stem? It resulted from the reduction of imports, the rise of costs due to inflation, a drop in exports to CIS countries, a sharp increase in prices for energy resources, export and import barriers, difficulties in interstate settlements, and a plunge in demand in both consuming countries and on the domestic market.

Can a monetary union remove all this? No, it cannot. However, it will allow us to create a normal economic environment that would remove artificial obstacles to the movement of goods and investments.

This also means an approximation of price levels, particularly for energy resources. This, in turn, will reduce production costs and sustain the demand for our goods on CIS markets. This is extremely important—the curb of growing prices for industrial, technological, and consumer goods on Belarus' domestic market, let alone the fact that our people will have an opportunity for free communication, movement, and activity.

Although a problem that requires great efforts from the government, the unification of monetary systems does not eclipse, but, on the contrary, only increases our attention to other numerous economic and social problems that we are resolving and will continue to do so.

Many problems are now resolved on the level of local agreements. First of all, this refers to energy resources. During our visit to Moscow, we agreed that this year Russia will supply us with 5.5 million tonnes of oil on a clearing basis.

In this clearing transaction, oil is priced at $85 per tonne, as compared to $129 per tonne last year. The rest of the oil will be supplied—until the currency systems of our two countries are practically unified—at world prices.

The Russian side provides for supplying the Republic of Belarus with an additional 3.5 million tonnes of raw oil to process for adjacent rayons of the Russian Federation. With regard to furnace oil, it can be fully supplied by our Republic's oil system.

An agreement have been reached with the Russian firm "Gasprom" regarding natural gas supplies in the amount of 16 billion cubic meters. That is the exact amount we need to satisfy our needs. Talks are being held on lowering the price to $55 per 1,000 cubic meters, as compared to $74 in December 1993.

Moreover, we are working out with "Gasprom" a large-scale project for running gas pipelines to our territory, which will allow for sharply increased supplies of gas reaching our Republic.

Esteemed People's Deputies!

The government's course with regard to Russia, of which I have given you the above account, is a practical implementation of Supreme Soviet resolutions.

Economic union with Russia is supported by managers of big enterprises, directors of kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and entrepreneurs, who understand the consequences of further disintegration.

Today, the union with Russia is supported by the majority of our Republic's population. To this testify numerous letters and appeals from our people to bodies and departments of the administration, as well as to mass media organs, and public opinion polls.

However, there are also opponents to such a union.

Economic integration with Russia provokes the anger of those who bet on national isolation, a full revision of the past, and a complete break with historical ties. The consequences of such a policy are well known to us from the events in other regions of the former Union.

All this, if we do not put a stop to unbridled hazardous activities, can happen to us, in Belarus. Just look at the ideas voiced by Zyanon Paznyak, leader of the Belarusian Popular Movement, in the Supreme Soviet organ NARODNAYA GAZETA. Russia, according to him, is a country of fools; its ideology and culture are founded on the policy of antagonizing people, on war and blood, on the cruelty of Mongol tradition.

There is more. He intends to put claims on the Smolensk, Bransk, and Pskov regions, on Bialystok and Vilnius, and on other territories. Such cynical and impudent statements were voiced, perhaps, for the first time.

People opposed to the union with Russia are to be found not only among individual politicians. The union is not desired by those who make the most of today's difficulties to their own advantage, who receive great profits from the course of means-of-payment transactions.

One topic, in particular, cannot be omitted. One should realize that the issue of union with Russia is not a question of one particular political course prevailing in the two states. It is an issue of far-reaching international consequences.

Unless our joint efforts to create an economic union on the principles of economic freedom, equality of rights, and mutual profits succeed, this will impact the future of our states with extremely negative consequences.

When such a mighty country as the United States is striving to establish friendly relations with Russia—which was once again corroborated by Clinton's visit—it cannot be different with Belarus, which has close historic relations with its eastern neighbor.

Esteemed People's Deputies!

I need not remind you of the difficult situation in our economy. We should do everything to bring it out of that situation. I am sure that our integration with CIS countries and, first of all, with Russia, will assist this task in many ways.

Correction to Shushkevich on Supreme Soviet Work

LD2401181294

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Shushkevich on Supreme Soviet Work, Reforms," published in the Belarus section of the 24 January 1994 Central Eurasia DAILY REPORT, beginning on page 77:

page 80, column one, first full paragraph, sentence six, make read...high as 1.6 trillion rubles. By the ... (correcting "quadrillion" to "trillion")

Moldova

Snegur, Experts Examine Proposals on Ilascu Group

AU2601120294 Chisinau BASAPRESS in English 1908 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Chisinau BASAPRESS, 24/1/1994—Today, President Mircea Snegur met at his request with heads of Moldovan justice bodies, says a communique of the presidential press service. Ways to solve the problem of the so-called Ilascu group prisoners in the context of proposals by CSCE and the Council of Europe groups of experts and by the European Union and Russia were discussed during their meeting. It was stressed that the support of international organizations was very important. The participants in the discussion expressed their readiness to analyze the suggestions of international experts, taking into the account the statements made by President Snegur. According to his statements, the prisoners should be transferred to Moldovan constitutional justice bodies, states the communique.

Kazakhstan

Nazarbayev Meets Nominees for Future Parliament

LD2101134494 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Russian 0200 GMT 21 Jan 94

[Text] As has already been reported, the new Kazakh Parliament will consist of 177 deputies—135 deputies will be elected [word indistinct] at the constituencies, and 42 will become deputies from the state list nominated by the president of the republic and to be elected by constituencies formed within the borders of relevant oblasts and cities with republican subordination status.

Yesterday, Nazarbayev met those whom he had decided to nominate. Addressing those invited, the president said that the list was formed with special care and thoughtfulness. The criteria of selection was very strict because a new parliament—to be formed this spring—should be professional. All deputies of the new convocation of the Supreme Kenges will have to leave their previous jobs and concentrate on law-making activities. Nazarbayev stressed: I think that all those present today are the president's first ever team capable of fulfilling their authority, but the final choice will be made by the electorate. The head of state promised that he would fully support his candidates and wished them success in their not so easy work.

Also attending the meeting were the vice president and [words indistinct].

Nazarbayev Interviewed by KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA

Cited on Foreign Aid Package

PM2501110994 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 1

[Vladimir Ardayev report: "World Community Grants Kazakhstan Over $1 Billion in Loans"]

[Text] Almaty—A consultative conference of "donor" countries providing financial assistance to Kazakhstan has ended in Paris. It was decided that the republic will be allocated more than $1 billion this year to continue economic reform.

Kazakhstan's main "donors" were the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Asian banks, and a number of states. For instance, $220 million was allocated by the Japanese Government. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has granted a 100 million-ECU [European currency unit] targeted loan for the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises.

The loans are being provided to Kazakhstan on favorable terms. For instance, the IMF loans are repayable over 17 years at an annual interest rate of 7 percent. Interest only will be paid for the first five years.

These facts were cited by Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev in an interview with the newspaper KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

Optimistic About Future of CIS

LD2301172694 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1400 GMT 23 Jan 94

[Text] Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev disagrees with those who are pessimistic about the future of the CIS.

In an interview published in today's KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA he notes that at the Ashgabat summit the positions of CIS countries moved closer together on all matters, notably on economic ones. Kazakhstan believes that the economies of CIS countries can be stabilized through strengthening the integration processes within the framework of the economic union, which has now been set up.

Nursultan Nazarbayev believes that the introduction of individual currencies is a powerful enough impetus for the integration of Commonwealth states. He believes that at some stage a currency will emerge that will be valid in all CIS states.

All problems ought to be solved in close cooperation with fellow Commonwealth members, and for Kazakhstan that means first and foremost with Russia, Nursultan Nazarbayev noted.

Sees Need To Increase Executive Branch Powers

LD2401191894 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1809 GMT 24 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: No. 15 (505)]

[Text] President Nursultan Nazarbayev has decided to set up a committee to deal with ethnic tensions that exist, he said, in relations between individuals. The new body will also draft bills for parliament to debate and advise the executive branch, he told the KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA newspaper.

He said that migration such as that taking place in the country was inevitable when empires collapse. In the president's words, over 200,000 Russians and still more Germans had left Kazakhstan last year. He described their departure as "a significant loss." During the same period nearly 160,000 Russians, some of them from Russia, settled in the country.

Nazarbayev emphasized that he had decreed a simplification of the citizenship acquisition procedure for those who have close relatives in the country.

He said that dual citizenship was an issue "imposed from outside the country" and that such citizenship was not provided for by the Constitution of Kazakhstan or Russia. If every other Kazakh resident is also a citizen of another state, the Kazakh society may be split into natives and aliens, chaos and mistrust can be created, the Kazakh leader thinks.

Nazarbayev called for creating conditions within the Commonwealth for free movement and communication so that when one moves to Russia, he or she obtains its citizenship freely and, on return to Kazakhstan, that country's citizenship. He called for working out "an agreed document allowing one to live where one wants (in the CIS), whatever the citizenship."

Nazarbayev said he pinned great hopes on the new parliament to be elected on March 7. He wants to work with parliament on amending the Fundamental Law and emphasized the need to specify in the Constitution that the country was a presidential republic, increase the powers of the executive branch and introduce a bicameral parliament consisting of a senate and a house of deputies.

In Nazarbayev's view, parliament must have the right to discontinue the president's powers before his term expires and the president, to dissolve parliament.

The president also said in the interview that "it was time that we took a wider view of land rights" and called for appointing judges for life and for removal of obstacles to entrepreneurial activities in every sphere.

Comments on Protecting Ethnic Rights

LD2201192894 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1230 GMT 22 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Akimov]

[Text] Almaty, 22 January—Any attempts to use interethnic relations for one's own ends should be strictly punished by law, President Nursultan Nazarbayev is convinced.

He has decided to set up a Council for Citizens' Rights under the president. This representative body will draw up bills for the Supreme Council and recommendations for the executive authority aimed at fundamentally increasing accountability for inciting interethnic dissension, for all forms of provocations, destabilizing the sociopolitical situation in the republic, and offending citizens' honor and national dignity. Nazarbayev stated this in an interview published in today's KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA.

My aspiration is for Kazakhstan's citizens to live prosperously as a single amicable family, he commented. I call upon all compatriots as before to strengthen peace and accord in our common home, to yield to no provocations, and to analyze critically those populist slogans and calls of pseudo-democrats that are being proclaimed so vigorously at rallies in the run-up to the elections to legislative and representative bodies of power scheduled for 7 March. One must also regard with healthy criticism those publications in the local and foreign press that are constructed upon biassed and amateur statistics.

Touching on the topic of the "Russian-speaking population," Nazarbayev commented that this is a term he does not accept at all. Virtually all residents in the republic, including Kazakhs, he said, are Russian speakers. You would hardly find anyone in Kazakhstan who does not speak Russian. Russian has been recognized as a means of interethnic communication, whereas Kazakh is the state language. In the republic there are legal guarantees preserving the sphere of use of the language of interethnic communication and of other languages, and it is categorially banned to restrict the rights and freedoms of citizens because they do not speak the state language or the language of interethnic communication, he stressed.

The question of dual citizenship, the president believes, could split society, could divide it into "us" and "them." This is why we should not resort to introducing dual citizenship in the republic. This could breed chaos and mistrust. It is far better not to get people worried, but to create within the CIS states conditions for free movement and communication; to make it possible, for instance, freely to acquire Russian citizenship when moving to Russia, and Kazakhstani citizenship when returning to Kazakhstan to one's permanent domicile. It would be even better if everyone could have a document permitting him to live wherever he wants within the confines of the commonwealth, Nursultan Nazarbayev said.

Cabinet Views Economy; Nazarbayev Says Situation Improving

LD2501193294 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Excerpts] The Cabinet of Ministers met today. It was attended by members of government; leaders of republican departments, holding companies, heads of regional administratrions, and of Almaty and Leninsk; chairmen of territorial committees for state property; and heads of regional missions of the National Bank. Under discussion were results of socioeconomic development of the republic in 1993 and plans for this year's economic policy.

Opening the session, Prime Minister Sergey Tershchenko said that the country needs to introduce qualitatively new economic transformations. He went on to note that the government will pursue the policy of supressing inflation, stabilizing the economy, and creating an institution of private ownership. Everything will be dictated by these main tasks. The minister of economy and the first deputy prime minister, Kazhegeldin, presented reports. It was stressed that in 1993, stabilization of the economy was not achieved. The situation in the economy was characterized by a further fall of production and a decline in the living standards of the population as well as the general instability of economic activity. [passage omitted]

In 1993, agricultural production fell by 9.8 percent, while construction and assembly work fell by 25 percent. The sky-rocketing prices for consumer goods led to a decline in people's living standards. Their annual index made up 2,265 percent. At the same time prices for food increased by 23 percent, consumer goods by 18 percent, and services provided to the population by 41 percent. The production of the main types of food decreased as follows: Meat by 12.6 percent, sugar by 36.1 percent, margarine by 48 percent and vegetable oil by 25.4 percent. The participants at the meeting spoke after hearing the reports.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev summarized the results of the discussion. He named the specific reasons for decline in production. It depends not only on disrupted ties with neighboring partners but also on the bad performance of economic and management bodies.

According to the president the situation in the economy of the republic is improving. The most noticeable change in this improvement took place last December. We have to analyze the reasons for this. At the same time we need to have a clear picture of the enteprises which are lagging behind. This year will definetely be a difficult and tough year. But we have every reason to believe that we can organize our work so as to stop falling into economic abyss. Such a clear-cut and precise line of government policy should be mandatorial this year. It should concentrate its efforts on this.

The Cabinet of Ministers adopted a relevant agreement on the issues discussed.

Further on Nazarbayev on Economy

LD2501221094 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1802 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Amangeldy Akhmetalimov and Fyodor Ignatov]

[Text] Almaty January 25 TASS—"1994 will be a hard and tense year, but we have a chance to make it the last year of economic collapse. This policy should be the core of government actions," Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev told a government meeting here today. The meeting focused on 1993 social and economic results of Kazakhstan and outlined actions for the immediate future.

"We have been stating production recession, deterioration of financial situation and drop in the living standards for three years. The only reason we cited was breaking of economic relations between former Soviet republics accompanied with payment crisis and increase of the inflation. Generally, it is so, but internal processes in the economy and society testify to much more," added the president. In his opinion, their quality "gives rise to more profound consideration and slightly different conclusions".

Last year three fourth of enterprises improved their work against the background of general production recession. Labor collectives of these plants have turned into genuine owners, adopted market laws and display independence and business-like attitudes. Those who still count on state support are not very successful, said the president. He called for more active reforms, denationalization and privatization of property.

Kazakhstan failed to achieve economic stabilization in 1993. Production recession in all material productions and drop in the living standards are underway.

The gross domestic product reduced by 12.9 per cent as compared to 1992. The production output decreased by 16.1 per cent, agricultural output by 9.8 per cent and construction works - by 25 per cent.

Price liberalization without tough financial-budget and credit policy did not change much the economic recession tendency but resulted in uncontrolled price rise. Prices have went up most in the fuel and energy complex, metallurgy, the chemical and petrochemical industries. Consumer prices and tariffs increased by 23 times.

The enormous increase of consumer prices resulted in a drop in the living standards. Their 1993 index is 2,265 per cent. Foodstuff prices increased by 23 times, prices on consumer goods - by 18 times and service tariffs - by 41 times. Stratification of the population goes on. Four fifth of the population are on the verge of poverty.

The government plan for 1994 is expected to help overcome the economic crisis, said the meeting.

ROK Grants $150,000 in Humanitarian Aid

LD2501193994 Almaty Kazakh Radio Network in Kazakh 1500 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vice President Yerik Asanbayev received the ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Kazakhstan at his request today. Under examination were prospects for furthering economic and cultural relations between our countries. Bilateral relations between the two countries are very effective, said Yerik Asanbayev. South Korean businessmen have began the production of TV sets in Almaty and fridges in Karaganda.

However, cooperation has to be boosted especially in the sphere of granting Kazakhstan credits. He [Asanbayev] expressed certainty that the South Korean side, which has promised to grant Kazakhstan with a credit of $350 million, will keep its word. The ambassador was thanked for pledging $150,000 in humanitarian aid that arrived from Seoul today.

The ambassador said that he will do everything so as to strengthen friendly ties between the two countries, facilitating economic ties, and attracting more investments from South Korea to Kazakhstan.

Tajikistan's Rakhmanov Visits, Meets With Nazarbayev

LD2601120594 Dushanbe Radio Tajikistan Network in Russian 1000 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Imamali Rakhmanov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan, paid a short working visit to Almaty, yesterday, during which he had a tete-a-tete conversation with Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev.

Nazarbayev and Rakhmanov exchanged views on the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and on ways of reducing the (?tension) in this region in an atmosphere of mutual understanding.

Kazakhstan's president has evaluated in a positive manner the Tajik leadership's measures on adjusting the political dialogue with the forces of different political orientation aimed at seeking peace and concord on Tajik soil. While discussing regional issues, the two leaders focused on the necessity of new efforts to reinforce the effectiveness of the CIS peacekeeping forces.

The two leaders have confirmed the invariability of the course of both states toward strengthening the independence and expanding the traditional friendly relations between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.

In a separate meeting, the delegatiions of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan discussed a wide range of economic issues, in particular on delivery of goods, ways of regulating mutual payments, and issues related to energy supply.

The government delegations of Kazakhstan and Tajikistan have confirmed the joint aspiration for the harmonious and balanced development of all-round relations. A number of economic intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements were concluded at the end of the negotiations.

Kyrgyzstan

Kozyrev Hands Yeltsin Message to Akayev

LD2501171794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1549 GMT 25 Jan 94

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[Text] Russia supports Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev's state program for improving the position of ethnic Russians in his republic, says Yeltsin's message to Akayev, handed to the Kyrgyz president by Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev.

This document confirms Moscow's readiness to continue rendering every possible economic assistance and support to fraternal Kyrgyzstan.

During his talks with Akayev, Kozyrev described Kyrgyzstan as one of Russia's closest allies. "I've always said that we are not alien to each other, although many have accused me of imperialism for such words," said the Russian minister. "What can be more normal than stating that we are vitally interested in each other," he said.

President Akayev said that the new program was aimed at checking the outflow of ethnic Russians from Kyrgyzstan. He believes that the Russian foreign minister's current visit will help support the industrial enterprises mostly employing ethnic Russians.

Akayev also said that the Kyrgyz defense enterprises employing ethnic Russians and their Russian partners should have equal access to raw materials and equipment. "This is not going to be a one-way street," he said. "If large packages of Kyrgyz enterprises' shares go to Russia, these enterprises will carry on, providing thousands of people with jobs," he added. He also thinks that this would enhance ethnic Russians' confidence.

As an example of the efforts to raise the ethnic Russians' status he referred to the establishment of a Kyrgyz-Slavic university in Bishkek which is training 200 students. To quote the Kyrgyz president, this university "is expected to calm the Slavic ethnic groups living in Kyrgyzstan, because their children will be able to receive an education in their native language."

The program also contains measures to ensure that the teaching of the Russian language, the language of interstate communication in the CIS, is not reduced. "The Kyrgyz people cannot neglect the great source of Russian culture," said Akayev.

'Text' of Yeltsin Message

LD2501202594 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1700 GMT 25 Jan 94

["Text" of Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin message to President Askar Akayev]

[Text] Estemeed Askar Akayevich, as you know, Russia closely follows with interest (?the development of events in Kyrgyzstan) and the steps which the government of Kyrgyzstan is taking so as to tackle difficult economic, social, and political problems in the transitional period. This is understandable since similar processes are also taking place in Russia.

On the other hand, and this is very important, the future and the status of Russian-Kyrgyzstan relations depends a great deal on how successful we are in our movement toward transformations and the wise choice by our people of the main directions, values and priorities. Cooperation and friendly relations between the two independent countries should be built on this basis.

I want to emphasize that we strive to strengthen friendly relations and wish for comprehensive cooperation with Kyrgyzstan, its president and the government in the interests of common goals.

We are devoted to the deep historically based roots connecting the Kyrgyz and Russian peoples, the fruitful legacy of which could not only be preserved but also enriched. This is especially important in light of the fact that in many centuries of our history the fates of the citizens of Russia and Kyrgyzstan have become intertwined.

We have already covered a major part of the path in building Russian-Kyrgyzstan relations. Its legal and normative basis has been created; a mechanism for realizing bilateral relations is being upgraded. Of course, we still have much to do in building our interstate relations, and should take into consideration the existing realities and common interests as well as the aspirations of the two countries toward preserving close relations, comprehensive interaction and mutual understanding.

Like you, Askar Akayevich, I am sure that the considerable intellectual and professional potential of the Russian-speaking community residing in Kyrgyzstan could be used effectively in successful implemention of political and economic reforms, strengthening democratic [word indistinct] and maintaining the interethnic accord of the peoples of Kyrgyzstan.

We understand that this is the goal of a state program aimed at stabilizing the status of the Russian-speaking community. It is being elaborated with the participation of different public forces of the republic.

We highly evaluate, Askar Akayevich, your personal contribution to the development of Kyrgyzstan-Russian relations, your activity aimed at strengthening [words indistinct] and democratic transformations in the republic. I am convinced that only on the basis of real economic and political transformations, and by joining our efforts will we succeed in achieving progress and prosperity for our nations. In connection with this I confirm the readiness of Russia to continue rendering economic assistance and support to the fraternal Kyrgyzstan. I want to wish you, estemeed Askar Akayevich, success in your honorable work in the interests of multinational Kyrgyzstan. Together with you we are ready to do everything [word indistinct] to develop and strengthen friendship and cooperation. [passage indistinct]

Akayev, Kozyrev Discuss Ties

LD2501210794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 25 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] "Two centuries ago the Kyrgyzes chose Russia as their main ally and today they cannot abandon this great source of culture," said Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev.

He told Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in Bishkek on Tuesday that a program was being drawn up to stabilize the position of Kyrgyzstan's Russian-speaking population, the aim of which was to reduce Russian speakers' emigration from the republic. One of the objectives of the program is to prevent attempts to cut down the teaching of Russian, a language used in contacts between different CIS states, Akayev said. As an example of support given to Kyrgyzstan's Russian-speaking community, he cited the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, set up last year. It has 200 students at present and is expected to have about 1000 in future. The creation of the university "ought to reassure the Kyrgyz Slavs, whose children can receive an education in their native language," the president said.

It is only jointly with Russia that Kyrgyzstan is able to solve the problems of its Russian-speakers, he said. "We can solve the psychological problems and create a favorable atmosphere, but it would be difficult for Kyrgyzstan to handle the economic aspects of the problem on its own," he said.

Akayev said Kyrgyz enterprises were short of raw materials and components, while the customs barriers and dual taxation raised the cost of their output tenfold. However, not only Kyrgyzstan and Russia but also other Commonwealth states needed goods produced by those enterprises, he said. He expressed the hope that the visit of Kozyrev, who arrived in Bishkek on Monday, would help solve some of those problems, which would have a serious positive effect on Kyrgyzstan's industry, where many of the republic's Russian speakers are employed.

The president said Kyrgyzstan's former military enterprises should have the same access to raw materials as such enterprises in Russia. "This won't be a one-way street. Let Russia own many of the shares in Kyrgyz enterprises. Thereby we will keep those enterprises going, providing work for tens of thousands of people," he said. It will also strengthen "the Slavs' confidence in their future," he said.

Kozyrev handed over to Akayev a letter from Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who expressed support for the comprehensive stabilization program for Kyrgyzstan's Russian speakers, work on which was being guided by Akayev. Russia is ready "to continue helping fraternal Kyrgyzstan economically as much as it can," Yeltsin said.

Kozyrev told Akayev Kyrgyzstan was one of Russia's closest allies. "I've always said that we are not indifferent to each other, although these days I'm accused of imperialism for such words. What can be more normal than saying that we are vitally interested in each other," he said.

"We, the people of Kyrgyzstan, are only too glad to hear that," Akayev responded.

Kozyrev said Russia's attempts to protect the Russian-speaking population in other former Soviet republics had nothing to do with imperialism. But "we cannot remain indifferent to restrictions put on the rights of Russian speakers, who are, for example, being ousted from Latvia," he said.

Akayev said he could trace no imperial ambitions in Russia's foreign policy. "Eurasia cannot be stable without a powerful and great Russia," he said.

According to Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister Askar Aitmatov, the Russian speakers' position in Kyrgyzstan does pose a problem. "It is a fact that there are certain things the (ethnic) Russian are concerned about. But at the governmental level everything is being done to eliminate the causes of that concern and ensure equal rights for the Russian-speaking population, as for all other citizens of Kyrgyzstan," he told INTERFAX.

In his opinion, the dual citizenship issue should be put before parliament.

However, Akayev, addressing the First Congress of Peoples of Kyrgyzstan last Saturday, said dual citizenship could be granted to residents of the republic on the basis of bilateral agreements and the right to it should not be formalized in the Constitution. He said all decisions on the issue would be determined by Russia's role as Kyrgyzstan's "main partner in all spheres." Earlier Akayev's press service said work on the dual citizenship problem would be "a constitutional process," not "an arbitrary decision by the president."

Akayev Addresses Deputies on Dual Citizenship

LD2201145994 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1353 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev believes that the republic's citizens can be granted the right for dual citizenship in accordance with bilateral agreements and should be not fixed as a constitutional norm.

He declared about this on Saturday at the opening of the first Kurultai (congress) of Kyrgyzstan's peoples. At the same time Akayev underlined that he would solve the problem of dual citizenship minding Russia's priority significance "as the major partner in all spheres."

According to the Kyrgyz leader, "the Russian language has been and remains the second one" for the republic's all peoples. Akayev is convinced that it is necessary "to strive for trilinguality which is to become the basis of mentality of Kyrgyzstan's single people" (saying trilinguality, Akayev believes that all citizens of the republic must fluently speak the Kyrgyz, Russian, and English languages—Interfax). He pointed out that the lingual factor "should not be a dominating one" during educating process and job placement.

Akayev called formation of a maximum favorable climate for joint existence of all nations and citizens as a necessary condition to activate consolidation of all ethnic groups into Kyrgyzstan's "single people." After the compatriots perceive their multinational unity, there will appear "a public atmosphere of aversion to nationalism and chauvinism."

Tajikistan

Foreign Minister Rejects Iranian Mediation Offer

NC2601074994 Paris AFP in English 1715 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tehran, Jan 25 (AFP)—Tajik Foreign Minister Rashid Alimov on Tuesday called on all Tajiks to take part in general elections in July, and said the Islamic opposition should play an active role in restoring peace to the central Asian republic.

Alimov, attending a ministerial meeting of the 10-member Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO) in Tehran, told AFP he appreciated an Iranian offer to help end the civil war in Tajikistan, where government forces have been fighting Muslim fundamentalists for more than a year.

However, Tajikistan "prefers the crisis to be resolved through wider efforts undertaken by the United Nations," he added.

Alimov said the government intended to hold general elections in July and called on Tajiks inside and outside the country to take part.

Last week Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 'Abbas Maleki said Iran had launched mediation efforts to end the conflict, following a request from four other Muslim central Asian states—Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

He said Iran was determined to use its influence to restore security to Tajikistan, and had already held talks with Tajik opposition leaders.

Pro-communist forces seized power in the Tajik capital Dushanbe in December 1992, toppling the ruling coalition of democratic and Islamic forces.

Iran has so far adopted a low profile toward the conflict to avoid antagonising the newly-independent central Asian states, with which it has been trying to boost economic and cultural ties.

Iranian President 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani opened the fourth session of the ECO Council of Ministers in Tehran on Tuesday with a call for an end to conflicts in central Asia and the Caucasus.

Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati told AFP the crisis in Tajikistan may be discussed during the two-day meeting.

The ECO was founded in 1985 by Iran, Turkey and Pakistan and expanded in 1991 to include Afghanistan as well as the former Soviet republics of Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

Russian Troops Strike Opposition Strongholds, Mojahedin

LD2601072994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0715 GMT 26 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Roman Zadunaiskiy]

[Text] Moscow January 26 TASS—The Russian border guards in Tajikistan delivered two preventive strikes overnight on the strongholds of Tajik opposition and Mojahedin in Afghanistan and on the routes which the militants were expected to use to penetrate in Tajikistan, a spokesman of the Russian frontier troops in Moscow told TASS on Wednesday.

The spokesman gave no further details.

Turkmenistan

Role of Russian Troops on Border Analyzed

PM2601104394 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 25 Jan 94 First Edition p 6

[Vladimir Berezovskiy report under "Near Neighbors" rubric: "Forces Have United on the Border"]

[Text] Ashgabat—Boris Yeltsin and Saparmurad Niyazov signed an intergovernmental agreement in Ashgabat last December on joint guarding of Turkmenistan's border and on the Russian servicemen's status. What gave rise to this document, and what has it changed in the life of our soldiers? Vladislav Shunevich, chief of staff and first deputy commander of Turkmenistan's border troops, speaks:

"Turkmenia's state border has always been complex. It is 2,472.1 km long. It extends over mountains and desert sands, along rivers, and across the Caspian. In the old union it was 'covered' by the Central Asia Border District. As of 11 August 1992 the guarding of the border passed entirely into the hands of Turkmenistan. I will not say that these changes caused a disaster. But the 'green caps' encountered serious problems. Owing to the rupture of ties with Russia, it became difficult to maintain in 'combat readiness' the various obstacles in the path of possible violators.

"In previous years it was mainly Slav officers and soldiers who were sent to the USSR's southern border. It was thought that they stood up better to the heat here and, moreover, any contact with Iranians and Afghans was ruled out on ethnic grounds. After Ukraine and Belarus demanded the return of their servicemen before 31 [date as published] November, and the Russian Supreme Soviet of its troops before 31 December 1993, a mass exodus began. Incidentally, the last six compulsory-service Russian soldiers left the border literally one month ago. Here I will emphasize that there was not a single case of desertion! As a rule, officers were transferred back home only after they had trained a replacement. Nevertheless, we have run into an acute shortage of professionals.

"A partial solution has been found. A school for junior officers 'forges' lieutenants and ensigns in the space of three months. Students drafted from higher educational institutions have closed up the breaches among specialists in communications and in motor vehicle and aviation hardware. University graduates have become deputy commanders for work with personnel, henceforth made up entirely of residents of Turkmenia.

"Today one-half of the officers are already Turkmens. But we risked losing the Russian servicemen who had stayed—the backbone of the commander corps. The first talks began under Russian Security Minister Barannikov. They soon reached impasse. The deadlock was overcome when Andrey Nikolayev came to head the Russian Federation's border troops. Much was resolved by his talks with President Saparmurad Niyazov of Turkmenistan—knots of problems were 'unraveled.'

"A joint command has been set up, headed by the commander of Turkmenistan's border troops. He has two deputies. I, the chief of staff, am one, and the other is the chief of the Russian Border Troops Operations Group, to whom all the Russian servicemen are subordinate. The Russian Federation has taken on their funding, while Turkmenistan will pay for the supply of hardware, ammunition, and arms. The most important thing is that the Russian officer can continue to serve calmly. He retains all rights and privileges indefinitely. You know, some officers who had tendered requests for a transfer have now withdrawn them.

"What is service like for the Russian officer in Turkmenia? There are no problems with housing or children's schooling. All school graduates whose fathers are serving in the Border Troops Directorate entered institutes or universities last year. Wages are paid at the officer's request either in manats or in rubles. There is no question of discrimination along ethnic lines. All the border detachment chiefs of staff are Russian officers. Yes, language problems do arise. But the Turkmens speak Russian, and all orders are given in it. Office work is also done in Russian.

"The signed agreement is also advantageous to Russia. Afghanistan remains a zone of heightened tension. The Turkmen leadership maintains close, good relations with the leaders of the northwestern provinces—Turan Ismail Khan and Rashid Dostam—but this does not remove all problems. Mass poverty is pushing Afghans into robbery and theft and the seizure of pastures and lands. The drugs business has assumed dangerous proportions in Afghanistan and is literally breaching the border. It is possible to speak purely hypothetically about a border service on the Afghan side, but many servicemen there, moreover, are light-fingered and live by smuggling.

"The Iranian border is a little quieter. A pass regime has been introduced there. But all kinds of things happen. A subunit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Lopushko recently tracked down some smugglers who were using three horses to carry a 150 kg consignment of drugs from Afghanistan across Turkmenia into Iran. The servicemen pursued them across snow-covered mountains for more than 30 km, caught up with them, and disarmed them after a fight.

"If Russia quits the Turkmen border, a muddy wave of crime and terrorism and a wave of drugs will swamp the Commonwealth countries. There have been proposals to move the border further north, but that is unrealistic. It would cost a colossal amount of money to equip."

Uzbekistan

President Says Future 'Inconceivable' Without Russia

LD2601103294 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1000 GMT 26 Jan 94

[Text] Addressing an international congress of industrialists and entrepreneurs in Tashkent, Uzbek President Islam Karimov said that Uzbekistan's future is inconceivable without Russia.

The president unequivocally favors the restoration and development of economic ties among the CIS countries and the states of Eastern Europe. At the same time he emphasized that the issue of restoring all previous interstate ties should not arise.

Karimov also noted that Russia continues - and I quote here - to play the role of a dictator with regard to countries which used to form the USSR. The disintegration of the ruble zone is a good example of this, the president of Uzbekistan claims, for it was at that time that Russia made its partners face the necessity of introducing their own currencies.

Presidential Decree Issued on Economic Reform

LD2401193094 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1642 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] An inter-departmental council for economic reform, enterprise, and foreign investment will be set up in President Islam Karimov's office. According to an appropriate presidential decree, released in Tashkent on Saturday, the new body will "promote economic reform, guarantee privatization, and encourage free enterprise in the republic."

The president gave the cabinet two weeks to form the council and one month to work out a privatization program to transform restricted joint stock companies into private businesses where all citizens can buy shares.

According to the document, shops and public services with the land they stand on can be bought by local residents and foreigners without declaring their source of income.

The decree lifts restrictions on the amount of hard currency and CIS money allowed for local citizens and foreigners to bring in and out of Uzbekistan.

Joint ventures producing consumer goods will no longer be taxed on their profits in convertible currency, if foreign investments in their statute fund do not exceed 50%.

Custom duties on all imports will be totally lifted by July 1, 1995.

The decree also lists administrative bodies authorized to permit the setting up of businesses and fix temporary custom duties on exports to CIS and other countries. It also lists commodities prohibited for export to CIS and other states. The prohibition applies to flour, meat, butter, tea, sugar, and artifacts of significant value.

As Finance Minister Bakhtiyar, a deputy prime minister, has reported, in the first half of this year the republic intends to introduce the "sum" - a national monetary unit that will replace the temporary coupons, now in circulation.

Speaking at an international seminar on banking in Tashkent, he declared that the main task for Uzbekistan in credit policy today was to attract more investment in key projects, primarily in the fuel and energy complex and in gold-mining.

He admitted that although the republic annually mined up to 50 tons of gold and nearly 90 tons of uranium, it had no policy of managing gold and currency reserves and securities.

Armenia

Azerbaijan Troops Reportedly Resume 'Offensive'

NC2501150094 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1330 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, 25 Jan (ARMENPRES)—Things are extremely tense in the Karabakh conflict zone. The Azerbaijani troops resumed their offensive against Mardakert this morning, but the Karabakh Army is halting the enemy attacks. An Azerbaijani tank was hit by 1030.

Active combat operations are taking place in the northwest of the war front. The enemy's army is trying to move deep into Mardakertskiy and Kelbadzharskiy Rayons. Again, the attack is being checked.

The Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Defense Army Press Service has denied an Azerbaijani Defense Ministry statement that claimed the Azerbaijani Army was successfully moving deep into Kelbadzharskiy Rayon and that the Armenians have suffered enormous losses (300 killed).

Incidents, Azeri Claims of NKR Losses Reported

NC2501204994 Yerevan Radio Yerevan in Azeri 1430 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] [passage indistinct] Azerbaijan's military forces have maintained their attacks against Matagis-Hakob-Kamari in the north of Mardakertskiy Rayon. The attacking units advanced considerably with the help of armored vehicles. The defense forces of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic [NKR] obstructed the enemy's advance at 1100. Latest reports said violent clashes took place in the area. There was positional fighting elsewhere on the frontline.

Azerbaijan's Air Force units have maintained their reconnaissance flights in NKR airspace. Several enemy fighter aircraft violated NKR airspace on 21 and 22 January.

Combat operations against the NKR were intensified again on 23 January. The HAY LUR NEWS AGENCY office in Stepanakert has revealed that Azerbaijan's military forces launched a three-pronged attack on the morning of 23 January. Reports said the enemy units were forced to retreat after losing many men in the clashes around Mardakert. The fighting around Martuni and Gadrut was continuing at noon the same day. NKR forces obstructed every attack and reinforced their positions in several parts of the frontline.

Azerbaijan's military forces launched attacks along the entire frontline yesterday morning. The HAY LUR NEWS AGENCY office in Stepanakert reported that clashes took place near [word indistinct] near Mardakert. NKR press and news agencies have reported that the freedom fighters hit a tank and killed nearly 20 enemy troops in the clashes. The attacks on Martuni and Gadrut resumed. The Armenian military forces obstructed the enemy attacks and reinforced their positions. The NKR Defense Forces still control the vitally important Omar Gorge. Reports said clashes are continuing in the area.

The situation on the NKR frontline is tense. In parallel with their attacks, the Azerbaijani military forces recently used their Air Force units in the clashes. The NKR Military Information Department has reported that two of Azerbaijan's military aircraft tried to attack Stepanakert at 1230 on 20 January. The NKR Air Defense Forces shot an attacking aircraft some 8 or 10 km from Stepanakert. The pilot's fate is unknown.

The NKR Defense Forces have obstructed all the enemy attacks on Agdam, Askeran, Gadrut, and Mardakert during the past three days. Azerbaijan lost 35 men in the clashes. The Armenian side lost two men. Six others were wounded.

Azerbaijan's military forces fired on the NKR positions with various types of arms yesterday morning. Azerbaijan's Defense Ministry has claimed that the Armenian side has lost 300 men and that Azerbaijan's military units have penetrated Kelbadzharskiy Rayon's inner areas. The NKR Military Information Service has denied that report.

Official Discusses Supply of Arms to Azerbaijan

NC2501214294 Yerevan SNARK in English 1445 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Stepanakert, January 25 (SNARK)—"In case Great Britain starts to supply Azerbaijan with armaments, it will contradict the UN Security Council resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh", asserted the Head of Foreign Organizations Department of the NKR [Nagorno- Karabakh Republic] Ministry of Foreign Affairs Masis Mayilyan.

These resolutions, added he, insistingly call states to refrain from supplying conflicting sides with any types of arms and ammunition which can lead to escalation of the tension. The information about intentions of the English business circles to conclude a bargain on arms supplies to Azerbaijan recently was spread by London daily THE INDEPENDENT.

Minister Comments on Cooperation With Georgia

NC2501213894 Yerevan SNARK in English 1344 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, January 25 (SNARK)—Home Affairs Minister Vano Siradegyan told SNARK today the attempts to establish active cooperation with the Georgian Home Affairs Ministry had no success so far.

"We repeatedly offered to organize joint protection of the gas main, the bridges and other objects on the territory of Georgia which are vital for Armenia. But each time we were rejected", said the minister. He added that the Georgian Government doesn't want another state's military units to be located on the territory of Georgia. "And this position does make sense" noted Vano Siradegyan.

Iranian Bank To Open Branch; Forged Money Noted

NC2501155994 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1330 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Yerevan, 25 Jan (ARMENPRES)—Bagrat Asaturyan, president of the Armenian Central Bank, told reporters that the Armenian coins known as lumas will be brought to the Republic. The absence of the luma is creating major problems, mostly in retail trade, and is causing artificial inflation in the price of some goods.

Asaturyan also said that Iran's "Mellath" Bank will be the first foreign bank to start operating in Armenia soon. The building to be allocated to the bank in Republic Square is not ready. The Armenian side is doing everything to enable the bank to start operating as soon as possible.

The Armenian Central Bank reported a noticeable flow of forged Russian rubles and dollars from Russia to Armenia. Circulation is helped by the existence of a foreign currency "black market."

Presidential Policy Backed by Only 18.9 Percent

MK2501142094 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 25 Jan 94 p 4

[Gamlet Matevosyan report from Yerevan: "President's Rating Plunges. Some Public Poll Results"]

[Text] According to the results of a poll conducted in Armenia by the Center for the Study of Public Opinion of the "Association of National Self-Determination" party, as little as 18.9 percent of the respondents support the policy of President Levon Ter-Petrosyan. Of those polled, 71.8 percent replied in the negative.

All in all, 17.5 percent would once again vote for Mr. Ter-Petrosyan. Incidentally, 52.7 percent of those polled at the time of the 1991 presidential elections voted for the current president. Hence, his rating has plunged in the past two years nearly three-fold.

The performance of the government and parliament is approved correspondingly by 7.7 and 6.9 percent of those polled.

Of interest is the attitude to the Constitution: those for a Constitutional Assembly comprised 8.1 percent, those for a referendum 21.5 percent, 9.7 percent of those polled are ready to entrust this job to the Supreme Soviet, and 20.7 percent were undecided on the matter.

Azerbaijan

Azeris 'Successfully Advancing' on Kelbadzhar

LD2501143994 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1414 GMT 25 Jan 94

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sevindj Abdullaeva and Viktor Shulman]

[Text] Baku January 25 TASS—Azeri troops are successfully advancing towards the south-western town of Kelbadzhar, earlier captured by Armenians, the Defence Ministry of Azerbaijan reported on Tuesday. Kelbadzhar is still being controlled by Armenians in spite of their heavy losses in recent combat operations.

The ministry experts associate the desperate attempts of the Armenian troops to keep control over Kelbadzhar with the existence of gold mines in the region.

According to the source, "in the past few days the enemy has brought into action even badly trained recruits" in a bid to hold the positions.

The Azeri military say that as a result of their latest military success, the Armenian troops near the town of Agderi were cut off from supplies from Armenia.

On Monday Azeri troops surrounded and completely destroyed a group of 240 Armenian servicemen who tried to penetrate the combat zone from Armenia, the source added.

Armenian Losses Reported

NC2501173094 Baku AZERTAC in English 1419 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Baku, January 25 (AZERTAC)—The Azeri National Army has succeeded in advancing towards Kelbadzhar in south-west Azerbaijan. According to the Defence Ministry, the enemy's troops in Kelbadzhar were repulsed to the frontier between Azerbaijan and Armenia while troops in Agdere [Mardakert] were cut off from their main base in Armenia. Armenian Armed Forces are still occupying the town of Kelbadzhar in spite of heavy casualties.

The Defence Ministry says that the Armenian Army headquarters try to hold the Kelbadzhar base in every way. Military experts consider gold-fields of Kelbadzhar a reason for Armenians staying there. Trying to hold their positions in Kelbadzhar, the enemy has thrown badly trained recruits into battle over the last time, the ministry says.

Yesterday the Azeri National Army encircled and destroyed a group of 240 Armenian soldiers, which has tried to break through from Armenian to Kelbadzhar.

Aliyev Urges Armenia to Withdraw Troops

LD2501204594 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1645 GMT 25 Jan 94

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[Text] President Geydar Aliyev says the Azeri army is setting an example of heroism reviving the nation's confidence, respect and love for its defenders. Speaking during a visit to an army unit on Monday, he said there was a revival of patriotic feelings in the nation and that latest developments indicated the ability by the Azeris and their army to defend their own lands."

Aliyev spoke of military successes notched up by the army on the frontlines of Fizuli, Kelbajar, Agdam and Agderin (Mardakert) recently and the nation's pride and joy over those achievements.

At the same time, the President said that Baku was opposed to war and still committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict. However, the Armenian army continues aggression against Azerbaijan by launching new offensives, he said.

Aliyev pledged commitment to further efforts for a negotiated settlement to the conflict saying appropriate contacts were under way to this end including Armenia. But he warned against further Armenian aggression saying his country would have no other option but to recover lost territory by force if that was not stopped.

The President called on Yerevan to relinquish the occupied territories of its own accord, withdraw its troops and respect the sovereignty and integrity of Azerbaijan. The war will end if the Armenian government fulfils those conditions, Aliyev said.

Leadership Rivals Interviewed, Profiled

PM1801140194 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Jan 94 First Edition p 13

[Article by Valeriy Vyzhutovich based on "recent" interviews with Ayaz Mutalibov, Abulfaz Elchibey, and Geydar Aliyev, in Moscow, Keleki, and Baku respectively: "To the Last Drop of Power"]

[Text] **Three Prophets in Their Own Country**

On 6 March 1992, under pressure from the armed opposition, Ayaz Mutalibov, first president of independent Azerbaijan, signed his resignation, only six months after being elected to the post. After an attempt to regain power which soon proved abortive, Mutalibov left the republic on board a military aircraft and has not gone back to this day.

On 17 June 1993, as a result of an armed rebellion raised in Ganja by Colonel Suret Guseynov, the newly elected Azerbaijani President Abulfaz Elchibey was forced to leave Baku secretly and return to his home village of Keleki in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, where he still is.

On 3 October 1993, by a nationwide vote, Geydar Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan, and he is presently exercising the powers of head of state.

All three consider themselves the legitimate president. All three lay claim to the role of father of the nation. Each of the three has his own view of the situation in the republic and his own action program.

I recently met with all three.

Audiences

In Moscow: I was helped to find Ayaz Mutalibov, who lives "somewhere near Moscow," by better informed colleagues. Secret contacts came into play, invisible threads were pulled, and soon, on the strength of a pledge to report the planned interview without bias, I was instructed to stay by the telephone for the next 15 minutes.

Mutalibov himself called. He said he was willing to meet, and dictated the address, on the condition that it was not to be handed over to anyone else. Half an hour later I found myself in a spacious, well-appointed, pleasantly furnished apartment almost in the center of Moscow, where, according to Mutalibov, relatives of his live and where he periodically meets with people he wants to see. So I too was unable to visit the dacha near Moscow which a businessman friend has rented for Mutalibov. The ex-president, his wife, and their son and his family have found shelter at that dacha for nearly two years now. The out-of-town house, whose whereabouts are known only to a very narrow circle, can probably be regarded as a place of political asylum too, since a criminal charge still stands against Mutalibov for failing, as president, to prevent the seizure and destruction by Armenian gunmen of the Azerbaijani city of Khodzhaly. "Aliyev says I could go back to the republic as an ordinary citizen and live there freely, unoppressed. That is not true. As soon as I turn up in Baku they will promptly arrest me."

We each drank a glass of Azerbaijani "Goy Gel" cognac and ate a slice of bread with black caviar, ignoring for the time being the expensive candies, nuts, and fruit. Then I gestured interrogatively toward the dictaphone, and my host nodded: "Switch it on."

In Keleki: Barely had the plane from Baku, arriving in Nakhichevan eight hours late, come to a halt on the tarmac, when I was intercepted at a passport check right there on the ramp. Having been escorted to the chief of the commandant's office, I was immediately subjected to questioning: Why had I come? To see whom? My newspaper accreditation only heightened this vigilant interest, as the Baku organizers of my meeting with Elchibey had warned me beforehand: Press attention toward the disgraced ex-president is not encouraged by the authorities; better keep quiet about who it is you have come to see, or else they will send you straight back on the same flight.

Having taken these instructions on board, I spoke very vaguely about the purpose of my visit, and as soon as they let me go, I made my way to the People's Front headquarters within 20 minutes; from there Elchibey's comrades delivered me to the rayon center of Ordubad.

There in Ordubad, in the building of the former KGB rayon directorate, is the stronghold of the ex-president's bodyguard, with two armored carriers in the yard and, on duty around the clock, unshaven men in camouflage uniform carrying automatic weapons. In the guardroom, no bigger than a lobby, I counted eight portraits of Elchibey, next to an "iconostasis" lovingly arranged on a wall made of empty cigarette cartons.

As night approached, in pitch darkness, we left for Keleki. Five people were crammed into a fully equipped UAZ jeep, including a man with an automatic weapon who hid under a tarpaulin. Three times there suddenly emerged from the gloom along the way a trailer perched on the roadside or some other kind of checkpoint, from which armed men sprang out, barring our vehicle's path. They demanded the password, asked who was being transported and what for, and, satisfied with a brief report, withdrew into the darkness.

The residence of Mr. President (I was instructed to address my lofty interviewee as that, and nothing else) turned out to be a village building apparently intended for public use, some kind of club or office—frankly I could not make it out properly, because there was not a glimmer of light around it; the blockade.... Here, I was told, the president works from very early morning until late at night (by the light produced by a small generator, or a kerosene lamp), receiving the information he needs by telephone, and also "from other sources." Nobody specified exactly what sources, but it was said that regular visits are made to Keleki by a few former staffers of the presidential apparatus who have remained loyal to Elchibey, retired ministers, and certain members of the Azerbaijani parliament. Moreover it was stressed particularly that the "legitimate president of Azerbaijan in exile" maintains contact, as is proper, with foreign diplomats and statesmen.

Apart from numerous relatives, Elchibey has with him in Keleki his wife and two school-age children.

I was instructed to present for inspection the bag holding my journalist's equipment. Then the chief bodyguard searched my pockets and the folds of my clothing with his own hands.

Finally the audience took place. Abulfaz Elchibey sat at a desk on whose smooth surface not a single object was to be seen except for the telephone and an ashtray. The entire expanse of wall behind my host's back was occupied by a map of Azerbaijan, and next to it the state flag of the republic was hoisted.

"I am pursuing a course of resisting the rebel power," Elchibey said, in his native language, from which he never once departed in a 90-minute talk simultaneously interpreted by an aide.

In Baku: At about two o'clock in the morning, the head of the press service cut short my wait: "The president will be working for another hour or hour-and-a-half, he sends his apologies." This could also be taken to mean that, at least until the time indicated, the state secretary, prime minister, head of parliament, ministers, and leaders of all the services of the president's apparatus also would not leave their offices. This work schedule was usual for Aliyev while he was, for 14 years, at the head of the republic, and it resumed when he returned to power.

Be that as it may, at the second attempt I was admitted to the official presidential apartments, which—unlike Mutalibov's and Elchibey's surroundings—I consider it superfluous to describe.

"I don't give interviews," Aliyev said, after a firm handshake, "I don't have the time."

That was how our two-hour talk began....

Now, having, by means of a newspaper device, placed the holder of real power on the same footing as two political recluses who have lost that power at the whim of dramatic circumstances, I am clearly not safe from objections on the part of Geydar Aliyev, whose status is undeniably not to be compared with the status of Ayaz Mutalibov or Abulfaz Elchibey, who, although they consider themselves presidents, are free of the burden of state decisions and the responsibility for them. This difference in the positions of three well-known Azerbaijani politicians, whose judgments and opinions, by creating a stereoscopic effect, help us to approach a calm, unbiased understanding of what is happening in the republic—this crucial difference should, I urge you, be kept in mind hereafter.

By Wartime Laws

On 2 November Geydar Aliyev addressed the people, presenting a detailed explanation of the reasons for the heavy defeats in the war, and called on citizens "to defend Azerbaijan from aggression by Armenian armed forces." Three and a half weeks later the republic National Assembly tightened up—with the stipulation "for the duration of the war"—the operation of a number of articles of the Criminal Code. Henceforth, evasion of the military draft carries the threat of five to eight years' imprisonment. For evasion of mobilization, a prison term of seven to 10 years is stipulated, or 10-15 years where there are aggravating circumstances. For absence without leave from a military unit at the front, there is 10-15 years' imprisonment, or even the death penalty.

Those are the wartime laws adopted by the Azerbaijani parliament and approved, according to December's figures, by one out of every two people polled by the sociological group of the republic State Committee for Statistics. The warring Azerbaijani clans and groupings build their relations by these same laws, having thoroughly grasped, for instance, this law: that a defeat in war is a defeat in politics.

So does that mean that losses and casualties at the front would suit some people in the republic?

A. Mutalibov: "I would give a straight answer if I had the facts available, but in any event nobody in Azerbaijan will be surprised by this question. A power struggle is going on. And some people will stop at nothing in this struggle."

G. Aliyev: "We are constantly observing a desire on the part of some political forces to reap benefits for themselves from our military defeats. These forces—first and foremost People's Front forces—are engaged in carrying out provocations in the Army, going out to rayons close to the front line and intimidating the population.... These forces have especially tried to create the conditions for the seizure of Azerbaijani rayons by the aggressors. We have information that these forces, as the main culprits to blame for the situation in which Azerbaijan now finds itself, wish to regain lost positions and wreak revenge...."

A. Elchibey: "I categorically reject such accusations against the People's Front. Geydar Aliyev is distorting the truth, to put it mildly. He must know that it was when we were in power that international efforts to settle the conflict became more active and the UN Security Council resolution providing for, in particular, the withdrawal of Armenian troops from Kelbadzharskiy Rayon, was adopted. Incidentally, this was the only rayon captured during my leadership of the republic. Whereas under Aliyev six rayons have already been occupied, and it is clear to everybody that the new authorities are unable to ensure the country's defense and incapable of crating a strong, professional army."

As of today 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory is under occupation. The country has 1.2 million refugees, providing for whom has already cost the republic budget 5 billion rubles, whereas several times this amount is required. Refugees are not given jobs. They are not paid benefits and pensions on time. Concentrations of refugees have unprecedented disease and death rates. As yet the new authorities have come up with very few successful ways to ease the fate of these unfortunates, unless you count the option suggested by the newspaper AZERBAIJAN, which is more than respectful to the president: "Guest houses, schools, and hostels do not need to be emptied to house refugees. The coziest refuge for a million refugees is Geydar Aliyev's heart."

G. Aliyev: "I consider that every family in Baku and other cities and rayons could take a refugee family. This would be very charitable. Some people have enormous houses and big apartments. Let each one of them house a refugee family. For my part, I recently instructed the Cabinet to take additional measures."

A. Mutalibov: "No measures will be of any help so long as the Karabakh map is a bargaining chip in the political game being played by the Azerbaijani clans, groupings, and individuals waging a bitter power struggle."

Reforms by Installments

A Baku black marketeer, who responded with alacrity to my request to be driven to Government House, explained to me his interpretation of the difference between the previous and the present authorities: "A year ago a traffic cop would sting you for 50 manats, whereas now the going rate is at least a thousand."

This has nothing to do with the change of authorities, of course. The scale of graft is also about the same as it was. It's just that the scale of prices is now different: inflation.... It has reached a rate of 40 percent a month.

At the end of November bread and gasoline prices were raised 750 percent by presidential edict. In response to a question from sociologists "how do you react to this," 29.2 percent of those polled answered: "Negatively—the edict will have no effect in terms of stabilizing the economy."

G. Aliyev: "Prices for the most important products should have been regulated at the right time, considerably earlier than a year ago. Rather than people engaging in populism. Azerbaijan has close economic and simply human links with neighboring states. The difference in prices between here and there had a painful impact on our already crisis-ridden economy, which, furthermore, is largely geared to defense. Measures had to be taken."

Only after bread in Azerbaijan started costing 22 manats (220 rubles) did the waiting lines for it diminish appreciably, but they have not yet disappeared. There are no waiting lines for meat, but it is rationed in the state trading network. As are sugar and butter. Admittedly "August" butter was only distributed in December, and there has been no meat since July. The consumer shopping basket costs 6,000 manats as against an average wage of 2,500.

A. Elchibey: "The whole point is that following the insurrection and my removal from power the National Assembly did not adopt a single law opening the way to market reforms. My edicts on privatization and the development of enterprise went unfulfilled; they were removed from circulation, as it were. At the same time uncontrolled privatization is steaming ahead. Mafia clans originating, as a rule, in the former party nomenklatura are getting their hands on plants and factories in exchange for big bribes.... Corruption has assumed a catastrophic scale."

A. Mutalibov: "Elchibey hoped that, severing ties with Russia and other neighbors, Azerbaijan would resolve its economic tasks by means of radical reforms. But this is impossible. Market reforms must be implemented simultaneously in all the countries of the former Union; it impossible to destroy what are virtually centuries-old economic links and break everything up at a stroke. I am a supporter of gradual and cautious entry into the market. Although I believe that the state hat which the republic's enterprises are currently forced to wear is preventing them from developing freely. This is the other, equally destructive extreme."

G. Aliyev: "Who is preventing, and whom? I even banned MVD and Prosecutor's Office organs from checking the financial and economic activity of state and commercial enterprises. Henceforth such checks will be carried out only by the tax inspectorate. I repeat: Our point of reference is a market economy, a combination and interaction of various forms of ownership. In the very near future parliament will again examine the question of privatization...."

According to data from a poll conducted by the "Mirror" ["Zerkalo"] republic newspaper, 70 percent of Azerbaijan's highest-profile entrepreneurs regard present conditions here as unconducive to private business. And to the question "How do you assess the prospects" 62 percent answered: "They will develop, but slowly." Here 48 out of the 50 people polled said that the decisive condition for the development or, conversely, the diminution of enterprise is the government's attitude to it. And they were practically all agreed that one of the main obstacles to the free and civilized development of private business is the corruption among state officials, who are continuing to struggle for power and spheres of influence. The nature of this struggle is evidenced, in part, by the fact that two-thirds of the entrepreneurs only agreed to participate in the study after being firmly assured that the poll would be anonymous.

In the Open and Behind the Scenes

Political skirmishes in Azerbaijan continue to take place in the open and behind the scenes. But now there is less shooting.

The opposition, whose ranks contain several parties of varying degrees of radicalism, is not reticent. The frontrunners here are the People's Front, whose chairman is still Abdulfaz Elchibey, and the "Musavat" party, headed by former parliament speaker Isa Kambarov. Both organizations regard Elchibey as the lawful president and Geydar Aliyev as an inveterate political intriguer who seized power through an insurgence.

In Isa Kambarov's view, Aliyev "is trying to govern an independent state using the same methods he used to govern a former Soviet republic." The "Musavat" party chairman also believes that, by refusing cooperation with any influential political force and relying solely on the apparatus, Aliyev is narrowing his social base and risks losing power within a few months if the round of military defeats continues.

G. Aliyev: "I am open to cooperation with all political forces. But you see what happens.... I offered National Independence Party Chairman Etibar Mamedov a choice of four state posts, particularly the post of foreign minister. He refused. Meanwhile there are representatives of various parties working successfully in the government, including people with a People's Front background.... Recently I held a meeting with party and movement leaders. Everybody came except representatives of the National Front, while the 'Musavat' party sent an observer as if we were having a meeting of some kind of official international body. This is all a joke...."

A. Elchibey: "How can you talk about any kind of cooperation with these authorities when human rights are being trampled underfoot. First a citizen is handcuffed right in the parliament chamber, then a few days later the question of stripping him of his deputy's immunity is raised. That was how National Assembly Chairman Isa Kambarov was arrested; that was how former republic General Prosecutor Ikhtiyar Shirinov was taken into custody.... Former Defense Minister Ragim Kaziyev was arrested and accused of corruption; former First Deputy Minister of National Security Sulkhetdin Akperov is behind bars.... There are currently around 40 political detainees in Azerbaijan."

G. Aliyev: "I don't know how many. This is criminal activity, not politics."

This—if not more so—is the pitch at which the confrontation at the top in Azerbaijan goes on, out of sight of the public at large. By carrying out a ruthless purge of the government and the presidential apparatus Geydar Aliyev strengthened his power by precisely the same extent as he undermined it by squeezing out his rancorous opponents in the shape of the vice premiers, power ministers, and other state officials put into retirement or into the dock, each of whom is backed by influential clans and groupings.

But the main source of discomfort for Aliyev, of course, is Suret Guseynov, the rebel colonel who successfully swapped his combat enthusiasm for the premiership in June. The new cabinet head's incompetence seems to be obvious to everyone in the republic, from State Secretary Lala Gadzhiyeva, who asked me not to ask her questions about Guseynov, to a semi-literate peasant tea-picker.

G. Aliyev: "He was appointed following a proposal from me and is working."

This was the briefest presidential answer during our interview.

A. Elchibey: "Aliyev cannot remove Guseynov yet. That would mean admitting that what happened in Ganja was nothing but an insurrection—that is, Aliyev obtained power from a rebel and them formalized it via a nationwide vote. Guseynov, on the other hand, is a puppet figure. He contents himself with his lofty title without having real influence. The ministers of defense, national security, and internal affairs are subordinate to the

Defense Council, which is headed by Aliyev. He controls all the key posts in the government. Aliyev and his people will never concede anything to us. They will fight to the last drop of power."

"Who Else?"

This is the general feeling. No matter who I spoke with anywhere in Azerbaijan (state officials and politicians aside), they almost all said the same thing: If not Geydar, who else will help us?

They trust him. Or rather, they trust in him. This desperate, maybe last-chance faith in a political messiah, a politician who will bring them salvation from the universal trials and tribulations, is already close to religious in some respects. To the question "who do you trust in the current crisis situation?" 77.8 percent of participants in a December poll answered: "Azerbaijan President G. Aliyev." He has to his credit: entry into the CIS, the restoration and strengthening of relations with Russia, the initiation of contacts with Iran and France, first successes in building a national army, the stopping of the separatist movement in the south of the republic, and the relative stabilization of the sociopolitical situation. On the debit side there are the six occupied rayons. Nobody here would be forgiven that number of defeats. For the time being Aliyev is being forgiven.

A. Mutalibov: "He is undoubtedly a highly experienced politician capable of skillfully controlling people and therefore the country. So when I became leader of the country I did not obstruct his return from Moscow and reacted calmly to his decision to return to politics. Unfortunately, counter to expectations, our relationship did not develop, in my view because of some of his past opponents, who managed to come between us...."

The people's trust in whoever is national leader is not boundless, however. At the presidential elections Abulfaz Elchibey obtained 59 percent of the vote, but last fall 98 percent of those who participated in the referendum gave him a vote of no confidence. Barely a year had passed!

Disillusionment with democracy? A reversion to type, to the old pattern of life? Neither. In Aliyev Azerbaijan sees not a former member of Brezhnev's Politburo but first and foremost a highly experienced politician, a ruthless pragmatist, and a competent administrator.

In Azerbaijan, Russia, and other republics which survived the disintegration of the USSR people today are less and less interested in ideological labels. They are less and less interested in the color of the flag and more and more interested in bread prices, the size of wages or pensions, and guarantees of peace and tranquility.

And there is increasing revulsion everywhere to a power struggle for its own sake, irrespective of who is involved or under what slogans. The experience of our troubled times brooks no delusion about the speed with which the last drop of power becomes far from the first drop of blood.

Georgia

Shevardnadze Dismisses Parliamentary Staff Head

LD2501154894 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1415 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 25 Jan—An IBERIA correspondent has learned that Hamlet Chipashvili, head of the Georgian parliamentary staff, has been released from his duties on the orders of Eduard Shevardnadze, Georgian head of state. He is blamed for failing to promptly make available the full text of the Geneva communique to parliamentary members.

The parliamentary opposition regards this as the head of state's political retaliation against parliamentary vice speaker Rusudan Beridze, who oversees the work of the staff.

Similar statements were made by the Republicans and Charter 91, who are Ilya Chavchavadze Association factions. The parliamentary majority, in fact, agreed with the decision of the head of state and the parliamentary speaker on releasing Hamlet Chipashvili from his duties.

Shevardnadze Seeks Tighter Government Management

LD2501193794 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1744 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] In a speech to the closed meeting of the parliamentary majority in Tbilisi late on Monday [24 January], Georgian leader Eduard Shevarnadze called to tighten discipline and law enforcement in all tiers of management including parliament, well-informed sources told Interfax.

Shevardnadze demanded that parliamentary chief of staff Gamlet Chipashvili be sacked. He blamed the official for failing to include the main point about the country's territorial integrity in a memorandum published in Tbilisi on the results of Georgian-Abkhazian talks in Geneva.

'Important Phrase' Missing From Abkhaz Communique

LD2501151594 Tbilisi IBERIA in Georgian 1415 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tbilisi, 25 Jan—IBERIA reports that at today's meeting of the Georgian Parliament, Jaba Ioseliani [chief Georgian negotiator at talks with the Abkhazians] stated that, for reasons unknown to him, an important phrase, "all volunteers are to be withdrawn from the conflict zone" had been dropped from the text of the Geneva communique distributed to members of parliament.

In Jaba Ioseliani's opinion, this was a deliberate act of sabotage on the part of certain forces, which should be studied by the competent authority.

Gamsakhurdia's Son Says Death Was 'Political' Murder

BR2501144494 Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Jan 94 p 3

[J.-A.F. report: "'My Father Was Victim of Political Murder,' We Were Affirmed by Constantin Gamsakhurdia"]

[Text] "Although I do not yet know the exact circumstances of my father's death, I do know one thing: It was a political murder!" Constantin Gamsakhurdia, son of the former Georgian president who died in early January in as yet unexplained circumstances, does not mince his words: In his opinion, his father, whom he does not suspect of having committed suicide, was the victim of a conspiracy.

Passing through Paris, he affirmed to us: "It is a typically Communist method to cast doubts on the circumstances of my father's death and on his death itself: Information is filtered to soothe emotions. If the Georgian population had immediately been informed about my father's death, it would have come out into the streets to display its grief. Constantin Gamsakhurdia agrees with the idea, put forward by his mother and endorsed by Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, for an international commission to investigate Zviad Gamsakhurdia's death, but he thinks it will be difficult to find witnesses: "Those who know how my father died are partisans. What will be done to them after they give their testimony?"

Gas Official Interviewed on Supply Problems

LD2301174394 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1900 GMT 22 Jan 94

[Text] The first deputy chairman of the Georgian gas department, Tamaz Gagua, gave an interview to Georgian radio today. Here is an excerpt from that interview.

[Begin Gagua recording] Our republic needs 23-24 million cubic meters of gas per day for the normal functioning of enterprises in winter. We still do not have the opportunity to buy gas in such quantities. Until today we were receiving 11.5-12.0 million cubic meters, which is about 45 percent of the demand.

However, since we were not fulfilling contractual obligations—as you know, all the gas comes from the Republic of Turkmenistan—we received a harsh notice yesterday morning. It said that due to a failure to fulfill contractual obligations—what they meant was the non-payment of a large debt in respect of a gas transit service—the gas supply would be terminated at 1800 hours yesterday.

This was followed by a message from Moscow. It was based on Turkmen information. The message was signed by a deputy chairman of the Russian joint stock company Gazprom, (Revizov). It said that at the request of Turkmenistan the gas supply to Georgia would be terminated at 1800 hours.

You can easily imagine what the consequences would have been. We did our best to put off the implementation of such harsh sanctions. After intensive talks with our colleagues we reached an agreement with them that these sanctions would not be implemented. However, the supply of gas was sharply reduced. Yesterday morning we were getting up to 12 million cubic meters of gas a day, while now we are being supplied with 8.5-9.0 million.

By a decision of the republic's deputy prime minister a government delegation has been set up and will fly, probably tomorrow, Sunday [23 January], to Turkmenistan for talks. We hope that this issue will be solved positively next week and that the supply of gas will be resumed at the pre-reduction level. [end recording]

Estonia

Army Chief's 'Insulting Statements' Protested

WS2501140294 Tallinn BNS in English 1116 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, Jan 25, BNS—Eleven Estonian MP's in a statement yesterday expressed their outrage at what they called insulting statements made to the press by the chief of the country's defense forces, Major General Aleksander Einseln.

Einseln in his statements recently has called the country's problem military unit, the Laanemaa volunteer infantry company, a "political mob" and has driven parallels between the unit and the Nazi groups in Germany at the beginning of the Hitler era in early 1930's.

Einseln, an emigre Estonian and retired U.S. army colonel, who returned to his home country and took over command of the defense forces last spring, has also been publicly critical of the Estonian state and people.

The MP's in the statement admit there are lots of problems of a complex character waiting to be resolved in Estonia, including problems in the defense forces and in the sector of the Interior Ministry.

"But all this cannot and shouldn't serve as basis for any person in the service of the Estonian state to disdain the Estonian people and the Estonian state," the MP's say.

The MP's who signed the statement say Einseln must publicly bring his excuses or an explanation of a possible misinterpretation of his words by the media.

Parliament Committee Rejects Call

WS2501203294 Tallinn BNS in English 1646 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Excerpt] Tallinn, Jan 25, BNS—The Commission for State Defense in the Estonian parliament today ruled to reject a draft bill calling for dismissal of the country's commander in chief, Major General Aleksander Einseln. The bill was submitted by opposition MP Katrin Linde.

Peeter Lorents, chairman of the defense commission, said the bill was turned down because it contained contradictions with the Constitution. Lorents said it was possible that Linde would bring the draft in line with legal standards and submit it to the parliament for a second time.

Lorents added that discussion of the draft had taken place in a peaceful parliamentary atmosphere.

Linde's suggestions were met with irony ranging to taunt at Monday's meeting of the parliament. [sentence as received]

The draft suggested the dismissal of Aleksander Einseln and revoking the earlier law on his appointment to office. [passage omitted]

Proposal on Altering Paldiski Status Accepted

WS2601101694 Tallinn ETA NEWS BULLETIN in English 0755 GMT 26 Jan 94

[From 26 January RAHVA HAAL, p 1,2]

[Excerpts] Wednesday, January 26—The government decided to approve the Justice Ministry propositions concerning the changed status of Paldiski pending the elections of the local council. Paldiski is to be merged with Keila to form a district of the latter, while the surrounding areas will be turned over to the communities. The government also discussed the powers and budgets of the government special representative to Paldiski, Juri Tikk.

A closed contest, held by the Economy Ministry, will be declared in order to purchase surveillance equipment for the border guard. The Border Guard Department was allocated the funds for the equipment. Prime Minister Mart Laar told the news conference that comparatively few offers have been made for the land border surveillance and the final decision can be made by April. Although the border guard preferred the Israeli company "Elbit", the government decided to hold a contest. Estonia has coordinated the purchases with Latvia and Lithuania, Laar added. [passage omitted)

The government decided to exempt foreign loans, foreign aid, credits with government guarantee and goods purchased for them from the sales tax. The equipment for the defence forces, the police and border guard, as well as presents connected with official visits, will also be exempted from the tax. [passage omitted]

New Governor Meets Russian Admiral

WS2601102994 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1829 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, January 25—Colonel Raul Luks, the Estonian governor for former Soviet submarine training base, Paldiski, in north west Estonia took office on Tuesday [25 January] and met the head of Russian navy's training centre, Admiral Aleksandr Olkhovikov.

Olkhovikov promised to present withdrawal timetable very soon, Luks said while adding another meeting would be held after a meeting in Stockholm on Paldiski reactors held from Tuesday to Thursday. The meeting was organised by the Swedish Foreign Ministry and besides Estonia and Russia also experts from U.S., Germany and Finland attend. The deadline for withdrawal is August 31, 1994.

Estonian Justice Minister Kaido Kama told a government briefing on Tuesday the government had supported Justice Ministry's proposition to unite Paldiski with Keila, a small town some 30 km from Estonia's capital Tallinn, pending local elections. This would be a step on bringing civil power structures to Paldiski, Kama said.

Local elections were skipped in Paldiski last fall due to Russian military presence.

Israeli Arms Shipment Reaches Tallinn Port

WS2601101994 Tallinn ETA NEWS RELEASE in English 1829 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Tallinn, January 25—Arms shipment for Estonia's Defence Forces from Israel worth $40 million was discharged at the Port of Tallinn on January 23, reliable sources told ETA.

Estonian government on January 7, 1993 concluded a $60 million agreement with state-owned Israeli arms company TAAS under which the company must supply Estonia with arms by end of 1995 and Estonia must makes payments by 2000.

The deal brought about a political uproar in Estonia resulting in ratification of the deal at Riigikogu's closed session on December 15 last year with 57 affirmative votes against 10 negative and two abstentions.

"The deal with Israel does not so much increase Estonian national defence than the will to defend Estonian state," Rein Helme, deputy head of the parliament's state defence commission, said.

Estonia bought from Israel automatic rifles Galil (5.56 mm caliber), machine guns Negev (5.56 mm), submachine guns Mini-Uzi, sniper's rifles, grenade launchers, mortars, antiaircraft guns, missiles, ammunition, radio transmitters.

First shipment arrived in Estonia last summer.

Latvia

Ministers Meet With U.S. Delegation

WS2501173694 Riga LETA in English 1300 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Riga, January 25 (LETA)—On Monday [24 January] the Latvian Foreign Minister, Georgs Andrejevs, and Defence Minister, Valdis Pavlovskis, met the U.S. delegation that included the Deputy Defence Undersecretary for European and the NATO affairs, Joseph Kruzel, the head of Eastern European Department of the U.S. State Department, Terry Snell, and other military officials. According to the press service of the Latvian Foreign Ministry, the delegation has come to Latvia to discuss possible cooperation between Latvia and the United States in military sphere as well as in security issues.

Andrejevs voiced his concern about the security of Latvia, particularly in respect of the radar base in Skrunda, because the presence of such site on the Latvian territory might cause various misinterpretations and incidents. The U.S. delegates said that, if the Latvian security was threatened, Latvia could consult with NATO and make use of the opportunities offered by the programme "Partnership for Peace". The head of the American delegation said that his country understood Latvia's concern over its security, therefore the contacts were being established to launch bilateral cooperation.

The talks also dealt with issues connected with the programme "Partnership for Peace". Andrejevs said that the Latvian Government was ready to sign the agreements on joining the programme. The U.S. delegation said that NATO was offering a possibility to consult with its advisors in order to find the best kind of Latvian participation in the programme. The guests also thought that the programme could encourage the Baltic States to cooperate on security issues.

Speaking about the defence problems, Pavlovskis stressed that they are mainly financial problems. The U.S. delegates said that a limited financial assistance could probably be obtained from the NATO.

Latvia-UK Investments Agreement Signed

LD2501151894 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] The United Kingdom embassy in Riga today told the Baltic News Service that Patrick McLoughlin, British minister of trade and technology, and Ojars Kehris, Latvia's minister of economics, signed in London on 24 January, an agreement on promotion and protection of investments.

In London Kehris took part in a conference of the Baltic states organized by British industrialists. Einars Repse, president of the Bank of Latvia, Uldis Vitolins, director of the development agency, and various businessmen accompanied the minister of economics to Great Britain. The ministers of economics and representatives of the central banks of Lithuania and Estonia are also taking part in the visit.

Addressing the conference, McLoughlin said that thanks to the contribution of various companies to the development of the Latvian economy, Great Britain has come one of the largest investors in that Baltic country.

Ministers Discuss Problems With Russian Army

LD2501173494 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1500 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Girts Kristovskis, minister of internal affairs of Latvia, and Heiki Arike, Estonian minister of the interior, discussed various problems concerning interests of the police and inhabitants of the two countries at the Latvian Ministry of Internal Affairs today. During the meeting the ministers acknowledged that it was necessary to work out a unified policy of the Interior Ministries of the Baltic states at conferences of the Interior Ministries of the CIS member states, in which representatives of the Baltic states are involved only as observers.

The ministers also discussed problems related to the activities of the Russian army in Latvia and Estonia, as well as other issues.

Lithuania

Brazauskas Sends Letter to Ukraine's Kravchuk

WS2501203194 Tallinn BNS in English 1646 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 25, BNS—Romualdas Ramoska, Lithuanian ambassador to Ukraine, presented on Monday [24 January] a letter from Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas to Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk.

Dainius Trinkunas, the Lithuanian president's foreign policy assistant, said the letter includes proposals on ways of improving economic relations, mutual settlements and exchange of Lithuanian and Ukrainian currencies. To attain these goals, Brazauskas proposed to create a joint Lithuanian-Ukrainian commercial bank, the presidential assistant said.

The Lithuanian president expressed hope that Kravchuk's forthcoming visit to Lithuania will stimulate further development of bilateral relations.

The Ukrainian president is scheduled to come to Lithuania Feb. 8-9.

Official: Belarus Extradited Criminals Lawfully

WS2501135794 Tallinn BNS in English 1116 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 25, BNS—Belarus extradited two alleged state criminals to Lithuania strictly in accordance with the Belarusian-Lithuanian agreement on mutual legal assistance, a high-ranking Lithuanian prosecutor's office official said.

As previously reported, Mykolas Burokevicius and Juozas Jarmalavicius, leaders of the underground Lithuanian Communist Party, were arrested by Lithuanian and Belarussian officials in Minsk and brought to a Vilnius prison Jan. 15.

The arrest and the extradition of the two communist leaders to Lithuania caused a political storm in Belarus. Some high-ranking Belarussian officials face dismissal.

Stanislav Shushkevich, chairman of the Belarusian parliament, told the Russian Ostankino TV Sunday [22 January] that Belarusian authorities had no right to extradite Burokevicius and Jarmalavicius to Lithuania.

Viktoras Markovas, chief prosecutor of the Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office, said on Lithuanian radio Monday that the problem in Belarus is dominated by political motives and in fact is an attempt to oust the leadership of the Belarusian Interior Ministry and the KGB.

The Lithuanian official said "what was undertaken, was done in strict accordance with the requirements of the agreement" on legal assistance. Markovas was among those who drafted the agreement.

The chief prosecutor said all necessary extradition documents were presented to the Belarusian side in advance, Belarusian officials considered the request and agreed to extradite persons who are not citizens of Belarus and are punishable according to the Belarusian law.

In Markovas' opinion, Belarusians should have assisted the Lithuanian side even more and to help transport the alleged criminals to Lithuania.

Burokevicius and Jarmalavicius are charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government and premeditated murder. If convicted they face from 15 years in jail to capital punishment. As a result of a military aggression in Vilnius Jan. 13, 1991, 13 civilians were killed and around 700 injured defending state institutions from Soviet tanks.

Slezevicius, Officials Meet Swedish Prime Minister

LD2401193594 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1700 GMT 24 Jan 94

[Text] Adolfas Slezevicius, the prime minister of the Republic of Lithuania, met Carl Bildt, the prime minister of Sweden, in Stockholm today. The talks lasted for an hour and a half. Bilateral regional problems were discussed. The plan Partnership for Peace, security problems of the Baltic Sea region, the possibilities for the development of cooperation between Lithuania and Sweden, and economic relations between the two countries were discussed by the two prime ministers.

Kazys Bobelis, chairman of the Seimas Foreign Affairs Committee, Deputy Foreign Minister Algimantas Januska, Romualdas Kalonaitis, Lithuanian ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Sweden, Lars-Aake (Nilsson), state secretary at the Swedish Foreign Affairs, Ministry, Tom Werterman, head of the CSCE Sector at the Swedish Foreign Affairs Ministry Political Department, Lars Magnuson, Swedish ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to Lithuania, and Jonas [name indistinct], Carl Bildt's adviser on international relations, were also present at the meeting.

Further Details

LD2501143194 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Lithuanian Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius met With Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt in Stockholm on 24 January. The prime ministers discussed problems of bilateral security and the security of the Baltic Sea region, the positions of both countries on the Partnership for Peace plan, and the possibilities and areas of cooperation between Lithuania and Sweden.

We are grateful to the Government of Sweden for the huge help granted to us in all areas, starting with the Ignalina nuclear power station and ending with environment protection, Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius told the ELTA correspondent.

Sweden welcomes the acceleration of the process of integration of the Baltic states. The Swedish prime minister's evaluation of joint efforts by the Baltic states to strengthen the control over the eastern borders, while implementing joint projects on the control over the airspace and maritime borders, was very positive.

Sweden will also help us to organize the training of the joint peacekeeping unit. It has been agreed that Sweden, together with other Scandinavian countries, will take part in the drawing up of a project of a trunk gas pipeline from the North Sea to the Baltic states. All the Scandinavian countries have interest in this project.

We proposed to Swedish Prime Minister Carl Bildt that the Baltic Institute in Karlsten should open a branch in Klaipeda.

The trade volume with Sweden in the overall balance of Lithuania's imports and exports comprises 3-4 percent. More than 70 Swedish-Lithuanian joint enterprises have been set up.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are setting up a council of ministers of the Baltic states similar to the currently existing Nothern Council of Ministers, which comprises five countries, including the Scandinavian countries.

Much attention was given at the meeting to the problems of the Kaliningrad region. It has been agreed to give support in various ways to the so-called Balladour plan and to aspire that a common concept on the demilitarization of this region as a guarantee to our security be formed. Dialogue between Lithuania and the Kaliningrad region is also important; therefore, the possibility of participation in this dialogue by the Western experts was discussed. The participation of Western experts in the preparation of agreements on military transit was touched upon. The experience of Western countries in this sphere is of great value to us; apart from this, the military transit through Lithuania should be coordinated with our neighbors, Adolfas Slezevicius told the ELTA correspondent.

Minister Denies Defense Treaty Signed With France

LD2501181694 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1400 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Linas Linkevicius, the Lithuanian national defense minister, has denied an ELTA report that he had signed a Defense Cooperation Treaty with France. Linas Linkevicius confirmed to a Baltic News Service correspondent that the text of the treaty was finally coordinated during a visit last Friday and Saturday in Vilnius by French European Affairs Minister Alain Lamassoure. According to the national defense minister, two possibilities of signing the treaty are being considered: Either the French defense minister arrives in Vilnius, and a corresponding invitation has been dispatched, or Linas Linkevicius will go to Paris.

The counsellor of the French Embassy in Lithuania, [name indistinct], told a Baltic News Service correspondent that the Defense Cooperation Treaty provided for the training of military experts, the exchange of experts, and consultations on various aspects of both countries' defense doctrines.

Envoy Presents Letter on EU Cooperation

WS2001105494 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 2124 GMT 19 Jan 94

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 419]

[Text] Vilnius, 19 Jan—A letter by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys was handed over to Greek Foreign Minister Karolos Papoulias by Lithuanian Deputy Foreign Minister Albinas Januska visiting Greece.

Gylys stated in the letter that Lithuania called to start the negotiations on the associative agreement with the European Union [EU].

It is noted in the letter that the dynamic development of economic and political situation in Eastern and Central Europe increases the necessity to create effective forms of integration into the European Union for the Baltic States.

Lithuania expressed its wish that the future free trade agreement with EU should comply with the commercial part of the associative agreement.

Gylys urged the Council of Europe to adopt the decision which would allow to transform the free trade agreement between EU and Lithuania into the associative agreement.

Greece presides in the Council of Europe during the first half of the year.

Brazauskas Addresses Procuracy Collegium Meeting

LD2501210094 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1500 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Excerpts] An extended meeting of the Lithuanian Procuracy Collegium was held today. It discussed the legal situation in Lithuania in 1993 and the Procuracy's future work. [passage omitted]

Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas made some remarks at the meeting. In his opinion, the investigation in the cases of corruption and in other cases which cause great anxiety to the people are being excessively delayed and thus unnecessary tension is preserved in society. [passage omitted] The president urged the officials to take all the necessary steps envisaged in the law to ensure that the cases of corruption and other cases are not delayed.

The President again explained his motives for rejecting the law on the declaration of income and property. According to Algirdas Brazauskas, there are no doubts about the necessity of such a law, but a system of its practical implementation should be created. The president stressed that the law must defend the interests of the state but not (?persecute) certain groups of people. In the opinion of Algirdas Brazauskas, a corrected law on the declaration of income and property should be implemented in several stages. At the beginning, high-ranking officials should be the first to declare their property—the president, members of the Seimas and government. In the future, all residents of the country should declare their income.

Algirdas Brazauskas stressed the importance of cooperation of all law-and-order institutions in combating criminals and in maintaining state law and order. [passage omitted]

Paulauskas on Crime Increase

WS2601101294 Tallinn BNS in English 1910 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 25, BNS—The present rate of crime poses a threat to Lithuania's statehood, Parliament Vice Chairman Egidijus Bickauskas said after a meeting of the Lithuanian Prosecutor General's Office collegium Tuesday [25 January].

Prosecutor General Arturas Paulauskas said over 60,000 crimes were reported to law enforcement institutions last year and this was the highest figure throughout Lithuanian history. The crime rate went up by 6 percent last year, but increased by as much as 25 percent a year earlier, he said.

In Paulauskas' words, the preventive detention law allowed to strike a heavy blow on organized crime, to break up a number of criminal gangs and to arrest underground bosses. But around 63 percent of crimes were not disclosed and sources that supply weapons to criminals were not destroyed. The number of premeditated murders, robberies, economic and financial crimes continued to increased, he said.

The collegium's meeting was attended by President Algirdas Brazauskas, who pointed out that the press "amuses" itself by writing about corruption and abuse of authority among officials. He urged law institutions to respond to such accusations "in a legal way" and as soon as possible.

The president said law institutions should establish closer cooperation among themselves and assured the meeting's participants that the state "does not and will not grudge" money to ensure law and order.

Bickauskas, who was present at the meeting, said an outbursts of crime was provoked by Gorbachev's perestroyka. In the lawmaker's opinion, "an absolute denial of Soviet laws" at the very start of Lithuania's national revival transformed into "denial of order," while constant changes in the legislation "stimulated legal nihilism."

The parliament vice chairman said law institutions "began to waver politically under pressure from both the left and the right, and gave up fearing they might be called the nation's enemies."

Bickauskas said the struggle against organized crime must continue, data bases about mafia must be created and agents must be infiltrated into criminal structures.

Opposition To Urge No-Confidence Vote in Spring

WS2501174494 Tallinn BNS in English 1414 GMT 25 Jan 94

[Text] Vilnius, Jan 25, BNS—The board of Lithuanian Social Democratic Party [LSDP] expressed no confidence in the government and commissioned the parliamentary LSDP faction to start a constitutional process of taking a vote of no confidence in the Cabinet during the parliament's spring session.

MP Aloyzas Sakalas, chairman of both the party and the faction, told reporters Tuesday that the social democrats will ask other political forces to back their initiative because six members of the LSDP in the parliament will be unable to start the process alone. Sakalas said the parliament will consider their demand only if it is supported by at least 27 lawmakers.

In a statement released last weekend, the social democrats mainly criticize the government's refusal to set a more favorable exchange proportion for people's savings during the introduction of national currency, as well as to draw a distinct line between legally and illegally acquired money.

The LSDP said the Cabinet does not observe the government program that was approved by the parliament, has not worked out a program for industry reconstruction and failed to draft an investment program.

TIESA Carries Text of Draft Defense Doctrine

WS2501120094 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian 13 Jan 94 No. 8 p 10

[Text of the "Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Lithuania (Draft)"]

[Text] **The aim of the defense of the Republic of Lithuania is to defend the independence of the Republic, its inviolability and territorial integrity, as well as to guarantee the security of all Lithuanian citizens from external threats. The defense concept is the total of political, economic,**

legal, social, military, and other measures that ensure the defense of the Republic of Lithuania, its territorial integrity and sovereignty.

This doctrine is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania, universally accepted norms of international law, U.N. General Assembly conventions and resolutions, and the principles of the national security concept.

The defense doctrine contains political, military political, and military technological parts.

1.1. The Political Basis of the Doctrine

The defense doctrine defines potential threats, the removal of which involves the Armed Forces.

External threats are established considering Lithuania's geopolitical situation, the possible aim of foreign states to restrict or abolish the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Lithuania.

The external threats are:

— an aggression of another state or military unions of other states;
— a civil war in neighboring states or an armed conflict between them that could spread to Lithuania;
— an invasion of uncontrolled military units or other armed groups;
— a large concentration of military force by other countries at Lithuania's borders;
— international terrorism.

Aggression is interpreted and assessed in accordance with the U.N. General Assembly resolution "On the Definition of Aggression" adopted in 1974.

The nature of threats decides the methods for their removal—political, diplomatic, military, and others. Priority is given to political and diplomatic measures.

Strengthening its security, Lithuania cooperates with other countries and international organizations on the basis of accepted principles of international law:

— superiority of the law;
— nonuse of force and intimidation by force in international relations;
— peaceful resolution of international disputes;
— noninterference into internal affairs of other states;
— equality of sovereign states;
— honest execution of international commitments;
— inviolability of borders;
— the principles of respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, and of cooperation among states.

The goals of Lithuanian foreign policy in the sphere of defense are:
— to integrate with international organizations:
1. The United Nations Organization;
2. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe;
3. NATO;
4. The North Atlantic Council for Cooperation;
5. The West European Union;
— to reduce confrontation in the region and Europe;
— to cooperate with defense security structures of the Baltic Sea region;
— to establish a defense union of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia;
— to sign bilateral and multilateral agreements guaranteeing the security of the Republic.

1.2. The Key Principles of Lithuanian Defense Policy

— Lithuania does not consider any state its enemy and does not intend to begin military action first;
— Lithuania does not have any territorial claims, does not restrict the sovereignty of other countries, and does not seek political goals by force;
— the Lithuanian Army is directed only against the violators of the country's sovereignty;
— Lithuania does not produce, deploy, or spread chemical, nuclear, biological, and other weapons of mass destruction;
— the Lithuanian Army can be used outside the country only in accordance with international commitments;
— the state does not tolerate the participation of Lithuanian citizens in military operations abroad;
— the Republic of Lithuania seeks the resolution of international disputes by peaceful measures;
— Lithuania's territory and air space cannot be used for aggression against other states;
— national defense is a universal armed resistance of citizens;
— civilian control over military activities;
— international cooperation in combating international terrorism.

2. The Military Policy

2.1. The Goals of the State in the Sphere of Defense

The defense of the Republic of Lithuania is the constitutional right and commitment of every Lithuanian citizen.

The military policy of the Republic of Lithuania, its military structures, and the manner of their arming must comply with the following key principles:
— to **discourage** a potential enemy from aggressive action;
— in case of aggression, to**defend** the state with minimum losses to society.

The Armed Forces must stop the enemy, force him to retreat, and restore territorial integrity and public peace.

In case of aggression, Lithuania chooses suitable modes and measures for defense.

2.2. Armed Forces and Military Measures Guaranteeing the Security and Defense of the State

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Lithuania is a system of state institutions, an armed force defending the independence and territorial integrity of the state.

In case of military aggression, the Armed Forces and state management institutions are reorganized in line with the law of the Republic of Lithuania.

The Republic of Lithuania conducts the policy of state security and defense along two lines:
- — preparing state institutions and society for state defense;
- — participating in international processes strengthening security.

Preparing its society, Armed Forces, and other state institutions for defense, Lithuania adopts the following measures:
- — upgrades the Army and its management system, and ensures control over the border and the air space;
- — strengthens the defense of the state borders;
- — supports social patriotic organizations seeking the formation of a proper state reserve of material resources, mobilization, the autonomy of armament in use, and the consideration of defense requirements.

Defense seeks to win enough time for the organization and rallying of international assistance. The state defense force is rallied to inflict the largest moral, physical, and political damage on the aggressor, and force him to renounce further aggression.

The basis of the defense system of the Republic of Lithuania is the Army.

The Army of the Republic of Lithuania is created:
- — following the principles of international law and the experience of Lithuania and other countries in forming and upgrading their military structures;
- — applying the principle of mixed recruiting;
- — considering the state's possibilities and demands to sustain the defense force;
- — expanding the system of centralized management;
- — upgrading the Army structure, technical and material supply, management system, and creating conditions for the integration with NATO and the West European Union.

2.3. The Nature of Potential Conflicts and War Action

In case of an **armed border conflict**, the latter is localized and suppressed by applying simultaneous political measures for its regulation. The localization is conducted by the state border defense service.

In case of an invasion into the territory of the Republic of Lithuania, the penetration of the enemy inside the country is halted, territorial integrity and the state border are restored, and the situation is normalized through political measures. The enemy is halted and the situation is stabilized by the Lithuanian Army.

In case of open aggression against the Republic of Lithuania, the entire state defense potential is concentrated to repulse aggression, by mobilizing the community and all material resources and adopting political measures for the acquisition of international assistance.

Weapons of mass destruction can be used against the Republic of Lithuania indirectly if:
- — Lithuania is in the zone of confronting states or their groups;
- — accidents and catastrophes at nuclear facilities, chemical enterprises, and other entities of increased danger are caused artificially.

After the use of weapons of mass destruction the key goal of the state defense system is to defend society against its effects.

3. The Goals of the Military Technology Policy

3.1. Goals

To maintain the necessary potential of the Armed Forces guaranteeing successful resistance against the enemy's aggression by considering economic and financial possibilities:
- — to discourage foreign states from using armed forces against the Republic of Lithuania for their political and economic interests;
- — to create economic conditions and scientific potential in supplying the Armed Forces with up-to-date technology and armament.

The priorities in supplying and arming the Army are:
- — the material supply and social guarantees of servicemen;
- — the upgrading of the management system;
- — the mobility and autonomy of action, and the strengthening of its fire potential;
- — the protection of key state and military facilities against enemy attacks from the air;
- — suitable measures of radio electronic suppression.

3.2. The Structure and Goals of the State Defense System

The state defense system in time of peace is comprised of:
- — the Army of the Republic of Lithuania;
- — the state border defense service;
- — the civilian defense system;
- — Interior Ministry units;
- — the state security service;
- — social organizations functioning at the National Defense Ministry;
- — other state institutions servicing the Army;

The state defense system in war time is comprised of:
- — the Lithuanian Army;
- — the state border defense service;
- — the civilian defense system;
- — Interior Ministry units;
- — the state security system;
- — militarized social organizations;
- — state institutions servicing the Armed Forces.

In war time, the Army General Staff is reorganized into the Armed Forces Staff.

3.3. The Key Army Goals in Peace Time:
— the prediction of possible military action, its aims and nature;
— the upgrading of Army structures, the creation and maintenance of military potential at a level that would allow for resisting aggression;
— the sustenance of a proper level of battle readiness in military structures;
— the interaction of the Army with other state institutions in a legal manner.

3.4. The Key Goals of the Armed Forces in War Time:
— armed resistance to aggression;
— the defense of the most important state defense regions and the key administrative and industrial centers;
— the mobilization of state and public material resources.

3.5. The Training of the Army of the Republic of Lithuania

The principles of Army training are:
— operative, tactical, combat, moral, and psychological skills to execute combat duties, considering the nature of possible military actions and the achievements of the art of war;
— the universal nature of units trained for war action;
— the patriotic military education of young people and servicemen.

3.6. The Army Upgrading:
— the maintenance of optimal proportions among different types of armed forces;
— the manning of the Army on the basis of the military obligation and contract service;
— the upgrading of management and structure in units and formations.

3.7. The Army Equipment:
— to expand the production of arms and technologies in the country;
— to design and manufacture facilities and armament in cooperation with foreign states;
— to buy up-to-date technologies, armament, and equipment abroad.

3.8. The Training of the State To Resist Aggression [subhead]

— to conduct the constant training of the state and its citizens for national defense;
— to upgrade the management system of the state and military structures;
— to establish new and upgrade the existing defense facilities;
— to engage in a continuous accumulation of mobilization resources;
— to stockpile state reserves to supply residents and armed forces in case of universal mobilization.

3.9. Cooperation With Military Structures of Foreign States:
— to participate in joint exercises, training, seminars, and other measures for upgrading the art of war;
— to train joint peacekeeping units;
— to cooperate in defending land, air, and sea borders;
— to exchange students of military schools and other specialists;
— to engage in post-graduate studies at foreign military training institutions and other types of military cooperation.

Drafted following the Lithuanian president's decree No. 164 of 11 May 1993 on the establishment of a working group for the preparation of the military doctrine (headed by V. Petkevicius).

[Dated] 15 December 1993

Today, we are publishing the draft military doctrine of the Republic of Lithuania for public consideration. As Vytautas Petkevicius, acting chairman of the Seimas National Security Committee [recently elected its chairman] (he is also the head of a large expert group that worked on this draft) has stated to TIESA, the document was drafted with great care for several months. The draft defense doctrine denies the propaganda that it is the opposition that is responsible for the president's decision to apply for NATO membership.

Premier, Defense Minister View Army Issues

WS2501150294 Vilnius TIESA in Lithuanian
20 Jan 94 No. 13 p 4

[Report by Terese Staniulyte: "There Will Be as Many Soldiers in Lithuania as the State Needs"]

[Excerpt] It is common knowledge that Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius was in Riga yesterday. However, the program "Radio Pressing Issues" broadcast a traditional interview with him. The conversation was recorded on Monday [17 January].

"The national defense structures have been assigned 130 million litai from the budget this year, which is 1.6 times more than last year," said the head of the government. In his opinion, this sum is insufficient to create good service conditions for soldiers and to feed them properly. However, one should not forget that our state national defense system is only shaping up, and there are shortages in many places. The prime minister reminded everyone that we received aid from the Swedes and the Danes. Therefore, the community has developed a feeling that we are dependents. Without such assistance from our neighbors, however, the independent emergence of a completely new structure of our state would be very difficult.

According to A. Slezevicius, after Lithuania has expressed its desire to become part of the collective security system (NATO), new demands will also be put on the Armed Forces. The standards of technology and tactics differ considerably. Therefore, according to the prime minister, we must think about the quality of our Army when seeking membership in this organization. A joint Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian peacekeeping force that is being formed now will be a certain test to our Army.

In the opinion of National Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius, the Army's quality depends on its commanders' training. That is why dozens of Lithuanian officers are constantly studying abroad. Recently, 30 young officers left for a training course in Denmark. Our traditional ties with Sweden, which L. Linkevicius visited a few days ago, and with other states of the Baltic region provide experience in forming the national defense system.

The minister does not rule out the possibility that in the future the Lithuanian Army will be recruited on a mixed basis—from professional soldiers and conscripts. Such a system can be accomplished in stages.

L. Linkevicius claimed that Lithuania's current Army is depoliticized, while the Riflemen's Union and other structures are operating outside the national defense system. According to the minister, the National Defense Ministry maintains relations with them and believes that it is necessary to have contacts with the community.

The opinion of the prime minister and the national defense minister on the notorious story of Army equipment is as follows: It is too early to make any conclusions. How will the national defense system spend the money allotted to it this year? The defense doctrine and its functions define the amount of finances to be assigned to it. Minister L. Linkevicius assured that the money would not be wasted.

The defense doctrine will also reply to the question whether the Lithuanian Army is not too large for a small country. The defense of borders alone will require a constant number of 5,000 guards. [passage omitted]

Seimas Objects to Agricultural Reform Decision

LD2001093294 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2200 GMT 19 Jan 94

[Text] The Lithuanian Constitutional Court decided on Wednesday that the Seimas decision on the main guidelines of agricultural reform was in its form contrary to the Constitution. The document adopted by the Seimas on the initiative of the majority of the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party last June has provoked dissatisfaction of some strata of the society and of the Seimas opposition. According to them, the main guidelines of agricultural reform were hampering a historically just restoration of land property in the country.

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